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Hostility to copyright has a long and honorable history. In the nineteenth century, for example, Lord Macaulay argued that while copyright might be necessary to ensure a "supply of good books," the
monopoly that it imposed was at best a necessary evil.
For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought
not to last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing
the good.'
A number of studies critical of intellectual property followed in our
century. 2 The most well known is probably the economically oriented
1970 study by Stephen Breyer (then a professor, now a federal appellate judge) who argued that the "case for copyright protection is weak,"
particularly as applied to certain classes of works. 3 The trend has continued. In 1988 William Fisher published a lengthy article recommending that the "fair use" doctrine 4 be reformulated to deny
enforcement of copyright claims that conflict with particular economic
1. THOMAS MACAULAY, Speech Before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in 8 THE
WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 199 (Lady Trevelyan ed. 1866) (opposing a bill which would
have extended the duration of copyright protection).
2. See the sources in collected note 25 infra.
3. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Casefor Copyright: A Study of Cop)right in Books, Photocopies,
and Computer Programs,84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 350 (1970) [hereinafter Breyer, The Uneasy Case];
see also id. at 283-84; Stephen Breyer, Copyright. A Reoinder, 20 UCLA L. REv. 75 (1972).
4. The "fair use" doctrine privileges acts that would otherwise constitute copyright infringement. Congress recognized this judicially created and protean doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982) (permitting "the fair use of a copyrighted work...
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies
for classroom use), scholarship, or research").
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or utopian goals. 5 Even more recently, Tom Palmer has attacked all
intellectual property as illegitimate for giving rights beyond what would6
be available under the common law of tangible property and contract.
Most of the critics of intellectual property have not challenged the
concept of private property in other contexts. This pattern is the reverse of what might be expected, since many of the most common criticisms addressed to the institution of private property are less applicable
to authors' claims over their works. For example, private property has
been strenuously criticized on the ground that it impedes full human
development by allowing workers to be separated from the fruits of
their labor. 7 Patent and copyright, by contrast, extend the power of
creative persons to control what they have made.8 Nevertheless, in
some quarters intellectual property has been hard put to hold its own.
The special burdens scholars place on copyright may have their origins in public perception.9 There is often a distrust of copyright when
its compulsions conflict with the usual expectations people have of the
freedoms they should be entitled to exercise over their physical posses5. See generally William W. Fisher III, Reconstructingthe Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659 (1988). I discuss Fisher's position further at text accompanying notes 407-409 & 440442 infra.
6. Tom Palmer, Intellectual Property:A Non-PosnerianLaw and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261 (1989). I discuss Palmer's position further at text accompanying notes 313318 & 344-388 infra.
7. See, e.g., ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 160-66 (1984) (examining

Marx's view that systems of production in which "property as capital ... is in control" frustrate humankind's need for creative work. Id. at 163-64).
8. The primary protection that intellectual property law gives creators is a legal right
against those who would use or copy the work without permission. That right can be employed as a tool of creative control. However, it is also a form of wealth. Subject to some
limitations, notably the inalienable power to terminate copyright grants, see note 143 infra and
accompanying text, creators can sell this wealth. Since intellectual property law can ameliorate but not eliminate underlying disparities in bargaining power, economic need might induce an impecunious author or inventor to part with control over her work, and even to give
up the liberty to use it, perhaps in return for fairly small rewards. Thus, although intellectual
property improves the creative person's position, it can guarantee neither adequacy of compensation nor continuation of control.
The issues raised by the transferability and employer ownership of copyright are outside
the scope of this article. By and large, I treat the creative person as the copyright holder, and
do not focus on the special issues that might be raised when the copyright holder is an employer or assignee. This should not significantly distort my arguments since neither the normative issue most directly implicated by these distinctions (namely, the "personality" interests
served by copyright) nor empirical issues are the focus here. All that is necessary for the
instant analysis is that creative persons receive some increased potential for control and reward
from copyright, which they certainly do. I have therefore thought it beneficial so to simplify
the discussion and reserve the questions raised for another time.
For further discussion of the varying roles of creators and others under copyright, see,
e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 6-9 (1967) (suggesting that publishers rather than authors were the intended beneficiaries of England's first copyright statute); id. at 74-75 (suggesting that copyright also "serve[s] the material expectations and
psychological cravings of the individual creative worker").
9. For a general discussion of the role that lay perceptions have played or should play in
the development of property law, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 88-167 (1977).
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sionsY° In everyday experience, when people who buy records, video
cassettes, and computer programs are told not to use their own home
machines to make copies of them, or when radio listeners are told it
might be unlawful for them to tape music off the air,11 there is often a
feeling of unfair restriction. Another source for popular unease regarding intellectual property is that one need climb no fences to make
copies of intellectual products. The restraints are obviously artificial,
making the state's hand visible in a way a physical barrier does not.
One knows one is doing something wrong when one tries to sneak into
a neighbor's house or pick the lock of another's automobile; it may not
seem so obviously wrong to tape a musical recording or duplicate a
computer program that is already in hand. In addition, an act of copying seems to harm no one. 1 2 There is no perceptible loss, no shattered
lock or broken fencepost, no blood, not even a psychological sensation
of trespass. As a result of all these factors, ordinary citizens may perceive a copyright owner's intangible interest as imposing an "extra"
restriction, limiting their liberty in a way that ordinary property does
not.
Legal scholars show a parallel unease. Although lawyers and theorists have long recognized that property is not a matter of touchable
"things" but rather a set of rules governing human relations in regard
to resources,' 3 some commentators are concerned that certain objects
of intellectual property law are not sufficiently "thinglike" to be the
subject of "ownership."' 4 Thus, doubts about copyright often have a
10. As one commentator observed, "By the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision [Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (the Betamax case)],
much of the population seem[ed] to have concluded that it was perfectly appropriate behavior
[to use VCRs] to record copyrighted programs broadcast over the public airwaves." Fisher,
supra note 5, at 1732.
11. Although the Supreme Court has ruled that certain off-the-air home videotaping of
television broadcasts is fair use, Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417, it is not yet clear whether home
audio taping, with its arguably greater potential for harm to the copyright owner, is entitled to
the same treatment, see 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05(F)(5)(b)(ii) (1988).
12. On the role of "harm" and "benefit" in copyright, see text accompanying notes 190202 infra.
13. The Supreme Court has thus held that intangible interests can be "property." Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade secrets are "property" subject to the
protection of the fifth amendment takings clause). The Court wrote:
It is conceivable that [the term 'property' in the takings clause] was used in its vulgar
and untechnical sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen exercises
rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it may have been employed in a more
accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it. In point of fact, the
construction given the phrase has been the latter.
Id. at 1003 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)); see
also Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1928).
14. Timothy Terrell and Jane Smith present a sophisticated variant of such an approach;
they usefully concentrate not on physicality but on specificity. They have suggested that the
right of publicity so lacks boundaries and specificity that it should not be treated as an inheritable property right, but that other intellectual property rights might not manifest this deficiency. Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A
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remarkably spatial dimension. For example, Justice Holmes opined:
[Copyright] restrains the spontaneity of men where but for it there
would be nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit. It is
a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons or tangibles of the
party having the right. It may be infringed a thousand miles from the
owner and without his ever becoming aware of the wrong.' 5
Running through much of the commentary seems to be the perception,
whether spoken or unspoken, that intellectual property is somehow a
"sport," a statutory exception to the common law pattern, imposing
unique restraints on liberty. 16 Some critics seem to think that, as a
moral matter, consent by the individuals affected is the only sufficient
ground for imposing legal restraints on copying.' 7 As with the lay perception, at bottom there seems to be a feeling that having intellectual
property rights is less natural than having tangible property rights, and
that somehow the compulsions inherent in copyright require special
justification.
One can further speculate about the reasons for such an attitude.
History may fuel it. In England and on the Continent, governments
sometimes did grant "exclusive rights" over printing and manufacture
for unsavory ends, such as censorship.' 8 In my view, the origins of intellectual property raise questions quite separable from the issue of its
Conceptualand Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY LJ. 1, 28-54 (1985) (presenting and applying a concept of" 'thingness' as specificity"); see also text accompanying notes
167-190 infra (discussing the function of boundaries).
For a discussion of the role demarcation plays in reducing the harm that intellectual
property rights can impose, see Wendy J. Gordon, Owning the Fruits of Creative Labor:
Boundaries and Limits in Intellectual Property (Aug. 16, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the Stanford Law Review) [hereinafter W. Gordon, Creative Labor]. For a discussion of
the role that demarcation plays in encouraging the formation of markets in intellectual property, see WendyJ. Gordon, FairUse as Market Failure,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1605-14 (1982)
fhereinafter Gordon, Fair Use].
15. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908) (Holmes, J.,
concurring). Justice Holmes argued further that because of this intangibility, copyright
"could not be recognized or endured for more than a limited time" and is therefore uniquely
a "product of statute." Id.
16. "Copyright law is usually treated as an offshoot of patent law-as one of the two
queer branches of ourjurisprudence in which, by an exception depending on statute, intangible ideas
are protected." Kenneth Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 932, 932
(1939) (emphasis added).
17. See, e.g., 2 MURRAY ROTHBARD, MAN, ECONOMY, AND STATE: A TREATISE ON ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 652-60 (1962). Rothbard favored rights against copying, apparently on the
ground that creators could bargain with potential copyists as a condition of physical access
and obtain consensual no-copy agreements from them. Id. at 653-55. In his view, the copyright notice reflected such an agreement between authors and purchasers of copies. Id. at
654. He opposed rights against independent recreation, such as appear in patent law, because an independent inventor does not need to bargain with the original inventor and thus
would have no reason to bargain away his freedom of invention. Tom Palmer takes such a
view one step further. Palmer, supra note 6. Palmer opposes both copyright and patent, and
he argues for limiting creative persons to the rights that they could extract through contract
from the law of tangible property. I discuss these consent-oriented positions at text accompanying notes 313-388 infra.
18. See, e.g., B. KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 3-9 (origins of copyright in England).
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present functioning; but the circumstances under which the doctrines
first appeared may leave a residue of doubt. 19 Also, it is conceivable
that a preference for physical over intangible claims reflects unchangeable aspects of human psychology. 20 Or the attitude may simply be a
habit of mind left over from a simpler age, when reprographic technology, and laws to control it, were not part of everyday life.
Whatever its sources, the unease with intellectual property has conceptual components that this article will analyze. For example: Are the
compulsions of intellectual property really different from what appears
in other areas of the law? What importance should tangibility have?
Has the perception that intellectual property is "different" pushed
scholars to judge the institution by inappropriate or unduly demanding
criteria?
The question of appropriate criteria is raised in particular by the
economic commentary on intellectual property, where a search for special justification is discernible. That economics should be a focus of
attention is unsurprising, since both copyright and patent law are seen
as serving primarily economic incentive functions. 2 1 What may be sur19. Thus, Tom Palmer argues that "[m]onopoly privilege and censorship lie at the historical root of patent and copyright." Palmer, supra note 6, at 264 (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., ROBERT ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE: A PERSONAL INQUIRY INTO

THE ANIMAL ORIGINS OF PROPERTY AND NATIONS (1966) (suggesting that humankind is a "territorial species" for which physical space has a unique importance).
2 1. The constitutional clause is usually taken to indicate that the primary goal of copyright and patent law is to provide incentives: Congress is authorized to give authors and
inventors rights of limited duration "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Justice Stevens wrote that the Constitution authorizes Congress
to convey limited "monopoly privileges" "to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products
of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
For discussions of intellectual property's incentive effects, see, e.g., Martin Adelman, The
Supreme Court, Market Structure,and Innovation, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 457 (1982); Kenneth Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resourcesfor Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE AcTIVrrY 609 (1962); Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1605-14, and sources cited
therein; William Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17J. LEGAL
STUD. 325 (1989); Barry Tyerman, The Economic Rationalefor Copyright Protectionfor Published
Books, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971); see also Richard Adelstein & Steven Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Marketsfor Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 209 (1985) (presenting an evolutionary approach to the development of
intellectual property markets). For an interesting attempt to systematize the kinds of empirical comparisons necessary to analyze fully copyright's incentive effects, see S.J. Liebowitz,
Copyright Law, Photocopying,and Price Discrimination,in RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE
ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181, 183-88 (J. Palmer & R. Zerbe eds. 1986) [here-

inafter THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS], and S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect
Appropriability: PhotocopyingofJournals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945 (1985).
Several foundational works provide the background economists draw upon when analyzing intellectual property questions. In one of these, Harold Demsetz presents the "internalization of externalities" as the key function of property. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of
Properly Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 (May 1967) (papers & proceedings). Note that
copyright allows authors to capture ("internalize") the payoff from benefits their works generate. In addition, intellectual products have what are known as "public goods" characteristics:
They can be shared over a fairly broad range of use without diminishing any one user's enjoyment, and it can be difficult to exclude nonpayors from sharing them. See Gordon, Fair Use,
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prising is that economic critics have spent relatively little time examining how copyright facilitates the evolution of economic markets, 22 as
compared with the attention they have devoted to examining flaws in
the markets that have evolved. In particular, academic critics have expressed strong concern that intellectual property's incentive effects for
encouraging new works might be too weak to outweigh its so-called
"monopoly" effects on resource allocation. 23 Despite inconclusive emsupra note 14, at 1610-12 & nn.65-73. Private markets do not reliably provide optimum supplies of "public goods," and it is often argued that this failure justifies some kind of governmental intervention either to provide the goods directly (e.g., in the case of roads or national
defense) or to restructure legal rights to create the excludability on which private markets
depend (e.g., copyright). See Otto Davis & Andrew Whinston, On the DistinctionBetween Public

and Private Goods, 57 AM. EcoN. REV. 360 (May 1967) (papers & proceedings) (general discussion of public goods); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of PublicExpenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &

STATIsTrcs 387 (1954) (foundational analysis of public goods).
Providing incentives for the creation of new works is not the only economic role intellectual property plays. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &

EcoN. 265 (1977) (suggesting that patents are also important in order to organize efficiently
the development and exploitation of existing inventions); Robert Denicola, InstitutionalPublicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandisingof Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C.L. REV. 603, 637-41

(1984) (applying a similar analysis to trademarks).
Note that although the Supreme Court's analyses continue to treat the provision of economic incentives to produce new works as important, an "authors' rights" or fairness-based
strain of analysis has also emerged. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 546 (1985); notes 449-450 infra and accompanying text.
22. Some economic treatments sympathetic to copyright do exist, however. See, e.g.,
Landes & Posner, supra note 21.
23. Intellectual property law gives creators whose works have no perfect substitutes the
power to increase their revenues by restricting their production of copies and charging for
each a price in excess of marginal cost. At the extreme, this can amount to monopoly power.
Economists discussing monopoly usually consider the decrease in quantity as the evil to be
avoided. As a result of monopoly pricing, fewer consumers will purchase copies than would
under conditions of perfect competition. SeeJACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONs 238-44 (3d ed. 1984); Fisher, supra note 5 at 1700-04; Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at
1605-14.
Perfect price discrimination would make it possible to induce the creator to produce both
the work and the optimal number of copies. Of course, this would also enable the producer to
capture all the consumer surplus. See Harold Demsetz, The PrivateProductionof Public Goods, 13

J.L. & ECON. 293 (1970).
The possibilities of price discrimination aside, intellectual property's ability to generate
incentives does bring with it some quantity reduction. The notion of copyright's causing a
decrease in the number of copies purchased may seem odd, however, since the creator may
not have fashioned the particular intellectual product at all had she not been able to look
forward to the economic returns made possible by copyright. In other words, sometimes the
alternative to copyright may be zero copies rather than more copies. For a model of quantitative analysis that takes this potential paradox into account, see Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,supra note 21, at 186-88. Copyright supporters tend to argue

that any short-run consumer loss that results from monopoly effects is more than compensated for by copyright's ability in the long-run to cause new works to be created. Copyright
critics tend to make the opposite empirical claim.
The balance between incentive and restriction is not always the same. For example, any
particular book, movie, or invention is likely to face competition from other books, movies, or
inventions which are near but not perfect substitutes. The extent to which monopoly power is
present in any particular case is an empirical question. See Edmund Kitch, Patents:Monopolies
or Property Rights?, in THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS

AND COPYRIGHTS,

supra note 21, at 31.

In addition to the quantity issue, the matter of price has normative implications. In everyday life, one common judgment of unfairness is that something costs more than it "should."
Macaulay suggested there is a moral aspect to the shift in consumer buying patterns that can
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pirical evidence, 24 a fairly wide range of encouragement-oriented comof intellectual
mentary centers on the possibility that the institution
25
property is not carrying its economic weight.
This article will address three issues inherent in intellectual property criticism: (1) the descriptive question of whether the structure and
function of intellectual property is essentially different from, or consistent with, the patterns found in other areas of the law; (2) the normative
question of whether copyright should be condemned because it imposes state-enforced restraints on potential copiers; and (3) the normative question of the proper role that economic analysis should play in
occur as books become more expensive: Copyright "is a tax on readers for the purpose of
giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the most
innocent and most salutary of human pleasures; and never let us forget, that a tax on innocent
pleasures is a premium on vicious pleasures." T. MACAULAY, supra note 1, at 201. Of course,
as book prices go down, there is no guarantee that the consumers will spend the cost savings
in ways that would please Macaulay or anyone else; there are many variant noneconomic conceptions of what is socially desirable.
24. Part of the difficulty is methodological. See George Priest, What Economists Can Tell
Lawyers About Intellectual Property, in THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND CoPYRIGrrs, supra note

21, at 19 ("[I]n the current state of knowledge, economists know almost nothing about the
effect on social welfare of the patent system or of other systems of intellectual property." Id
at 21.).
25. See notes 396-401 infra and accompanying text. Judge Breyer's work represents the
leading modern analysis suggesting that copyright might not be economically justifiable. See
Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3 (arguing that in several areas copyright is so unnecessary
to securing remuneration that portions of the proposed statutory revisions then under consideration that would grant additional protections to authors would be inadvisable); see also
Breyer, Copyright:A Rejoinder, supra note 3. For an earlier analysis reflecting similar judgments
about the economics of copyright, see Arnold Plant, The EconomicAspects of Copyright in Books, 1
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 167 (1934) (arguing that publishers have ample means other than copyright
to obtain remuneration and suggesting that instead of a long copyright term, a compulsory
license arrangement should be imposed five years after publication so that "the public would
no longer have to wait more than five years for cheap copies of the books they wish to buy."
Id. at 196); see also Robert Hurt & Robert Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56
AM. ECON. REV. 421 (May 1966) (papers & proceedings) (stating what came to be the standard
economic analysis-weighing incentive effects against restrictions on access-and concluding
that the welfare effects of copyright required more empirical investigation).
In addition, there is some concern that any extra profits accrued by virtue of the intellectual property monopoly may not aid incentives toward creation but rather may be "dissipated
through competition for the monopoly." SJ. Liebowitz, The Betamax Case 30 n.4 (Aug. 16,
1984) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
The efficiency aspects of intellectual property continue to be an active concern among
economists and economically oriented lawyers. See, e.g, THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS, supra note 21; William R. Johnson, The Economics of Copying, 93J. POL. ECON. 158
(1985); Ian Novos & Michael Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection, 92 J. PoL.
ECON. 236 (1984).
Much of the debate concerning the economic aspects of copyright surfaces within the
context of fair use law. For varying uses of economics in that context, see Fisher, supra note 5,
at 1698-1744 (analyzing how a court might restructure the law of infringement and fair use if
its goal were solely to maximize economic value); Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14 (suggesting
that efficiency gains can justify fair use where, because of market failure, enforcing the copyright would not yield the copyright holder substantial revenues); Liebowitz, Copyright Law,
Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,supra note 21 (suggesting that copyright protection may
be undesirable and "fair use" preferable where "the benefits of increased consumption appear to outweigh the harm from reduced production." Id. at 188); see also Adelstein & Peretz,
supra note 21 (evolutionary approach).
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justifying copyright. On the first issue, I will show that the perception
of difference is largely erroneous and that copyright is actually more
consistent with the common law pattern than a lack of copyright would
be. On the second issue, regarding the evils of compulsion, I will argue
that consent cannot stand alone as a criterion of moral adequacy. On
the third issue, economics, I will show that the special economic tests to
which most critics subject copyright are premised on questionable
foundations. In my view economics provides an important descriptive
tool for understanding the operation of copyright law, and certain economic criteria can even provide useful guidance in interpreting some
areas of ambiguity or "open texture" in the current statute. But I argue
that "wealth maximization," as an aggregative criterion that disregards
the possibility of independently derived individual rights, cannot serve
as an acceptable foundation for the initial assignment of entitlements.
The article concludes that inquiries based on consistency, consent, and
economics do not impair, and often offer affirmative support to, the
legitimacy of intellectual property.
There are other important issues, notably the possibility that intellectual property rights may inhibit freedom of speech. 2 6 Plaintiffs in
several recent copyright infringement suits appear to have been motivated at least in part by the copyright owner's desire to silence personally objectionable views, 27 to forestall discussion of a subject the
copyright owner wanted kept out of the public eye, 2 8 or to control pub26. For example, Lord Macaulay argued that copyright might result in works being "totally suppressed or grievously mutilated." T. MACAULAY, supra note 1, at 204. He was concerned particularly with suppression that might occur when the copyright had passed to heirs
unsympathetic to the author's works. See id. at 204-08. For commentary concerned with suppression issues in the copyright area, see, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech:
ConstitutionalLimitations on the Protectionof Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLuM. L. REV. 983, 988-90 (1970); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing FirstAmendment Defenses in Right of Publicityand Copyright Cases,
57 TUL. L. REV. 836 (1983).
27. The sons ofJulius and Ethel Rosenberg sued Louis Nizer for copyright infringement
for using many quotations from the Rosenbergs' letters in his book about the Rosenberg
executions. Meeropol v. Nizer, 417 F. Supp. 1201, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding fair use as a
matter of law), revzd and remanded, 520 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013
(1978). Nizer's book was viewed by some as being "sensationalized and partly inaccurate."
See, e.g., WILLAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 78 (1985). The trial
court was concerned that the plaintiffs "really desired a trial of the accuracy and fairness of
defendants' book" rather than on its use of copyrighted letters. Meeropol, 417 F. Supp. at
1208; see also New Era Publications Int'l, ApS, v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (critical biography of Scientology founder L. Ron Hubbard found to have
infringed certain of Hubbard's writings; injunction denied), aff'd on other grounds, Nos. 887707, 88-7795 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 1989). In New Era Publications, the trial court noted that
"[t]he record contains substantial indication that plaintiff's primary interest is to destroy a
book that is hostile to the Hubbard image," 695 F. Supp. at 1528 n.14, though the court did
not rely on that fact in refusing plaintiff an injunction, id.
28. A corporation controlled by Howard Hughes purchased the copyrights to several
articles that had been written about him and then used them to attack an "unauthorized"
biography with a copyright infringement suit. W. PATRY, supra note 27, at 73; see also id. at 72
(discussing "allegations that Hughes was attempting to suppress perceived unfavorable comments about him"). Hughes may also have been motivated by his ironically well-publicized
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lic perception of the copyrighted work. 29 Copyright law currently contains doctrinal protections for the free speech of copyright defendants,
such as the "fair use" doctrine, 30 and it would be worthwhile to discuss
whether additional limitations are mandated by the public's first
amendment entitlements. This article, however, pays little attention to
the first amendment question. Though it is my belief that the public
interest in free speech should indeed "trump" conflicting intellectual
property rights in appropriate cases, 3 ' the quest for a determinate set
of criteria capable of identifying all such cases of conflict would take us
too far afield from my inquiry into copyright's general legitimacy.
Thus, this article concerns itself with a limited set of questions, such
as: whether it is appropriate to place on intellectual property a special
burden of justification not imposed on other forms of property;
whether the burden most often placed upon intellectual property, that
it prove itself economically, is itselfjustifiable as applied by those commentators whom this article dubs the "encouragement theorists"; and
whether the alternative proposed by intellectual property opponents
has any clear claim to superiority. Even so limited, the field of inquiry
is broad. To keep the discussion within manageable bounds, the discussion will focus on copyright law and will refer to other intellectual
property doctrines (such as patent and trademark) only for comparison.
The article is divided into three parts. Part I is primarily descriptive.
Responding to the perception of some critics that copyright and its kindred doctrines are out of kilter with the common law, Part I draws many
structural and functional parallels between copyright and the common
law of tangible property and torts. Among other things, I suggest that
the set of boundaries provided by copyright serves largely the same
functions as the physical boundaries of tangible property. Part I also
gives persons previously unfamiliar with intellectual property law an
overview of the area. Overall, Part I addresses the question of copyright's consistency with common law patterns.
Part II briefly surveys several alternative legal structures for handling intellectual property questions. Opponents of intellectual propdesire for privacy. When the Second Circuit vacated the plaintiff's preliminary injunction, at
least two of the judges were explicitly concerned with the first amendment issue. Rosemont
Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311-13 (2d Cir. 1966) (Lumbard, CJ., concurring), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
29. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (Disney suit against
counter-cultural comic books that, among other things, portrayed Mickey Mouse in compromising positions), cert. denied sub nom. O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979).
30. The courts have been generally reluctant to embrace a distinct first amendment privilege, relying instead on the "idea-expression dichotomy" and the fair use doctrine to protect
defendants' free speech interests. See New Era Publications, slip op. 2863, 2882.
31. Even from an economic point of view, the utility of copyright enforcement is questionable when first amendment issues are involved. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at
1630-32 (allocation of nonmonetizable interests such as free speech should not be tied to
market-based intellectual property system); id. at 1632-35 (courts should tend to find fair use
where authors seek to use copyright law to censor persons who wish to comment negatively
on the author's work or to investigate or report on the author).
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erty typically argue that members of the public should be privileged to
copy any work freely as long as they violate no independent law (such
as restraints arising out of tangible personalty law, privacy law, or contract) when they obtain and make copies. Part II compares this option,
which I denominate "copy-privilege," with other structural alternatives
and shows why it is the one most often favored by intellectual property
opponents.
Part III, the heart of the piece, presents a primarily normative comparison between copyright and copy-privilege, its most likely competitor. The first two sections of Part III deal with consent theory. The
part begins by showing how the nature and sources of authors' power
over their works would differ in a world with copyright and in a hypothetical world where the only restraints on copying were those contractually agreed upon. I then advance the following propositions: The
noncontractual restraints imposed by copyright are of the same nature
as those imposed by other areas of the law; the central role played by
the user's consent in copy-privilege does not make that regime morally
superior to copyright; and the state's imposition of noncontractual restraints on resource use does not per se necessitate more justification
than does the state's refusal to intervene.
Part III then turns to the economic arguments. Rather than attempt
to redebate the inconclusive empirical evidence, the discussion outlines
the logic underlying most efficiency arguments against copyright. I argue that the normative base of the "encouragement" theory is not dictated by the foundational premises of welfare economics, and that it
lacks any principle of distributional justice sensitive to individuals'
claims as individuals. Further, I show that the distributional principle
which, if normatively acceptable, would come closest to justifying "encouragement" theory's results is itself at odds with the common lawincluding the doctrine in restitution law that volunteers and intermeddlers should ordinarily have no right to compel payment for their efforts. I also suggest that the "encouragement" critics take a position
that is fundamentally at odds with moral notions of desert. Finally, I
show that copy-privilege is inherently arbitrary, making the relations
between authors and users depend largely on serendipitous physical circumstance, while copyright pays due respect to the intangible domain.
Through the route I have described, I seek to demonstrate intellectual property's legitimacy. I aim not to show that all forms and extensions of authorial rights are good or desirable,3 2 but that the decision
to give creators some legal rights to control or be paid for 3 3 certain
32. For an extended discussion of the limitations I believe should curtail intellectual
property rights, see W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14 (arguing against recent judicial
extensions of intellectual property rights and for reserving to the public a significant range of
privileges to use others' creations).
33. Since this article analyzes whether authors should have any legal rights in their in-
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uses of their creations embodies the same kind of structural, functional,
and normative choices that are sewn into the legal fabric elsewhere.
I.

ENTITLEMENT STRUCTURES: STRUCTURAL AND

FUNCTIONAL CONSISTENCY

To begin the exploration of intellectual property's relation to the
common law of tangible property and torts, this part reviews the set of
entitlements that, taken together, ordinarily constitute property in tangible resources. It then reviews the set of entitlements that make up a

federal copyright and compares the ways in which the entitlements that
constitute intellectual property resemble, and differ from, those in the
common law. Part I concludes that the commonalities in structure
predominate over the differences. Part I then analyzes the distinct economic functions played by each component of the entitlement package
and argues that intellectual and tangible property serve similar economic roles.
A.

Entitlement Structures: Rights, Privileges, and Powers
1. Entitlement structures in tangible property and torts.
When the courts and laypersons speak of some tangible thing as

being someone's "property," they usually mean that the person designated as the "owner" has rights to exclude other people from the resource and to obtain relief if they cause intentional or negligent
damage to it, s 4 exclusive powers to transfer the property to others, and
privileges to use the property to suit her purposes. 35 Justice Holmes described the package of rights and privileges this way:
Within the limits prescribed by policy, the owner is allowed to exercise
his natural powers over the subject-matter uninterfered with, and is
more or less protected in excluding other people from such interference. The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no
36
one.
tangibles, whether rights of control or payment, I make no distinctions here between these
two sorts of rights or between injunctive and monetary remedies.
34. Property also gives owners a "privilege" to exclude. That is, one can not only sue
trespassers, but one can also build fences to keep them out. See text accompanying notes 246254 infra (distinguishing rights and privileges).
35. For a brief but relatively formal review of some of the entitlements that constitute
typical fee simple ownership of realty under the common law, see Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE LJ. 710, 746-47 (1917).
Varying and much more complex definitions of property have been suggested, see, e.g.,
Timothy P. Terrell, "Property," "Due Process, ""and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in
Legal Analysis, 70 GEO. LJ. 861, 865-74 (1982), but these three basic entitlements (rights of
exclusion, powers of transfer, and privileges of use) capture the essence of property for our
purposes.
36. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 246 (1881). The Holmes view is
revisited in notes 347-351 infra and accompanying text. Frank Michelman writes of a "pure"
ownership model:
To be 'full owner' of something is to have complete and exclusive rights and privileges
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Bruce Ackerman's description of the ordinary concept of property is
little different:
A particular thing is Layman's thing when: (a) Layman may, without
negative social sanction, use the thing in lots more ways than others
can; and (b) others need a specially compelling reason if they hope to
escape the negative social sanctions that are normally visited 3upon
7
those who use another's things without receiving his permission.
As the following discussion makes clear, copyright exhibits the same
pattern: A copyright proprietor is privileged to use her 38 work in many
ways others are not and has the right to forbid certain uses of the work
by others. In addition, a copyright owner, like any other owner, has
39
certain powers to transfer her entitlements to others.
Using the terms right, duty, privilege, and power in the precise senses
employed by Wesley Hohfeld illustrates the property ownership pattern most clearly. 40 This section defines the Hohfeldian categories and
then uses them to examine the pattern ofjural relations that together
constitute "property." This survey is followed by a parallel analysis of
copyright. Hohfeld's terminology, which illuminates the fact that all
rights limit liberty, will help us focus on the question of whether the
limitations on liberty imposed by copyright differ from those imposed
41
by other forms of property rights.
The rights of tangible property ownership. In the Hohfeldian lexicon, a
right is an entitlement 42 to have the government interfere on one's behalf. For these purposes, right has no connotation of transcendency,
natural law, or constitutionality. It is a nonnormative, positive term
that simply represents that courts and other government agents will
take action.
Where one party has a right, those against whom the right operates
over it-the 'rights' meaning that others are legally required to leave the object alone
save as the owner may permit, and the 'privileges' meaning that the owner is legally
free to do with the object as he or she wills.
Frank Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, 24 Nomos 3, 5 (J. Pennock &J.
Chapman eds. 1982).
37. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 99-100 (footnote omitted).
38. This gender choice was made simply as a matter of convenience. In this article both
masculine and feminine pronouns will be used when no particular person is being discussed.
39. Ackerman omits explicit mention of "rights of transfer" from his list because he
views powers of alienation as a subset of the right to use the property. See B. ACKERMAN, supra
note 9, at 100 n.11.

40. See

WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN

JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (WN.Cook ed. 1923); Hohfeld, supra note 35;
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in JudicialReasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16 (1913) [hereinafter Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions]. When the Hohfeldian
terms can be confused with the common ones, I emphasize the Hohfeldian terms with quotation marks or italics.
41. For a discussion of Hohfeld's influence in helping the legal profession understand
the inevitable costs of entitlements, see Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Propertyand
Contract Efficent?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 751-58 (1980); Joseph William Singer, The Legal
Rights Debate tn AnalyticalJurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975.
42. "Entitlement" as used in this section is simply a catch-all term for legal relations.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581843

1356

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1343

have a duty to respect it.4 3 That means that rights and duties are correlatives, two faces of the same legal relation; for a right to be meaningful,
someone somewhere must have a duty not to infringe it.44 Tort law,
with its focus on duties, thus teaches a great deal about property, for
often a property right may be best understood by tracing the duty it
creates. 4 5 For example, if negligence law specifies that persons have a
duty to use reasonable care toward each other's property, then one of
an owner's entitlements is the right to be compensated for negligent
damage to the property.
This logical relationship between rights and duties makes clear that,
while an owner's set of rights may increase his security, and thus his
own personal sense of liberty, the duties so created necessarily restrict
the freedom of others. Every question about private property is therefore also a question about public restraint.
Property owners have at least three potential categories of rights
worth mention: rights of exclusion, rights against harm or interference,
and rights over the benefits their property yields. The right to exclude
is generally agreed to be the most important of the owner's entitlements. 46 The right to exclude entitles the owner to call upon the police
to eject or arrest trespassers or to call upon the courts for injunctive
relief or damages against intrusions on the property. The public's corresponding duty is to refrain from entry.
The right to exclude is broad. Any intentional intrusion onto the
physical thing owned is ordinarily a sufficient basis for suit. Thus, a
plaintiff charging trespass need not prove that the intruder has caused
damage or done something socially undesirable on the land in order to
maintain a cause of action. 4 7 Further, the trespasser will be liable for
43. Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions, supra note 40, at 30-32.
44. See id. at 32. Hohfeld writes: "[I]f X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the
former's land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the
place." Id. Similarly, if X has a right that others use a particular standard of care when dealing with his property or a right to hold his property free from intentional injury, then others
have a duty to use that care in regard to X or to avoid inflicting such injury.
45. Torts like trespass, conversion, and negligent infliction of damage to property are
the litigative reflection of property rights; and in tort litigation those rights are concretized.
In a trademark opinion, Justice Holmes evocatively wrote of this linkage between torts and
property: "[hIn a qualified sense the mark is property, protected and alienable, although as
with other property its outline is shown only by the law of torts, of which the right is a prophetic summary." Beech-nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927).
46. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 13, at 12 (the "essence" of property "is always the right to
exclude others"); see also Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987) ("exclusivity is
an important aspect of confidential business information and most private property for that
matter"); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987) ("the right to
exclude [is] 'one of the essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property' ") (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
47. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND

KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13, at 70 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
At one point unintentional as well as intentional intrusions onto land also gave rise to virtually
automatic liablility. But in most jurisdictions today, realty owners only have rights against
those accidental intrusions or interferences that cause harm and satisfy generally applicable
criteria for liability, such as negligence. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965)
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intentionally setting foot on the owned land even if the boundary cross48
ing occurred through a reasonable mistake.
A landowner's rights against intentional but nonintrusive harm are
somewhat more limited. Where no entry has interfered with possession, for example, intentional interference with an owner's ability to
use and enjoy property will give rise to an actionable private nuisance
"only if the interference proves to be substantial and unreasonable. '4 9
Also, the type of interference with the owners' expectations can make a
difference; thus, economic harm is not easily recoverable when it stands
alone and is most reliably recoverable when it is parasitic on physical
damage. 50
Rights to exclude and against interference also find protection
under the fifth amendment takings clause, which in part functions as a
sort of public tort law governing the redress available to owners whose
interests in land have been subject to certain harms at the government's
hands. This protection is particularly strong for intrusions. When a
wire is physically placed on an apartment building, a court might order
compensation for the intrusion even if it caused virtually no harm to the
building's value. 5 1 "Takings" law places a somewhat lesser emphasis
on the importance of rights against noninvasive harm. For example, a
local government's prohibition against mining gravel might eliminate
virtually all of the economic value in a previously operating gravel pit,
yet the courts might rule that this nonintrusive governmental act does
not constitute a "taking" requiring compensation.5 2
In addition to rights against intrusion and harm, owners also have
some rights to derive benefits from their property. But these are relatively weak and generally parasitic on the intrusion right. Thus, when
someone receives a benefit from another's property without harming it,
the owner ordinarily cannot recover 53 unless the benefited party has
also physically interfered with the property either by entry (for land) or
(harmful intrusions caused by recklessness, negligence, or ultrahazardous activity); id. § 821
(1979) (harm); id § 822(b) (1979) (unintentional nuisance).
48. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 47, at 74-75.
49. Id. at 70.
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C comment b (1979) ("parasitic"

compensatory damages may be recoverable where pure economic harm would not be). For a
general discussion of this issue, see Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recoveoyfor .Vegligently Inflicted Economic Loss, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985).

51. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(treating minor physical intrusion as a taking); see also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
107 S. Ct. 3141, 3145 (1987) (treating easement as a physically invasive taking). See generally
John M. Payne, From the Courts, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 258, 263 (1988) (interpreting .Vollan in light
of Teleprompter).
52. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
53. See John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1183 (1966) (persons who voluntarily improve their own property cannot ordinarily require
payment from neighbors who incidentally receive benefits as by-product).
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touching (for personalty). -5 4 Generally, strangers who draw benefits
from land can be sued successfully only where the owner can prove a
boundary crossing. 5 5 If that can be proven, intruders who cause no
harm can be required to pay not only nominal damages but potentially
substantial sums in restitution 56 if they have either profited 5 7 or saved
money 58 by using the other's land. When there is no intrusion, a stranger's mere benefit from ("use of") another's property does not ordinarily give rise to a right of action.
For example, many motels and restaurants may deliberately locate
near a tourist attraction in order to take advantage of its popularity
without giving the benefit-generating landowner any right to extract
payment from them for such use. 5 9 By contrast, as previously mentioned, a plaintiff landowner may be entitled to a significant recovery
from a defendant who has used and entered the land.6 0 Thus, the law
of physical property tends to use entry to distinguish between those
benefits which the property owner has a right to control and those over
which the owner has no legal right of recapture.
Powers of transfer. In addition to having rights to state protection,
owners generally have powers to transfer their rights, powers, and privileges over the resource to others. The Hohfeldian term power denotes
an ability to alter legal relations. Ordinarily, only owners have powers
54. See Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946) (personalty),
discussed at note 167 infra; notes 56-58 infra.
55. See generally Wendy Gordon, Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse
(Aug. 16, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Lau Review) [hereinafter
W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse]. For a suggestion that all appropriations of property
interests should bring restitutionary remedies, see Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a W1'rong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504
(1980).
Drawing benefits from another's tangible property in a way that does not harm or physically touch the property may sometimes generate a cause of action when some independent
factor is involved (such as violation of fiduciary duty), but in the absence of additional factors
most forms of such use are privileged. See Nat'l Football League v. Governor of Delaware,
435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977) (surveying the many ways that persons in an interdependent society give each other benefits for which the law will not require recompense).
56. Even with regard to tangible property, the law is somewhat uneven. See DAN B.
DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES 372-75 (1973) (restitutionary remedies for trespass to land); id. at
416-19 (tangible personalty). Most commentators seem to agree "that a defendant who trespasses on the plaintiff's land should be liable to make restitution to the plaintiff in respect of
both profits which he has earned and expense which he has saved thereby." ROBERT GOFF &
GARETH JONES, THE LAw OF RESTITUTION 16 (1966); see also id. at 431-33.

57. See Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936) (plaintiffheld entitled to a share of the proceeds where defendant charged fees for tours of a cave that extended
under plaintiff's land).
58. See Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946) (plaintiffheld
entitled to compensation despite the absence of harm when defendant transported more coal
over plaintiff's land than their existing arrangement allowed).
59. Under current law the owners of tourist attractions are not helpless. Those who
wish to capture the "full" value of their enterprises try to purchase nearby land and build
hotels and restaurants to receive the profits that the tourists bring. This is a form of "internalization by contract"; to the extent such internalization occurs, separate property rights
over the benefits themselves are economically less necessary.
60. See notes 56-58 supra.
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to affect the legal status of a resource. 6 1
A power, too, is an entitlement. While we often take the ability to
make legally enforceable contracts for granted, as if it were the inevitable concomitant of the human propensity to make agreements, it is a
powerful thing indeed to be able to enlist the state's might to enforce
the allocations which two or more people make among themselves.
Similarly, making a gift may seem the most natural thing in the world,
as if the power of gift-giving flowed inevitably from the desire to be
generous. But absent governmentally granted powers, sellers or donors
could do no more than forbear from asserting their own claims on the
thing transferred.
Privileges of use. The last important category of entitlement to discuss is privileges. A privilege is an entitlement to be free of governmental interference or compulsion. For example, in the law of intentional
torts, a person who uses a gun in self-defense is privileged to do so,
meaning that the courts will not provide a cause of action against that
person for harm so caused.
Although this category is most familiar from intentional tort law, the
Hohfeldian term "privilege" is applicable whenever someone's actions
would not violate existing rights. Thus, where negligence law governs,
any unintentional and nonnegligent act is privileged, for an injured
plaintiff has no right to use such an act as the premise of a successful
damage suit. Furthermore, the policies underlying various privileges
are often consistent with each other. Many privileges are based on the
substantive desirability of the privileged act. For example, compare the
absence of negligence, which will defeat a negligence suit, with the
presence of a privilege such as "self-defense," which will defeat an intentional tort claim. Though each has different procedural implications, 62 the two share a conceptual unity. A nonnegligent act is often
described as not wrongful, as socially desirable, or, in economic terms,
as yielding more benefits than costs. 6 3 Most privileges in intentional
tort law similarly involve actions, such as violence committed while defending oneself against unprovoked attack, or remaining on another's
61. In Hohfeld's scheme, where there is no power, there is a disability. Ordinarily, nonowners of an owned resource are disabled from affecting its legal status. They can physically
destroy it; but ordinarily the law will not recognize their efforts to sell it, encumber it, or give
it away. When others are disabled from affecting someone's legal relations, Hohfeld describes
that person as having an immunity. Both physical and intellectual property ownership give an
owner a large degree of immunity from nonowner powers. I do not list immunities separately
as property entitlements since they are not particularly important for our purposes. Rather,
the article generally employs the term "exclusive powers" to indicate that no one but the
owner has powers over the resource.
62. The intentional tort defendant ordinarily has the burden of proving facts entitling
her to the privilege, while in the negligence suit the jury will find the defendant nonnegligent
unless the plaintiff proves otherwise.
63. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of.Vegligence, 1J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972); Henry T. Terry, Xegligence, 29
HARV. L. REv. 40 (1915).
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land in cases of emergency, that are judged morally, economically, or
otherwise desirable. 64 Both tort doctrines "privilege" desirable behavior. Another type of "privilege" is based not on the substantive desirability of the privileged act, but on the policy judgment that certain
spheres of behavior are best left unregulated by government. This is
the basis of many of the privileges in the Bill of Rights. 6 5
Privileges also exist in property law. A landowner may have a privilege to build a house, reservoir, or factory on his land, for example, or a
privilege to mine it. If he has such privileges, then others have no legal
right to call on the state to prevent him from exercising them. As a
definitional matter, persons negatively affected by the owner's exercise
of a complete privilege will have no right to an injunction or damages;
if the owner's privilege is "incomplete," those negatively affected can66
not stop the contested activity but can obtain a damage remedy.
Generally speaking, property owners have broad privileges to use
and enjoy their property, or to let it go to waste, as they see fit.6 7 Defenders of private property tend to argue both that owners will use
their privileges in ways that are socially desirable and that governmental noninterference with property management is itself a positive
68
good.
But a property owner's privileges are not unlimited; 69 on some oc64. One measure of desirability might be the pursuit of distributional or "other justice"
goals. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, ProperlyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1098-1105 (1972).
65. Thus, for example, the first amendment privilege to speak and publish is theoretically based not on the positive desirability of every statement that might be uttered under its
protection, but rather on the belief that government should not be choosing between desirable and undesirable utterances.
66. Privileges that function as defenses to tort suits are sometimes distinguished as
"complete" or "incomplete." See Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict IntentionalInvasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307 (1925). For example, the
privilege of necessity in tort law is "incomplete"--the person with the privilege may use another's property, but she must pay for any damage intentionally caused in the process. See
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). The holder of the
"incomplete" privilege is subject to the opposing entitlement-holder's "incomplete" right to
payment. Note that in Calabresi and Melamed's terminology, a similar distinction is captured
by focusing on the mode by which entitlements are protected: They compare a "liability rule"
that gives a remedy of monetary recovery with a "property rule" that gives a veto or injunctive
remedy. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64.
One can describe compulsory licenses as granting incomplete privileges and persons
owning property subject to compulsory licenses as possessing incomplete rights. Copyright
law frequently requires compulsory licenses. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C.A. § I I1 (West 1977 & Supp.
1989) (compulsory license for cable retransmission of copyrighted material); see also note 135
and text accompanying notes 135-136 infra.
67. But see text accompanying notes 69-90 infra (discussing limitations on use and nonuse of property in general); text accompanying notes 147-166 infra (discussing limitations on
use and nonuse of intellectual property).
68. See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1605-10 (discussing the legacy of Adam
Smith and its role in contemporary economic defenses of private property); see also the
sources cited in id. nn.35 & 59 (certain political and economic arguments in favor of property
owners' independent decisionmaking).
69. See text accompanying notes 79-90 infra.
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casions the courts will indeed inquire into the use made of land. Thus,
owners have some duties to the public. 70 If a neighbor has a right that

the owner not build a polluting factory, for example, or a right that the
owner prevent any reservoir on his land from flooding the neighbor's
mine shafts, 7 1 then the owner has a duty to comply and no privilege to
pollute or to allow his reservoir to leak. If strangers in emergencies
have rights to enter the land, owners will not have the privilege to eject
72
them.
2.

Common law limits on ownership entitlements.

Property owners' rights to exclude, powers of transfer, and privileges of use are not unlimited. 7 3 First, the privileges of others limit the
rights that attach to ownership of land or tangible personalty. For example, though owners may have many rights against intentional and
intrusive harm, most jurisdictions give the public privileges to act reasonably even when reasonable acts accidentally cause intrusive harm to
land. As a result, owners have no right to keep their real property secure from the unintentional and nonnegligent harms that others might
inflict on it.74

A property owner may not even have a right of redress against intentional entry to the land if the entrant acted pursuant to some recognized excuse or justification, such as the preservation of life or public
necessity. Further, as mentioned above, when a stranger needs entry to
someone's property greatly enough, the owner may not lose only a
right of exclusion; the owner may also have a duty to refrain from interfering with the imperiled person's use of the land.7 5 Federal or state
76
constitutional liberties may similarly limit property rights.
An owner's powers of transfer have their limitations as well. For
70. Definitionally, someone's duties arise where his privileges terminate and others'
rights begin. Duties are the opposite of privileges.
71. See Rylands v. Fletcher, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), af'd, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (H.L.
1868).
72. While a defendant who enters another's land out of necessity may be required to pay
for any damage done, as in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221
(1910), the entrant may be able to sue the landowner if the landowner tries to throw her off
the land during the emergency. See, e.g., Ploofv. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908) (landowner's demurrer overturned where his servant cut loose a boater's craft moored for safety
from a storm).
73. Recall for example that Justice Holmes prefaced his description of property entitlements with the clause, "[w]ithin the limits prescribed by policy." See text accompanying note
36 supra.
74. See, e.g., Hammontree v. Jenner, 20 Cal. App. 3d 528, 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971) (store owner not entitled to compensation where driver's negligence did not
cause out-of-control vehicle's crash into storefront); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166

(1965).
75. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 474, 71 A. 188, 189 (1908) (reversing demurrer for
landowner whose servant had cast off plaintiff's boat into the water during a storm, even
though the boat had moored without permission).
76. Thus, state constitutional law may give rights or privileges of entry to persons who
wish to bring petitions into shopping malls. The mall owners may have no federal constitu-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581843

1362

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1343

example, the law will invalidate an owner's attempt to control future
disposition of his property that violates the rule against perpetuities;
and some contracts regarding real and personal property are void as
against public policy. 7 7 Furthermore, the owner's powers to affect the
property are not fully exclusive. As the doctrine of adverse possession
exemplifies, strangers may occasionally have powers to affect ownership. 78 In addition, the government has several powers in regard to
privately owned property, the most notable being the power of eminent
domain and the power to require the owner to pay taxes on penalty of
losing ownership.
Privileges are also limited. As already noted, owners have duties

that limit their privileges of action; 79 and their privileges of inaction are
also limited. For example, a landowner who neglects to make his land
reasonably safe may be liable to an invitee who is injured; and owners
who do not eject trespassers may eventually find that adverse possession has made their title unenforceable against the squatters.8 0
As between private parties, the overall rule under the common law
is that one is not privileged to act in ways that intentionally invade
others' legally protected boundaries, 8 ' or that do harm to others' interests. 82 Although there are of course exceptions to this general approach,8 3 the most noteworthy arising in the area of unintentionally
caused harm, some theorists attempting to unify the various tort law
tional right to be compensated for this gap in their entitlement to exclude trespassers. See
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
77. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (enforcement ofrestrictive deed covenant barred by fourteenth amendment); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) (unconscionability provision).
78. The Hohfeldian term "power" refers not only to an ability to form a binding contract but also to an ability to effect an alteration in legal entitlements. Thus, adverse possession is an exercise of "power," for it results in loss of title. 7 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICKJ.
ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 1017 (1989). Since adverse possession requires some

behavior by the "open and notorious" possessor, that possessor has some conditional power
over the property; and the property owner's immunity from the powers of others is correspondingly limited.
79. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
80. See 7 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, supra note 78, at 110-17 (adverse possession results in
loss of title).
81. Harmless but intentional violations of boundaries have increasingly come to be
treated as not only actionable, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 47, at 75-77 (trespass to
land), but also as giving rise to potentially significant restitutionary recoveries, see, e.g., notes
54-58 supra and accompanying text; note 170 infra and accompanying text.
82. Regarding intentional harms, see Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice and
Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1894) (general rule for intentional harms). As to unintentional
harms, see Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973) (urging
strict liability for all harms directly caused, subject to excuses and justifications); George P.
Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972) (urging liability for all
harms resulting from nonreciprocal risk, subject to excuses and justifications); see also A.M.
Honor6, Ownership, in PROPERTY: CASES, CONCEPTS, CRITIQUES 78, 85 (L.C. Becker & K. Kipnis
eds. 1984) (property owners not entitled to use their property harmfully);Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 161-63 (1971) (suggesting that no
compensation be owed for governmental restraints on previously privileged uses of land if
those uses cause negative effects on other property).
83. See Singer, supra note 41 (discussing various privileges to do harm).
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doctrines come close to recommending that the law of unintentional
harms be seen as expressing a general principle of "pay for any harm
you cause,"8 4 and several decades' growth in strict liability and other
pro-plaintiff tort developments have reduced the lacunae of noncompensation.8 5 The dividing line between an owner's privileges and duties is more often drawn where the owner's use of the property causes
invasions or harm than elsewhere.
Note that the description here largely assimilates property owners'
duties with the duties persons generally owe. Although landowners
once had a number of special duties and privileges peculiar to their
status and to the status of the entrant in relation to the owned land, in
many jurisdictions those duties and privileges today follow more general patterns, with landowners' duties to trespassers, licensees, and invitees being judged by a unitary standard, for example.8 6 Admittedly,
owners do have some limited privileges to do harm in defense of property; rights of exclusion in tangible property may be accompanied not
only by privileges to build walls and lock gates, but also by privileges to
use reasonable force against an intruder in certain circumstances. But
nonowners' privileges to defend their persons parallel landowners'
privileges to defend their property. Further, as demonstrated by the
generality of Learned Hand's negligence formula,8 7 the common law
grants a privilege to do unintentional, cost-justified harm that does not
at all depend on the privilege-holder being a land owner.8 8 Thus, while
some differences exist, the limits the law places on an owner's privileges generally parallel those affecting nonowners.
Although boundary invasion and harm provide the most obvious dividing line between privilege (to act) and duty (to refrain from acting),
an owner's liberties are sometimes limited even when their exercise
would not invade or injure anything. Zoning is perhaps the most striking example of legal regulation that limits owners' freedom to use land
absent threatened harm or invasion, yet it is considered consistent with
84. See Epstein, supra note 82 (presumptive liability for all harms directly caused);
Fletcher, supra note 82 (presumptive liability for all harms except where risks are reciprocally
imposed).
85. The twentieth century has seen a sharp and accelerating trend toward favoring the
victims of unintentional harms, particularly through expanding strict liability for hazardous
activities and for products. Other pro-plaintiff developments include contraction in the ability
of government, charity, or family-member defendants to claim immunities; growth in the nondelegable duty doctrine; increases in the kinds of duties that courts are willing to impose; and
relaxation of causation requirements.
86. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 442 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968)
(adopting unitary standard of care). Similarly, unintentional trespasses are now largely governed by the same principles that govern liability for other unintentional acts. See note 47
supra and accompanying text.
87. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (1947).
88. The privileges afforded by the negligence principle have been narrowed in recent
years by some forms of strict liability that apply with special force to landowners (such as for
ultrahazardous activities), but other equally significant forms of strict liability (such as for
products) are not particularly linked with land ownership.
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property ownership. Another example is the eminent domain area,
where many important cases have focused on whether a particular legislative limitation on previously existing privileges should amount to a
"taking" of "property" for which compensation should be paid;8 9 it is
far from clear that only "harmful" or "invasive" privileges can be restrained without paying compensation. 90
We should not allow the limitations to obscure the basic property
model-rights of exclusion, privileges of nonharmful use, and exclusive
powers of transfer. However variable the Supreme Court's treatment
of threatened rights, powers, or privileges, 9 ' for example, no one can
doubt that a "taking" of "property" has occurred where the government cancels all of an owner's rights, powers, and privileges, particularly if the government simultaneously transfers those entitlements to
itself. In a sense, then, we define "property" using a proportionality
inquiry:9 2 The more complete the package of rights, powers, and privileges, the more comfortable most Americans feel in using the term
"property" to describe the phenomenon to which these characteristics
93
attach.
To what extent does the entitlement structure within copyright law
mimic the patterns of the common law allocation of property entitlements? Clearly there must be differences. For example, since intellectual property has no physical boundaries that can be crossed, it must
perforce use something other than entry to distinguish between those
89. Compare Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (requirement that certain coal be left unmined held not to constitute a "taking") and Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (city safety ordinance prohibiting excavations below the water table held not to constitute a taking of plaintiff's gravel business though the
excavations essentially destroyed the business) with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922) (prohibition of mining under dwelling houses held to constitute a "taking" of
defendant's mining privilege). For an interesting exploration of the disparity between the
Court's treatment of the privileges in Pennsylvania Coal and Goldblatt, see B. ACKERMAN, supra

note 9, at 156-65.
90. See Sax, supra note 82, at 150 n.5;Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36, 46-50 (1964) ("[T]he problem is not one of noxiousness or harm-creating activity at
all; rather it is a problem of inconsistency between perfectly innocent and independently desirable uses." Id. at 49.).
91. See note 89 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 37 supra (Bruce Ackerman's definition of property; it is a
matter of proportion, not "either/or" choices).
93. The constitutional protections for "property" can be triggered by damage to interests which would not ordinarily be termed property interests. The Court in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984), indicated that, for takings clause purposes, a materialman's lien as well as a valid contract have been held to constitute property. This is even
more true in the due process context. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281-82
(1979) ("Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that the State has created is a species of "property" protected by the Due Process Clause.") (dicta); Perry v. Sinderman, 408
U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (certain expectations of continued employment are "property" for due
process purposes). Nevertheless, ordinary conceptions of property have had an impact on the
Court's takings law jurisprudence. See generally B. ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 88-189.
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uses of the property the owner can control and those she cannot. 94 Yet
we will find the parallels to be remarkably close.
3. Entitlement structures in copyright law.
Copyright is the body of law that protects works of authorship.
"Works of authorship" include books, music, sculpture, movies, and
even computer programs, 9 5 but not ideas, processes, or systems, no
matter how valuable or creative. 96 Copyright today is largely governed
by federal statute, the Copyright Act of 1976. 9 7 The following over-

view of federal copyright law will outline how the copyright statute, like
the law of tangible property and torts, grants to proprietors rights of
exclusion, privileges of use, and powers of transfer.
Section 106, the central provision of the 1976 Act, gives authors98 a
right to prohibit copying and other specified uses of their works of authorship. Section 106 grants to creators "exclusive rights to do and to
authorize" the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, public perform94. See text accompanying notes 170-189 infra.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) (works of authorship include literary, musical, and dramatic
works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; motion
pictures and other audiovisual works; and sound recordings); see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 117 (West
Supp. 1989) (special provisions regarding computer programs); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "including" as "illustrative and not limitative").
96. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). Other areas of law, such as patent, protect some subject
matter not protected by copyright.
97. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989). Until the Copyright Act of 1976
became effective on January 1, 1978, states were free to grant copyrights in unpublished
works. The new act, however, has largely preempted state copyright law.
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright.., in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright ....
whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title.... [N]o
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the
common law or statutes of any State.
17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). Some areas of state activity are preserved, such as causes of action
accruing prior to the new Act's effective date, id. § 301(b)(2), and state action regarding "activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright," id. § 301 (b)(3). The statute also emphasizes that preemption does not affect works "not fixed in any tangible medium of expression." Id.
§ 301(b)(l). Fixation is a requirement for federal protection. Id. §§ 101-102. State copyright
in "unfixed" (unrecorded) performances thus remains available. State copyright in performance is sometimes given the name of the "right of publicity." This misnomer was carried into
to the Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564
(1977) (holding that Ohio would not violate the first amendment if it gave "human cannonball" Zacchini a right of publicity against news stations which broadcast his act in full, at
least so long as Zacchini sought revenues from and not an injunction against dissemination of
his performance).
98. Unless the article's context indicates otherwise, the terms "author" or "creator" will
be used to include not only authors, composers, painters, and other creative persons, but also
employers, assignees, licensees, heirs, and anyone else claiming copyright interest in work
created by another. Potentially significant differences characterize the normative status and
empirical effect of copyrights in the hands of original creative persons and copyrights in the
hands of publishers and other derivative parties. Such issues are outside the scope of this
article. See note 8 supra.
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ance, and public display of their works. 99 Taken together, I will generally refer to these as rights over "copying."
Although section 106 employs only the word "rights," it uses that
word loosely, as synonymous with "entitlements." 10 0 In fact, section
106 constitutes a simultaneous award of Hohfeldian rights, privileges,
and powers over the enumerated uses. Because the section 106 grants
are "exclusive," the owner has the right to exclude others from the
physical acts described.1 0 1 Because the section 106 grant includes an
entitlement "to do" the enumerated physical acts, creators have a privilege to use their creations in the manners specified. Because the grant
awards an entitlement "to authorize" the various physical acts, creators
have a power to transfer their entitlements. Because creators hold that
power "exclusive[ly]," they also have an immunity from other persons'
efforts to affect the legal status of the copyright. Thus, the intellectual
property entitlements include, for example, the privilege to make reproductions, the right to forbid strangers to make reproductions, and the
power to sell others a privilege to make reproductions.
The right to exclude othersfrom particularmodes of enjoyment. As the tort
cause of action denominated "trespass" vindicates the duty to stay off
strangers' land, the tort cause of action denominated "infringement"
vindicates the duty to refrain from copying others' works of authorship.
Thus, as with tangible property, copyright's core is a set of exclusive
rights; and violation of those rights gives rise to tort and other remedies. Persons who enjoy a work in the ways reserved to the copyright
owner's exclusive control-for example, reproducing the work verbatim, adapting it for use in new works, or publicly performing it-may be
liable for injunctions,10 2 damages, 10 3 accounting for profits, 10 4 criminal
06
penalties,' 0 5 and other sanctions.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). Not all of the rights apply to all types of works or in all
contexts. For example, musical groups who record their performances have an exclusive right
of reproduction but not of performance. Id. §§ 106(1), (4), 114. Radio play, therefore, earns
royalties for the composer of the music but not for its performers.
100. Such a usage is quite common. In fact, Hohfeld offered his definition of entitlements in part to clarify the many ways in which judges and commentators used the term
"right." See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 40, at 30-31. Hohfeld's
stipulative definition attaches only one of the common meanings of "rights" to the word, and
he invented or borrowed other terms to denote the other meanings.
101. Since the grant states that owners have the exclusive privilege of using the work in
the specified ways, no one else can engage in the listed acts. Since persons other than the
creator have no privileges to use the work in the listed ways, they have duties not to so use it;
correlatively, the creator has rights against such persons.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982); 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11, at §§ 14.06(A)
(preliminary injunctions), (B) (permanent injunctions).
103. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 501, 504 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
104. Id. § 504.
105. Id. § 506 (criminal penalties applicable only to infringements undertaken "willfully" for "purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain").
106. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1982) (impoundment and destruction of infringing copies), 17 U.S.C.A. § 504 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989) (statutory damages); see also 17 U.S.C.
§ 505 (1982) (attorneys' fees).
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Rights in tangibles differ from the rights in intangibles largely with
regard to the kind of control each set of rights gives. The differences
can be illustrated, for example, by comparing how the law treats particular intellectual products with how it treats the physical objects embodying the intellectual products. Copyrightable narrative is routinely
embodied in paper and ink, just as copyrightable artistic design is commonly embodied in canvas and paint, and someone who receives letters
from famous friends owns the pieces of paper and the ink on them. But
if the recipient includes the text of those letters in her memoirs she may
be unpleasantly surprised by a copyright infringement suit. 10 7 This is

so even though the recipient would have been free to sell the letters to
an autograph dealer' 0 8 or throw them away. Similarly, if a museum
purchases a copyrighted painting but does not also purchase the artist's
copyright interest, the museum would infringe the copyright by making
posters or postcards of the painting for sale in its gift shop without the
artist's permission.
Conversely, if a burglar steals the letters from the recipient's desk
drawer or the painting from the museum, that harm may not be redressed under the copyright law, even though the theft may deny the
copyright owner effective use of the creative work. As long as the burglar only steals the letters or painting and does not reproduce them or
otherwise employ them in violation of section 106,10 9 the copyright
statute gives no redress. The legal avenues to achieve some "remedy"
for the harm-notably burglary law and the tort law of conversion"I 0 107. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (author obtained
preliminary injunction against publication of a biography which contained quotations from
some of his letters); see also Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E.2d 863 (1949)
(owner of Mark Twain manuscript held not entitled to publish it because physical ownership
of a manuscript does not necessarily include ownership of its copyright); 17 U.S.C. § 202
(1976) (transfer of object does not "of itself" carry with it ownership of copyright); id. § 204
(transfers of copyright ownership are invalid "unless an instrument of conveyance, or a note
or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and signed").
The existence of a chattel "embodiment" is essential to federal copyright, which applies
only to works "fixed," embodied, in "stable," "tangible medi[a] of expression." Id. §§ 101
(definition of "fixed"), 102(a) (subject matter of copyright). So, for example, until a playwright makes a stable record of his play, via pen, video camera, or otherwise, federal copyright law does not protect it. And although all objects "embody" the intangible ideas that
make naming and understanding possible (a chair "embodies" the notion of chairness, for
example), the large majority of these ideas fall outside the range of copyrightable subject
matter.
108. Although one of a copyright owner's exclusive rights is the right "to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale," id. § 106(3), lawful owners
of copies have a privilege to resell or otherwise dispose of them; this has been established by
the "first sale doctrine," now embodied in id. § 109(a). That section "is an extension of the
principle that ownership of the material object is distinct from ownership of the copyright in
the material." Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
The doctrine does not apply to commercial record rentals. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b).
109. Note, however, that the burglar's sale of the painting might violate the copyright
owner's exclusive right to control sale, 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1976), since the privilege of owners of copies to resell them is not available to persons who are not lawful owners. Id. § 109(a);
see also § 109(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
110. Like a landowner, an object's owner has rights to physical dominion over the thing
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are available to the person who owns the physical object, who often
does not own the copyright;"'I and even that person's chances of gaining satisfaction are determined by the government's ability to identify
the thief and enforce burglary law and by the thief's solvency as a tort
defendant.
Thus a copyright owner's rights largely operate independently of
the rules governing physical ownership. Intellectual property is concerned not with entry or physical interference but with forbidding specified uses of the work that may be quite independent of physical
touching. Nevertheless, this right, like the right at the core of tangible
property, can be viewed as a right of exclusion. Thus, in examining the
"property" status of one type of intellectual property (trade secrets) for
purposes of fifth amendment takings law, the Supreme Court' 12in fact
characterized the right at issue as a "right to exclude others." "
Types of use a creator may exclude. The Court referred to the right to
exclude others from "enjoyment," ' 13 but that is not a technical term.
Such phrases generally refer to the various rights an intellectual property owner might have to exclude others from benefiting from the intangible at issue. Any mode of drawing benefits from a resource might
be referred to as "enjoyment" or "use," and intellectual property law
does not purport to control them all.
There are many ways one can benefit from a resource, and different
uses trigger liability under different intellectual property rules. Patent
law approaches "use" most expansively. A patentee's rights to "make,
use, or sell" the invention render it unlawful even for one who independently replicates-without copying-a patented invention to profit
from it."14 In ordinary language, profiting from an independent inven-

tion seems to be an enjoyment of an invention that happens to be the
same as the patented invention, rather than an enjoyment of the patented invention itself. Nevertheless, patent policy gives patentees the
right to control independently created duplicates, at least partly because we believe that giving independent inventors' privileges to exploit what they find might interfere with potential inventors' overall
owned and rights to redress physical harm done to it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,

supra note 74, §§ 216-218, 222 (trespass to chattels); id. §§ 222, 222A (conversion).
111. Ownership of an object containing a work of authorship includes no presumption
of ownership of its copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 202. This is true whether the object in question
is an original manuscript or the 10,000th copy from a massive press run.
112. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984).
113. Id.
114. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. 1984) (it is an infringement to make, use, or sell any patented invention within the United States during the patent term, and no exception is made for
independently derived duplicates of the invention); EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN,
LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 747-48 (3d ed. 1986). Although the statute

does not exempt even the making of one copy of the invention, there are some judicially
created exceptions, e.g., "the manufacture and experimental use of a machine ... until the
machine is put to a commercially valuable use." 2 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDA-

MENTALS § 17.02(1), at 17-15 (2d ed. 1988).
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willingness to invest in research. When several scientists are hot on the
be the only prize
same trail, a promise of exclusivity to the winner may
1 15
meaningful enough to keep the race from flagging.
Rights over use also can be defined quite narrowly. If the patent
stands near the expansive end of the spectrum of infringement standards, at the opposite extreme is unfair competition law, 1 6 including
trademark and trade secret law. Here the plaintiff must show something substantially more than a mere unconsented use of the "owned"
thing to prevail on an infringement claim. For example, in federal
trademark law, only a mark's uses that the plaintiff can show are likely
to cause consumer confusion are actionable. 1 7 Thus, even if the second user employs an identical mark, his use is not ordinarily actionable
unless the plaintiff's and defendant's products are related enough that
the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause confusion to consumers. 11 8 Similarly, use of a trade secret is usually prohibited only if the
user has violated some independent legal obligation, such as a fiduciary
obligation not to disclose secrets revealed during confidential business
negotiations. As the Seventh Circuit observed:
The only protection equity affords the possessor of a trade secret is to
prevent its use by those who obtain the secret information in breach of
contract or of a fiduciary relationship, and by third parties who knowingly participate in such breach.... The gravamen of a cause of action
of this nature is wrongful appropriation. One who obtains secret information honestly may use it freely. 19
115. History holds many examples of apparently simultaneous discoveries, so that the
law's grant of control to patentees even when others can prove the independent origin of
their inventions is significant. A purpose of the public record of patent claims is to make the
scientific community aware of their content.
116. The overall field of law that governs the control of intangibles is known as "intellectual property" or "unfair competition." It can be helpful to distinguish between the two
terms. The term "intellectual property" is best used to identify those areas of law, such as
patent and copyright, where copying or use sinipliciter constitutes an infringement. In these
areas, the form of control can be easily analogized to the ownership of realty, where mere
intrusion contitutes a trespass. "Unfair competition" is the term best used to identify those
areas, such as trademark law and trade secret law, where more than mere copying or use is
necessary to constitute infringement. These doctrines are more like the torts that govern
interpersonal relations than like property. However, it is common to use the term "intellectual property" to refer to both sets of doctrines, and this article will often use the term in this
fashion.
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1982); 2J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:1 (1984 & Supp. 1988). Although some recent cases have cast doubt on
the continued vitality of the confusion requirement, see, e.g., Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n
v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1012 (5th Cir.) (duplication of hockey
team symbol for sale as a cloth emblem held an infringement of trademark rights because
consumers would associate symbol with team, regardless of whether consumers would be misled as to the emblems' source), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975), trademark law is still
predominantly employed in contexts where the mark is used to identify a product, rather than
where the mark itself is the product being sold.
118. See 2J. MCCARTHY, supra note 117, § 24:1, at 160-63.
119. Ferroline Corp. v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 207 F.2d 912, 923 (7th Cir. 1953);
see also I ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §§ 4.03, 5.04(3)-(4)(a) (1988).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581843

1370

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1343

Thus, one may freely copy another's trade secret if one has discovered
the secret by reverse engineering or other lawful means.
The uses prohibited by copyright law occupy a middle position between patent and unfair competition law on the infringement continuum. To obtain relief, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the
defendant had access to and borrowed some protectable aspect of the
copyrighted work. Thus, a defendant can defeat a claim of infringement, regardless of how similar the plaintiff's and defendant's works
might be, by proving that she independently created the supposedly
21
infringing work. 120 A plaintiff, however, need not show any injury,'
confusion, or violation of independent duty in order to prevail. Copying is per se actionable.
Copyright's grant of exclusive rights thus most closely parallels
landowners' "right to exclude,"' 12 2 for patent law gives proprietors
something more than a "right to exclude"' 23 and trademark and trade
secret law give something less.' 24 Copyright gives authors only what
trespass law gives landowners: Authors have the right to exclude
others from what they own.
Limitations on the exclusion right. As with the rights against physical
interference that attach to tangible property, 125 the exclusive rights of
an intellectual work's creator against unconsented uses of her works are
limited in various ways. The 1976 Act grants no rights at all for works
that fall outside the subject matter and uses it designates for protection.' 26 Thus, the Act protects only expression and not ideas,
127
processes, systems, discoveries, or similar products of mental effort,
and so grants no rights in copyright in these subject matters even when
120. See, e.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
121. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-502 (1982) (proof of injury not a prerequisite for infringement suit); see also id. § 504(b) (entitlement to award of infringer's profits); id. § 504(c) (statutory damages available in lieu of actual damages and profits).
122. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra (nature of trespass suits).
123. For example, patent proprietors can stop strangers from using what the strangers
themselves have created. In real property law, that would be similar to granting landowners a
right to bring trespass suits against anyone who entered property "just like" the owners' land.
124. For example, strangers can use marks or secrets as long as they cause no socially
undesirable confusion and breach no independent duties. In real property law, that would be
similar to landowners having no action for trespass without showing that the entrant had
made some socially undesirable use of the land or was violating some independent obligation
by entering.
125. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
126. See note 95 (protectable subject matter) & text accompanying note 99 (enumerated
rights) supra.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (copyright does not "extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery"); see also Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879). Ideas are not subject to protection for several reasons, including deference to the first amendment. See M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 1.10(B)(2); see also
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-14 (2d ed. 1988).

Other reasons in-

clude practical considerations such as the costs of tracing ownership, see John P. Dawson, The
Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1974), and the injury that ownership of
ideas would do to public life and to later creators' ability to make works of their own. See
notes 172, 518 & 530-531 infra and accompanying texts.
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they are contained in otherwise protectable works of authorship.
Where the copyright statute grants proprietors no rights at all, potential users are privileged to copy. 128 So, for example, anyone is privileged to copy an author's themes or ideas, since copyright does not
protect these aspects of otherwise copyrightable works.' 29 Similarly,
the Act's list of enumerated "exclusive rights" is limited. For example,
copyright owners have rights over public but not private performance
and display of their works; 130 over initial distribution of their works but
not over a library that lends the books it has purchased;' 3 ' and over
133
reproduction 13 2 but not over enjoyment.
Copyright law imposes a number of additional limits on the rights it
3 4
does grant. The most famous is probably the restricted duration.'
Although ordinary property can be owned forever, copyrights expire.
Another interesting limitation is the set of compulsory licenses
copyright bestows in areas such as cable retransmission and the production of new recordings of existing music.' 3 5 Persons entitled to
128. However, legal protection other than copyright may be available. For example,
although the refusal to protect general ideas stems from Congress's affirmative desire to keep
ideas free of constraint, the refusal to extend copyright protection to utilitarian objects stems
instead from a recognition that copyright is an inappropriate vehicle for such protection.
(There may be also a constitutional dimension to copyright's refusal to protect useful objects.
See KENNETH J. BURCHFIEL, The ConstitutionalIntellectual Property Power: Progressof the Useful Arts
and the Legal Protectionof Semiconductor Technology, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 473, 501-02 (1988)).
Other legal regimes may be available and specifically tailored to the issues presented by the
various forms of intellectual property.
Patent law, which is available to the inventors of utilitarian objects, demonstrates such a
specific adaptation. A right only against copying is of limited value to an inventor. Though a
right against all replication of an invention would be more valuable, it is more restrictive.
Patent law has worked out a compromise: A patent gives rights against independent replication, but utility patents are quite difficult to obtain and have only a 17-year duration.
129. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (themes not
protectible), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); see also notes 185-186 infra.
130. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4)-(5).
131. See id. §§ 106(3), 109. Lending the books one has purchased is privileged under
the "first sale doctrine." Id. § 109(a).
132. Id. § 106(1).
133. See id. § 106 (no mention of a right of enjoyment of copyrighted works).
134. Except where Congress chooses to enact private bills at the behest of particular
copyright owners, a copyright can last no longer than the life of the author plus fifty years. Id.
§§ 302-305.
135. See, e.g. id. § 111 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (in designated circumstances, owners of
copyright have no right to prohibit cable operators from retransmitting on-the-air broadcasts
if statutory formalities are satisfied and governmentally specified fees are paid); id. § 115
(once a composer authorizes distribution of a nondramatic musical work on phonorecords in
the U.S., virtually any performer can obtain a compulsory license to make and issue phonorecords using the composition); id. § 116 Ojuke boxes); see also Second Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law, ch. 7, at
18-20 (Oct.-Dec. 1975) (draft) [hereinafter Second Supp. Report] (exemplifying the attractions of the compulsory license as a mode of legislative compromise for conflicting claims in
addressing protection for typeface designs). See generally STAFF OF SvBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., IST
SESs., THE COMPULSORY LICENSE PROVISIONS OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print

1960) (H. Henn) (history of the phonorecord compulsory license). Some changes are in the
offing for jukebox compulsory licenses. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
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such licenses have "privileges" to use the copyrighted material, regardless of the copyright owner's preferences. The privileges are "incomplete" since the copiers must pay at least the governmentally set
licensing fee. Correlatively, copyright owners have only "incomplete
rights" of ownership in works subject to compulsory licenses.1 3 6
The most often litigated copyright limit is the "fair use" doctrine,
judicially created and now enshrined in the statute.13 7 Uses of copyrighted works "for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research"' 138 are likely to be found "fair" and thus noninfringing. As currently interpreted, persons entitled to "fair use" have
complete privileges to use copyrighted works in the sense that they are
both permitted to use the work and free of any obligation of payment.1 3 9 Much debate surrounds the question of which situations are
Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 4(a)(4), 102 Stat. 2853, 2855-57 (adding new § 116A to the Copyright
Act).
Compulsory licenses continue to be created. The newest compulsory license permits satellite carriers to make certain secondary transmissions to "unserved households" with home
dishes, for private viewing, at a statutory royalty fee. See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988,
P.L. 10-667, creating a new section, 17 U.S.C. § 119. The Act is a temporary measure. On or
before the end of 1992, the statutory fee option will no longer be available; and in 1994 the
Act itself terminates. Id.
136. See note 66 supra.
137.

17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).

See generally LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN

COPYRIGHT (1978); Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
139. Conceivably "fair use" could be implemented as an incomplete privilege instead.
Under that approach, which has its own difficulties, a user might be allowed to continue utilizing the work but be required to pay. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1724-27 (use of a liability
rule); Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1622-24. The common law contains several incomplete privileges, such as the incomplete privilege of "private necessity" in tort law, see Vincent
v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910); other sources cited in note 66
supra, and the recognition in nuisance law that sometimes a valuable but noxious activity
should be allowed to continue as long as it pays its own way, see, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (defendant allowed to
continue polluting as long as it paid damages).
With fair use cases, as in copyright litigation generally, the courts have so far adhered to
an all-or-nothing approach, so that a defendant either is found to be an infringer, subject to
injunction as well as damage liability, or is allowed to continue the contested use for free. In
New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd
on other grounds, Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 1989), Judge Leval attempted to
depart from this approach. He had before him a critical biography of L. Ron Hubbard which
used many quotations from Hubbard's published and unpublished works. Finding that most
but not all of the defendant's quotations were fair use of Hubbard's copyrighted expression,
Judge Leval concluded that the biography did infringe. 695 F. Supp. at 1524-25. He nevertheless refused to grant an injunction against the book's publication, id. at 1525-28, because it
"would diminish public knowledge" and would "implicate[] concerns of the First Amendment," id. at 1525. The Second Circuit repudiated that aspect of Judge Leval's opinion and
affirmed the denial of an injunction solely on the ground of laches. New Era Publications,Nos.
88-7707, 88-7795. There are, however, some signs that the all-or-nothing approach to remedial issues in copyright cases may be eroding. See Abend v. M.C.A., Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479
(9th Cir. 1988) (injunction refused); see also .ew Era Publications,slip op. 2863, 2884, 2907-13
(Oakes, C.J., concurring; vigorously disagreeing with the majority opinion and referring inter
alia to Boomer and other cases involving real property as analogical support for denying an
injunction).
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appropriate for fair use treatment. The most recent example of a use
found "fair" by the Supreme Court is home videorecording
of broad140
cast television shows for the purpose of time-shifting.
Exclusive powers of transfer and their limitations. The copyright statute
gives copyright owners "powers" both to transfer exclusive rights and
to grant mere privileges to use the work.' 4 ' Limits temper the exercise
of these powers. For example, the Act requires certain formalities for
transfering exclusive rights. 14 2 More significantly, the statute gives authors an inalienable power to terminate any grant after a specified period of time in virtually all but work-made-for-hire contexts, thus
limiting most creators' present ability to make full transfers of what
they own. 143 The statute also limits inheritance of this termination
140. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984). "Time-shifting" refers to viewing videorecorded broadcasts at a more convenient time.
141. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting "the owner of copyright... the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize" reproduction, adaptation, distribution to the public, public performance, and
public display) (emphasis added); id. § 201(d) (transferability of rights).
142. Thus, though grants of privilege (also known as "nonexclusive licenses" or "permissions") can be oral, transfers of exclusive rights must be memorialized in a signed writing.
See ide§ 204 (a signed writing required for any transfer of copyright ownership other than
transfers by operation of law); id. § 101 (the phrase "transfer of copyright ownership" does
not include nonexclusive licenses). Restrictions of this sort may frustrate owners' desires in
the short run but tend to work to further the long-term functioning of the transfer system.
They thus function much like the statute of frauds in contract law or the requirement that
disinterested witnesses sign wills in the law of estates.
143. See id. § 203 (applying the termination power to works copyrighted after the effective date of the 1976 Act); id. § 304(c) (applying the termination power to the renewal rights
in works copyrighted before the Act's effective date).
Authors can terminate grants roughly 35 to 40 years after their execution, id. § 203(a) (3),
or 56 to 61 years after copyright was secured, id. § 304(c)(3). See generally Frank R. Curtis,
Caveat Emptor in Copyright: A PracticalGuide to the Termination-of-Transfers Provisions of the New
Copyright Code, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'v 19 (1977); Melville B. Nimmer, Termination of Transfers Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 947 (1977).
The new termination power largely replaces the "renewal" provisions of the Copyright
Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), which also aimed, though with limited effectiveness, at returning to authors control of their works. Whether or not the new limitation
will prove to be in the authors' long-term interest is a matter of debate. Briefly, the debate is
between those who see a disability to make transfers as a limitation that impairs authors'
ability to get the best price for their efforts (as well as an interference with authors' autonomy), and those who view it as a way to protect authors' interests in a way the authors themselves cannot.
Congress, of course, intended termination rights to operate in the creators' interest. See
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 123, 124-28, 139-42 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5738-44, 5755-58 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. One
could argue, however, that the new power merely eliminated one of an author's bargaining
chips: Prior to the new statute, an author could have bargained for inserting a termination
right into her contracts or could have received a higher license fee or sale price in return for
forgoing such rights. "A right that cannot be the subject of bargaining is worth less .... "
Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 11
(1984). Nevertheless, disparities in bargaining power might ordinarily have prevented authors from obtaining such concessions in the first instance. Also, it is not clear that moviemakers, publishers, and other grantees are paying authors less today than they otherwise
would. Given discount rates, the value to a grantee of exclusive rights 35 years later is probably small, particularly since grantees can continue to use derivative works made prior to termination of the grants even after termination (e.g., motion picture dramatizations of novels). On
the operation of the derivative works exception, see Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153
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power to statutory beneficiaries rather than allowing it to 44descend to
those whom the author would prefer to designate by will. 1

Despite these and other minor restrictions on the power of transfer,
Congress, in the new copyright statute, ratified and even expanded the
powers of the copyright proprietor. Most notably, declaring its adherence to "the principle of unlimited alienability of copyright,"' 145 Congress further eased transferability of copyright interests by making
intellectual property more divisible than it had been under the prior
law. 146
Privileges of use and their limitations. A "privilege" to use and refrain
from using one's works is implicit in both the statutory grant of "exclusive rights" to use the work in designated ways 14 7 and in traditional
Anglo-American law, under which people may use the resources they
own. In addition, in 1912 the Supreme Court held that the privileges
of "using... selling, producing, or performing" a copyrighted work
are "[f]ederal right[s] specially set up and claimed" under the copyright
48
statutes.1
When the copyright holder loses the exclusive rights guaranteed by
section 106 or they expire, the work becomes a part of the public do(1985); see also Howard B. Abrams, Who 's Sony Vow?: Termination Rights and the Derivative W'orks
Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 181 (1985).
The power of termination is a species of "inalienable" entitlement. Inalienability sometimes serves the interests of the party who is deprived of the power of transfer, and sometimes
serves other interests. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of Property
Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1092-93, 1114.
The term "inalienable" is often applied to entitlements that can be waived but not sold.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64. It is possible for the law to go one step further, and
prohibit even the waiver of rights. Copyright law does not go so far. The termination power
is waivable, since no termination will occur unless the holder of the termination power takes
specific steps to assert it. The holder can also make a binding agreement to waive it, but only
many years after the initial grant. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1982).
144. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2) (1982). Grants made by will, however, are not
terminable. Id. §§ 203(a), 304 (c). That is, if an author died possessed of the right to make a
motion picture from her novel and bequeathed the right by will, the right so passed would not
be terminable. A probate court could not enforce, however, a provision in an author's will
purporting to bequeath her power to terminate a previously made movie contract to persons
other than the statutory beneficiaries.
145. HousE REPORT, supra note 143, at 123 ("The principle of unlimited alienability of
copyright is stated in clause (1) of section 201(d).").
146. Id. Prior law considered a copyright indivisible. Copyright's embrace of a series of
quite different entitlements that an author might wish to sell separately created a range of
difficulties. "The indivisibility concept mandated a single owner or proprietor ofcopyright at
any one time ....The ramifications of indivisibility reached such questions as notice, ownership, recordation of transfers, standing to sue, and taxes." ALAN LATMAN, ROBERT GORMAN &
JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 227 (2d ed. 1985). Under the new law, any
holder of an e'clusive license is an owner of copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 101; HousE REPORT, supra
note 143, at 123.
147. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (author has "rights to do" the enumerated activities).
148. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 431 (1912) (construing the applicable copyright
statute, U.S. Comp. Star. tit. 60, § 4952 (1901), and holding that a right to perform one's own
federally copyrighted play is a right under federal law sufficient to provide a basis for federal
jurisdiction). The Court used the term "right" in the general sense of "entitlement"; what
was at issue was clearly a privilege.
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main. Although the former copyright holder remains privileged to use
the work, she then shares the privileges with everyone else. This mutual sharing is familiar from the common law, too, where unowned or
abandoned resources can be used by all, "free as air to common
use."1 49 Unlike the common law pattern relating to unowned
tangibles, however, intellectual products whose copyrights have expired or been lost' 50 cannot be appropriated by later comers. Once a
work of authorship is in the public domain, it remains there.' 5 '
Although the copyright statute itself imposes virtually no limits on a
copyright owner's privileges of use,' 52 other branches of the law do.
Under defamation law, for example, an author might be privileged to
write a story but have a duty not to utilize the story to malign someone
falsely. Similarly, the law of fraud might prohibit an author from employing a talent for fiction in a deceptive enterprise. Antipornography
laws may also restrain distribution of certain works. Overall, however,
use limitations are few. This is not surprising since most limits on privileges in our system stem from a policy of preventing harm or invasion, 153 and much of the harm that works of expression can do is
permitted by the deference given to free speech under first amendment
54
doctrine.1
Even when a copyright owner lacks a privilege to use the work in a
particular way, the copyright proprietor may still retain the right to prohibit others' use. Thus, for example, antipornography laws might penalize the author of an obscene film for publishing or distributing the
work and thus effectively destroy the author's privileges for that work.
Yet the author may still possess exclusive rights in the work and thus be
able to command payment from anyone else who wishes to display it
149. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973) (citingJustice Brandeis in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)) (referring particularly to intellectual products).
150. Publication without proper notice has been treated as an abandonment regardless
of the copyright owner's subjective intent. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 405-406 (West 1977 & Supp.
1989). With the adoption of the Berne Convention, lack of notice ceases to cause a loss of
copyright.
151. New creators can adapt existing public domain works-for example, a composer
might newly arrange an old song-and have a copyright in the adaptations. The copyright
extends, however, only to what has been added. 17 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1982). Also note that
if a second author, unacquainted with the public domain work, happens to duplicate it, that
independently derived duplicate can be validly copyrighted. Id. § 102 (copyright given in
"original" works; novelty not required). The public domain work will remain free for all to
copy, but persons who copy its copyrighted twin will be infringers. Sheldon v. Metro Goldwyn Pictures, Inc., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936) (classic statement of the rule).
152. This contrasts with the many limitations it imposes on authors' exclusive rights. See
notes 134-140 supra and accompanying text.
153. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
154. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that the first
amendment barred public figure's claim that magazine's caricature was tortious intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
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(perhaps an exhibitor in a more sexually tolerant jurisdiction). 155
Not only are a creator's privileges of use fairly unconstrained in intellectual property law, but a creator also has privileges of not using the
creation. For example, a nondisclosure privilege is inherent in the
"right of first publication" long guaranteed by state common law. 15 6
Although the 1976 federal Copyright Act preempted most state common law of copyright,' 5 7 the Supreme Court recently stressed that the
judiciary would continue to protect the author's first publication rights
strenuously.' 5 8 In the patent area, the right not to use one's patent and
even to suppress it deliberately is well established. 15 9
Yet some negative consequences may attach to nonuse. For exam-

ple, in the right-of-publicity area, some controversy has attached to the
question of whether a deceased celebrity's heirs should be able to assert the celebrity's right of publicity only if the celebrity had exploited
that right while alive.' 60 In the copyright field, authors who do not allow access to their works after initial publication' 6 ' may find their ex62
clusion rights somewhat vulnerable to the fair use doctrine.'
155. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir.
1979) (obscenity held not a defense to infringement action); see also Belcher v. Tarbox, 486
F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 1973) (fraudulent content held not a defense to infringement
action).
156. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privay, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 197202 (1890) (suggesting that the "right of first publication" expresses a right of privacy).
157. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989); note 97 supra.
158. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
159. See Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945) (patentee is free not to use, and
to suppress, its patent). The courts have hinted, however, that this liberty may be limited
where a refusal to license a life-saving invention, or even a health-promoting process, is at
issue. See id. at 380-84 (Douglas,J., dissenting); see also Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941, 945-46 (9th Cir.) (patentee's refusal to license
vitamin-enriching process for oleomargarine, 'the butter of the poor,' might justify denying
injunction against patent infringement) (dicta), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945).
160. The trend seems to be away from requiring such exploitation. See SHELDON W.
HALPERN, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND "MORAL RIGHTs" 537-85 (1988).
161. Exercising the privilege of nonuse is very unlikely to prejudice an author's ability to
assert her exclusion rights as long as no publication at all has occurred. See Harper& Row, 471
U.S. at 551 (copying unpublished work is particularly unlikely to qualify as fair use). In such a
context, privacy interests, and even a first amendment right not to speak, may be implicated.
In a recent controversial opinion, the Second Circuit extended this respect for a copyright
owner's interest in controlling initial publication to a case where the author of the unpublished work is no longer alive and where, unlike in Harper& Row, the copyright owners would
themselves be unwilling to publish the passages quoted or paraphrased by the defendant. See
New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795 (2d Cir. Apr. 19,
1989). Although, as the court notes, the copyright owners would "make available" L. Ron
Hubbard's unpublished writings to someone writing an "authorized biography," id., slip op.
at 288 1, the unflattering passages would be unlikely to appear in such a publication and might
thus remain unpublished for the full duration of the copyright.
162. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1632-35 (antidissemination motives). See also
Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11 th Cir. 1984) ("The fact that [plaintiff television
station] does not actively market copies of the news programs [copied and sold by defendant]
does not matter, for Section 107 looks to the 'potential market' in analyzing the effects of an
alleged infringement," id. at 1496, but the case might present different issues if the station
"absolutely refused to allow the public to view recordings or scripts of its broadcasts," id. at
1498.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
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Similarly, the intellectual property rights that have emerged from the
common law of unfair competition are often harder to assert if the
plaintiff does not serve the particular market where the defendant is
responding to public demand. Thus, some state courts have demanded
as a prerequisite to a misappropriation action that the plaintiff show
163
that the defendant competed with the plaintiff in the given market.
In addition, the first amendment is more likely to defeat an intellectual property claim if the plaintiff is enforcing the exclusion right to
prevent utilization of the work. For example, the Supreme Court held
that the Constitution did not prevent Ohio from giving a "human cannonball" a common law right against a television station that had
broadcast the entirety of his unfixed performance without permission. 6 4 But the Court suggested that the result might have been different if, rather than using his rights to extract compensation, the plaintiff
had sought to suppress dissemination:
[I]t is important to note that neither the public nor [the television station] will be deprived of the benefit of petitioner's performance as long
as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately recognized. Petitioner [Zacchini] does not seek to enjoin 6the
broadcast of his perform5
ance; he simply wants to be paid for it.'
Thus, at least after initial disclosure, an intellectual property owner's
privileges not to use or license the work may be slightly limited as the
courts seek to ensure that someone is serving the public interest by
disseminating the work.
Finally, the "real world" limits privileges even when the law does
not. A privilege's value depends on the privilege holder's ability to exercise it. This point is important not only when assessing the impact of
copyright (the author of an unpopular song or unpublishable story gets
very little from her privileges of use), but also when considering recommendations, like those of copyright critics, that privileges be substituted for rights. 166 Someone holding a privilege unaccompanied by
rights is vulnerable to the interference of other persons utilizing their
own privileges of action.
163. See James Rahl, The Right to "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 OHIO ST. LJ. 56, 57
(1962). Professor Rahl notes that "the court's protection will be reserved for situations in
which defendant's conduct threatens to destroy the opportunity to market the trade value, the
prospect of which has induced plaintiff to bring it forth." Id. at 63. While this indicates that
an owner's refusal to use her property beneficially should trigger partial loss of her right to
exclude, several misappropriation cases have declined to take that approach. See, e.g., Board
of Trade v. Dow Jones & Co., 98 Ill.
2d 109, 456 N.E.2d 84 (1983) (holding competition
between the parties not a prerequisite to misappropriation suit and permitting DowJones to
enjoin use of the Dow Jones average in a market it did not wish to serve).
164. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); see also text
accompanying notes 457-458 infra.
165. Id. at 578. Some authority would limit this concern for public access solely to
"facts." See New Era Publications, Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795.
166. See generally Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 321-22; text accompanying
notes 246-264, 393-401 infra.
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B. Assessing the Patterns
This article has thus far demonstrated that the tangible and intangible property structures are quite similar. Both have three key components: rights of exclusion, powers of transfer, and privileges of use.
Two important differences, however, must be assessed. The first concerns boundaries: Since tangible property has physical edges while intangible property does not, how can intangibles be property? The
second pertains to how an owner's exclusion rights are defined, for
where a realty owner has rights against physical intrusion, an intangible's owner has rights over use. What are the implications of this
difference?
In the following material, I suggest that intellectual property doctrine provides functional substitutes for the missing element of tangibility and argue that this functional understanding explains intellectual
property law's willingness to give rights over use. I also suggest that as
a result, restraints on liberty need not be any more a part of intellectual
property rights than they are of any property rights. Finally, I show the
similarity in economic role played by the entitlement package in both
forms of property. In sum, I suggest that copyright is functionally as
well as structurally consistent with tangible property.
1.

"Thingness," "use, " and the role of boundaries.

How can intellectual property's grant of rights over use or enjoyment be squared with the law of tangible property, where ordinarily
someone else's extraction of benefits from the owner's resource is not
per se actionable? For real property, a stranger's mere benefit from
("use" of) the land does not ordinarily give the landowner a right of
action. Someone who crawls under the fence to see the circus is trespassing; someone who looks through a hole in the fence is not. An
owner must ordinarily plead and prove intrusion before he can be
awarded a share in a user's profits. 167 On the other hand, a copyright
owner is presumptively entitled "to demand compensation from (or to
deny access to) any group who would otherwise be willing to pay to see
or hear the copyrighted work." 168 The owner of the copyright in a
painting of a beautifully landscaped garden can therefore demand compensation from the publisher who prints a copy of the painting in a
book. The owner of a magnificently landscaped garden, however, can167. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text. Although the courts sometimes
speak of the "right to exclusive use" for tangible personalty, see Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,
26 Wash. 2d 282, 286, 173 P.2d 652, 654 (1946), they seem to mean by that a right to exclusive physical use, equating "use" with a physical intermeddling that has benefited the defendant. Language concerning the "right to exclusive use" in the tangible property context tends
to appear where there has been some physical intermeddling with the object. See id. at 286-87,
173 P.2d at 653-54. Such physical touchings invade the owner's interest in physical
dominion.
168. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
cited with approval in Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985).
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not demand compensation from those who benefit, even monetarily,
from the sight or proximity of the landscaping.
Why should harmless 169 enjoyment of another's resources be actionable in intellectual property, yet nonactionable in the tangible
realm? The answer lies largely in the similar role played by different
types of boundaries in the two areas of law. For realty, physical intrusion triggers restitution; 170 for copyright, violation of a specified exclusive right does the same.
In the law of real property, physical boundaries are essential to organizing transactions. To have a market, the objects to be bought,
sold, and licensed must be clearly identified. Outside the market
sphere, boundaries function to keep an owner's rights within socially
tolerable limits. Because physical boundaries give notice as to what
constitutes a trespass, they make planning for the future possible
("What activities can I pursue without worrying that my neighbor's
property interests give him grounds to sue me?") and make the tracing
of consequences from past action practicable ("Now that someone has
trespassed, what harms or profits have flowed from it?").
These functions are go important that where physical boundaries
lack this capacity to limit liability, even common law liability for harm is
much less likely to be imposed. 17 1 Limitless liability for benefits-a
rule that we each be required to pay for any enjoyment or use we draw
from another person's property-would be even more potentially explosive. Requiring that a landowner prove a boundary crossing helps
contain this liability.
169. "Harm" to a plaintiff in the usual tort context is determined by looking to the plaintiff's condition "in the absence of any interaction with the other party." Susan Rose-Ackerman, I'd Rather Be Liable Than Iou: A Vote on Property Rules and Liability Rules, 6 Ir'L REV. L. &
ECON. 255, 258 (1986). The controversial but still dominant "but for" test of causation exemplifies this approach: "But for the defendant's interaction with the plaintiff, what would the
plaintiff's welfare have been?" Thus, in a standard tort case, if the defendant has benefited
from his interaction with the plaintiff, but without making the plaintiff any worse off than the
plaintiff would have been if the interaction had not occurred, the plaintiff will be treated as
one who has suffered no harm.
However, "harm" is a relative concept that depends for its content on specification of a
baseline, and "absence of any interaction," id., is only one possible baseline. See text accompanying notes 190-195, infra, for further discussion of this issue.
170. George Palmer notes that while "[r]estitution is generally awarded only in order to
deprive the defendant of an enrichment obtained at the plaintiff's expense... [t]here need
[not] be any loss to the plaintiff except in the sense that a legally protected interest has been
invaded." 1 GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAw OF RESTITUTION § 2.10, at 133 (1978). For some of
the technical difficulties arising when unjust enrichment remedies are sought for harmless
trespasses, see D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 372-75.
171. Avoiding that 'nightmare of the common law judges,' unlimited liability, has long
been a motivating force in the law. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE

195-98 (1927). Tort law exhibits this concern in proximate cause doctrine and in the courts'
reluctance to make emotional and economic losses as easily recoverable as physical losses. In
partially explaining the latter phenomenon, for example, Harvey Perlman has suggested that
while physical harms must come to rest somewhere, economic effects have no natural stopping point. Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with Contractand Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash
of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 61, 72 (1982).
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In short, an interdependent world requires demarcations to avoid
paralysis and preserve valuable, mutually beneficial reciprocities. 172 As
John Dawson has argued,
Uncompensated gains are pervasive and universal; our well-being and
survival depend on them.... Even with a bank of monster computers
one could hardly estimate the consequences of discovering electric
light. The radius of the fallout and the number of beneficiaries on
whom it descends must be sharply reduced before one could even con1 73
sider tracing the fallout back to its source.
Physical boundaries provide one important limit. Copyright provides
its own boundaries which, by and large, substitute well for physical
boundaries, both in regard to promoting transactions 174 and to keeping liability within tolerable limits.
First among these substitute boundaries are copyright's fixation and
demarcation requirements. Federal statutory copyright gives ownership not in vague and hazy abstractions but in "works of authorship"
which are "fixed" in a "tangible medium of expression."' 175 The works
so fixed-whether pencil-written melodies, tape-recorded symphonies,
printed books, or computer programs embedded in plastic disks-have
identifiable boundaries and stable identities much as physical things
do.17 6 Additionally, notices attached to these "fixed" copies when the
172. In cultural life, the costs of tracing and administering payment might be high
enough to bring intellectual life to a standstill if an unbridled restitutionary principle is allowed full play. But in the end there may be little conflict between the need to limit the
restitutionary principle to avoid paralysis and the desire to give a "fair return" to those whose
labor generates benefits for others. In many situations, it will likely be "just" to pay no compensation, because the donors will reap reciprocal benefits from leaving such benefits uncompensated in the long run. For example, authors might prefer having no copyright in their own
oral conversations, see notes 182-183 infra, or in their general ideas, if the alternative meant
that they would have to secure others' permission every time they wanted to quote a speaker
or convey to a third party another's idea. For further exploration of this theme, see W.
Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55; see also notes 530-533 infra and accompanying
text (Pareto-based privileges of use).
This argument is obviously indebted to Frank Michelman's treatment ofjust compensation law. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof
*justCompensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1222-24 (1967). In situations of reciprocity,
where today's restrained landowner is likely to benefit tomorrow from like restraints on
others, Michelman suggests that fairness does not require compensation to be paid. His analysis treats the possibility that restrained landowners may be better off in the long run without
compensation, if having been compensated they would then (in their role as taxpayers) have
to compensate all others similarly situated and bear the high administrative costs of doing so,
or forgo (in their role as members of the public) the benefits of having a restraint like the one
affecting their land applied to others' land as well. Id. at 1223-35, 1248-51. Similarly, there
are some areas in which authors might benefit more from unencumbered reciprocity than
from rights and duties over copying.
173. Dawson, supra note 127, at 1412. On the virtues of preserving the unencumbered
interdependence of modern life, see National Football League v. Governor of Delaware, 435
F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977).
174. See Gordon, Fair L'se, supra note 14, at 1612 (examining the economic role of demarcation in copyright).
175. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
176. See Terrell & Smith, supra note 14, at 28-54 ("thingness as specificity"). However,
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works are published mark them as owned.' 77 Although the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 makes the use of notices voluntary
rather than mandatory,178 notices will probably continue to be widely
used since, under the Act, the use of notices reduces defendants' ability
to use the "innocent infringer" defense to mitigate damages. 179 Fixation and notice requirements warn potential infringers of the copyright
holder's claims. 1 8 0 They also make it easier to avoid mistaken infringement and resulting unfair surprise. 18 1
Even state common law copyright in unfixed works seems to require
that the work of authorship be bounded in some way.182 When Ernest
Hemingway's widow claimed an ownership interest in the author's oral
conversations, the New York court refused to honor the claim. Comparing oral with written communications, the court indicated that anyone who wished to exclude others from using his oral communications
must provide boundaries around his claim and warn others that he asserts ownership.
Letters. . . -like plays and public addresses, written or not-have distinct, identifiable boundaries and they are, in most cases, only occasional products. Whatever difficulties attend the formulation of
suitable rules for the enforcement of rights in such works ... they are
relatively manageable. However, conversational speech, the distinctive
behavior of man, is quite another matter, and subjecting any part of it
to the restraints of common-law copyright presents unique problems.
One such problem ...

is that of avoiding undue restraints on the

freedoms of speech and press and, in particular, on the writers of history and of biographical works ....
the copyright owner's rights over adaptation and over non-verbatim copying can create some
fuzziness at the edges.
177. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-406 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989).
178. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 7, 102 Stat.
2853, 2857 (1988). This Act modifies formalities in American copyright law to meet the international Berne Convention membership requirements.
179. Id. § 7(a)(4); see also id. § 7(b)(4) (similar provision for notices on phonorecords).
According to the Joint Explanatory Statement on Amendment to S. 1301 and H.R. 4262, 36
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 901, at 648, 650-51 (Oct. 13, 1988), section 7
"eliminates the mandatory notice requirement and replaces it with an incentive for voluntary
notice." For other federal provisions regarding the use of notices, see 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1982)
(patent notices); 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982) (trademark notices).
180. As Justice O'Connor notes of the notice requirement in patent law, it "is designed
'for the information of the public'... and provides a ready means of discerning the status of
the intellectual property embodied in an article of manufacture or design." Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 983 (1989). Patent law provides "clear federal
demarcation between public and private property." Id.
181. Copyright law, like the law of trespass, does not exempt good faith, innocent infringement. A person who walks on a neighbor's land is trespassing even if she honestly
believes the land is her own. A composer who has heard a rival's music is similarly liable if he
unconsciously copies it. Both copyright law (via the notice requirement) and land use law (via
recordation requirements) try to minimize the occasions on which such mistakes will occur.
Boundaries and demarcation also help keep property rights from imposing unanticipated obligations of payment on recipients of benefits.
182. The 1976 Act did not preempt state protection for "unfixed" works. See 17
U.S.C.A. § 301 (West 1977 & Supp. 1989); note 97 supra.
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Assuming, without deciding, that in a proper case a common-law
copyright in certain limited kinds of spoken dialogue might be recognized, it would, at the very least, be required that the speaker indicate
that he intended to mark off the utterance in question from the ordinary stream of speech, that he meant to adopt it as a unique statement
and that he wished to exercise control over its publication. In the conventional common-law copyright situation, this indication is afforded
183
by the creation of the manuscript itself.
The second way in which copyright imposes boundaries is by declaring only a limited set of intellectual products protectable.18 4 The copyright statute gives authors no rights at all in some aspects of creative
works. Themes and general ideas may be copied without violating
copyright law, 18 5 for copyright protects only the author's expression.
Copyright similarly does not restrain the copying of systems, methods
of operation, processes, or discoveries that a work of authorship may
contain;18 6 and the statute's protection does not extend to an article's
utilitarian features, no matter how aesthetically pleasing they might
be. 187
A third type of boundary is found in the statutory grant of only a
183. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 347, 349, 244 N.E.2d 250,
254-55, 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 777, 779 (1968). Regarding the court's reference to "conventional common-law copyright," recall that at the time Hemingway was decided, states' "common-law copyright" covered unpublished documents such as letters.

184. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
185. See id. § 102(b); note 127 and text accompanying notes 126-129 supra; see also Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (classic discussion by judge
Learned Hand of those elements in literary works that may be borrowed by others), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
186. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982). For example, assume someone invents and publishes a
description of a solar-powered outboard motor. A copyright in the description will not impose on persons who read the description any duty to refrain from using what they learn from
it to build such a motor or from selling it in competition with its inventor. The author's rights
cover only the expression in the description. Furthermore, if the only way to communicate a
given idea or system is to use the original author's language, then even copying of the particular language is permitted. See Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir.
1967) (no copyright in short statement of contest rules where there is only limited number of
ways to convey their substance); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir.)
(legal forms copyrightable but infringement finding necessitates higher-than-usual amount of
copying), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definitions of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"
and "useful article"); id. § 113; HousE REPORT, supra note 143, at 54-55, 105 ("Unless the
shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress ... or any other industrial product contains
some element that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be copyrighted under the bill." Id. at 55.); see
also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (statuette held entitled to copyright although sold as
lamp base).
The dividing line between utility and aesthetics is often hard to locate, even within a
single circuit's opinions. Compare Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411
(2d Cir. 1985) (plaintiff's mannequins not copyrightable) with Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories
by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (plaintiff's ornamental belt buckles copyrightable);
see also Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (plaintiff's modernistic lighting
fixtures not copyrightable), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Norris Indus. v. International Tel.
& Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11 th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff's automobile wheel covers not copy-
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limited set of rights. As previously outlined, copyright gives proprietors defined rights over specific ways in which people can benefit from a
work,
rather than giving authors a generalized right to all the bene18 8
fits.

For example, section 106 gives copyright owners no right to

control the public's ability to learn from a work or to enjoy it, as long as
the public does its learning or enjoying in ways that do not involve reproducing the work or doing one of the other specified acts reserved to
the copyright proprietor. Thus, as an owner of realty has a right to be
paid for the use of his land if he can prove intrusion, to be paid for use
the owner of copyright must prove the defendant violated boundaries:
a specific section 106 right in regard to a protectable aspect of an original and "fixed" work of authorship. Nor can the copyright holder obtain relief simply because someone's activities are causing her economic
harm. To be actionable, the harm must result from copying or some
other prohibited act. Thus an author cannot successfully sue a competitor whose more popular, but independently created, work is cutting
into her market. As is often true with physical property, the copyright
owner's rights to recompense for economic harm is parasitic on intrusion, the violation of boundaries.
Although they are not physically "crossable," the fixation and marking requirements and the limits on protectable intellectual products
and copyright owners' rights function as boundaries in the same way as
the edges on personal property or physical boundaries around realty
do. Inevitably, the boundaries of intangibles will be less precise than
the metes and bounds of realty, and the courts must be vigilant in enforcing copyright's limits lest the public be "chilled" in its proper use
of the unprotected aspects of a work.' 89 If this vigilance is maintained,
rightable). See generally Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and IndustrialDesign: A Suggested Approach
to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707 (1983).
188. See Berlin v. E.G. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 543 (2d Cir.) (rebuffing plaintiff's
claim that "the copyright laws restrict the economic benefits of copyrighted works to the copyright holders"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). Copyright thus tends to avoid the dangers of
unlimited accountings that concerned John Dawson, supra note 127, at 1412.
189. Although first amendment issues are outside the scope of this article, it may be
worthwhile to discuss briefly the question of whether duties not to copy or adapt creative
works create qualitatively different burdens on the public than do the duties not to harm and
duties not to enter that characterize tangible property; in particular: Do copyright's duties
inhibit liberty of thought and expression?
The short answer has three parts. First, since intellectual property does not protect
ideas, there is no explicit control on the expression of ideas one has learned from others.
Second, intellectual property, like the rest of the law, only imposes duties regarding physical
actions: replication, public performance, and public display. It does not purport to control
thought. However, some of these physical actions do have a special and intimate relation to
freedom of thought and expression of ideas. This leads to the third point: To the extent
intellectual property does indirectly impose such restraints, its borders should be redrawn.
Speaking one's mind in public is a form of public performance, for example, and responding
to one's opponents effectively may demand some use of their expression. That use should be
permitted. See New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795,
slip op. 2863, 2884 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 1989) (Oakes, C.J., concurring).
Connection between the physical and the intellectual also occurs, though with less frequency, in the law of tangible property. Both tangible property law and intellectual property
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copyright's boundaries can work simultaneously to identify the staked
claim over which others must respect the owner's entitlements and to
identify the intellectual material open to use by all. Because the natures of the intellectual property and tangible property boundaries differ, the natures of "trespass" and "infringement" differ. Yet the
boundaries function alike in identifying what constitutes "property."
2.

Harms and benefits.

Copyright gives authors an ability to sue for a share in the profits
others make from using their works. In doing so, does copyright really
go further than giving rights against harm? In the text so far I have
been willing to assume so, in order to highlight certain potential differences between copyright and tangible property, but in fact the answer
is largely a matter of definition. The word "harm" is usually used to
indicate the extent to which someone's welfare is below some specified
baseline level of welfare.1 90 Whether to call the author's failure to receive revenues from particular copiers a "harm" thus depends on how
one characterizes the author's baseline.
The clearest case of "harm" is where a copier sells to the author's
own customers a product identical (except for its lower price) to what
the author would have sold, so that the author's sales are diverted to
the copier. Giving the copyright owner a right to share in the infringer's profits where those profits simply represent revenues that the
copyright proprietor would herself have earned in the infringer's absence would be uncontroversially described both as a right against
"harm" and as a right to recapture benefits. (It is commonly recognized that in the area of intangibles it can be difficult to measure the
amount of injury, and that giving authors a share in the profits copiers
make is in part a reaction to, and compensation for, that difficulty.' 9 )
If the copying does not affect the copyright owner's expected markets,
the case is harder to classify. Such a case might arise in several ways;
perhaps the copier is a second creative artist with a valuable and novel
law should and usually do give way when such conflicts occur. Thus, when the owner of a
"company town" uses ights against trespass to inhibit first amendment rights, the federal
Constitution requires those trespass fights to give way. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946). When the owner of a shopping mall uses rights against trespass to keep out activists
bearing petitions, certain state constitutions will require those rights, too, to give way and will
privilege the strangers' entrance despite the landowner's protests. See Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Similarly, and more systematically, copyright's fair use
doctrine, and its refusal to give creators rights over ideas, seek to ensure that rights over
copying will not significantly inhibit liberties that are essential to human self-expressiveness
or to political life. To the extent such inhibition is threatened, copyright need not be abandoned. It can be designed to give way when conflicts occur. One can criticize particular copyright decisions for being insufficiently sensitive to first amendment issues without
condemning copyright as a whole.
190. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAw: HARM TO OTHERS 65
(1984).
191. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 431-34.
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conception for adapting the copyrighted work, someone who transmits
the work to a new audience using a communications technology invented after the work was created, or perhaps an entrepreneur who
knows of a market of which the author is ignorant. Assume that the
revenues these copiers earn are not revenues the copyright owner
could have earned on her own. If the author is entitled to control all
copying of her work then a lack of compensation from these copiers will
make her worse off than she was legally entitled to be. If "harm" is
defined as the extent to which she is worse off in comparison with how
she would have fared had the copier respected her copyright and paid the
license fees the author would have demanded, then these copying activities done without her permission will be said to "harm" her. However, if she is entitled to control all copying of her work, but "harm" is
instead defined as the extent to which she is worse off in comparison
with how she would have fared in the defendant's absence, then it will not
be said that she has been "harmed" in these cases. One would say instead that when the copyright law allows a copyright proprietor to sue
successfully in such circumstances, it is solely giving her an entitlement
to share in the benefits her work generates.
For the issues raised by copyright law, it is largely irrelevant
whether the author's entitlement is viewed as an entitlement to be "free
from harm" or "to share benefit." As I will explore shortly, it is appropriate that copyright should give rights beyond mere protection against
harm (narrowly defined). Among other things, it is desirable for authors to be responsive to the public demand in new areas as well as
established ones, 19 2 and a rule of law that denied authors compensation except to their "expected" markets could cause line-drawing
problems that would dampen the incentives that new markets should
bring.

19 3

An additional point about the harm/benefit distinction should be
mentioned. Although it is frequently argued that the law should only
be employed to regulate behavior that causes "harm to others," that
argument in its strongest form has no applicability to copyright. The
"harm to others" argument is best used to argue that the law should
not regulate the category of behaviors John Stuart Mill described as
"self-regarding"-behavior that affects the actor much more than any192. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1621-22. It might be argued that potential
revenues from unexpected uses are unlikely to play much of a role in the author's pre-creation
planning, and they are thus irrelevant to incentives. However, revenues from works at various
stages of an author's or publisher's career commonly cross-subsidize each other. Thus, a
frequent argument for copyright is that the occasional best seller and its mammoth revenues
makes possible a publisher's willingness to give first time authors a tryout. For an individual
author, too, whose books are well adapted to a new use (for example, particularly suited to
cinematic presentation), obtaining large revenues the first time his work appears in the new
medium may be important in providing him the wherewithal to make a second work.
193. Further, it can be quite difficult to decide what is or is not an "expected" use. For
example, there certainly had been some expectation that new broadcast media would evolve
once radio was in existence and prior to the time television was announced as practical.
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one else. 194 However, copying is not a "self-regarding" act; a legal decision whether or not to allow unauthorized copying to proceed does
not only or primarily affect the copier. Italso affects the author. For
example, obtaining revenues from a new use could make the difference
between a novelist staying a novelist or quitting to take a job in
advertising.
A different question is presented if enforcing the copyright entitlement would not generate new revenues for the copyright owner; in
such a case, the act of copying could conceivably be regarded as "selfregarding." In such cases, however, it is far from clear that the copyright owner could bring a successful suit.' 9 5
3.

Diferences in liability criteria.

Although formally the owners of both tangible and intangible property have a similar right to recapture benefits 19 6 achieved through intrusion, there may be some concern that the impact of this right will be
greater in the intangible realm. Physical boundaries might allow a wide
range of uses to occur without compensation. Intangible rights'
boundaries, by contrast, have been artificially defined precisely to bring
within their scope a wide range of the uses that can be made of the
product. When copyright gives authors rights over specific forms of
use,19 7 the law arguably risks imposing a more expansive liability than
with rights against physical intrusion or harm.
However, the differences are not as great as they may seem, and to
the extent the design of intellectual property is broader, this breadth is
tolerated because copyrights would provide little real protection without it. For physical property, rights triggered by intrusion allow the
owners of realty to control most of the uses made of their land. Since
most economically significant uses of land require physical entry (growing crops on arable land, building skyscrapers on a city plot) and most
economically significant uses of tangible personalty require physical intermeddling (eating an apple, driving a car), rights against physical intrusion indirectly give tangible property owners a right to control most
194. SeeJOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 91-95 (C. Shields ed. 1956). The typical example is freedom of thought or sexual behavior; since how X thinks or how X behaves in the
bedroom affects X more than it does anyone else, and since controlling X's thoughts or sexual
behavior would hurt X more than it could help anyone else, the law should not interfere in
these aspects of X's life. Other interpretations of "self-regarding act" and of Mill's position
can be made. For example, it might be argued that Mill was not merely making a utilitarian
calculus, but also had in mind a particular substantive idea for human development or a particular preference for liberty. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, in MORALITY AND THE LAW
107, 117-18 (R.A. Wasserstrom ed. 1971) (exploring non-utilitarian arguments in On Liberty).
Such a position might have different implications for intellectual property.
195. I have suggested that such copiers have a good claim to the privilege of fair use. See
generally Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14; text accompanying notes 434-435 infra.
196. See text accompanying notes 190-195 supra.
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
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economically significant uses of what they own. 1 98 On the other hand,
a right against physical intrusion would not enable an intellectual property owner to control most economically significant uses of the intellectual product. For example, assume that someone visits a park and
photographs a famous statue, intending to mass-produce a replica of
the statue in plastic. Giving the sculptor a right only to control physical
touching of the work would give her no effective remedy. Or assume
that someone writes a symphony. Inexpensive portable taping techniques may make it possible for someone who hears a broadcast of the
work, or who is a member of the audience present at the work's performance, to make recordings that will compete with the composer's
own records.
In these examples, a right against physical intrusion alone is unlikely
to make the sculptor or composer fully responsive to the public demand for what they can produce. More generally, resources tend to be
utilized most efficiently when the decisionmakers must take the costs
and benefits of potential decisions into account when deciding. In economic language, they must "internalize" the costs and benefits. Demsetz and others have argued that "the main allocative function of
property rights is the internalization of beneficial and harmful effects
....
"199 In the law of tangible property, an owner is encouraged to
keep his land from going to waste and to use it productively because he
bears the loss or reaps the profit that results. The same logic applies to
accident law. Forcing harm-causers to "internalize" the costs of their
harm by imposing tort liability on them deters their careless behavior.
Intellectual property performs the same internalization function; as
accident law discourages careless behavior by internalizing costs, copyright encourages productive behavior by giving creators a share in the
benefits they generate. For a nonaltruistic benefit-creator to alter her
behavior to increase the benefits her work will give to others, economic
theory suggests, she must be able to internalize at least part of those
benefits. The more revenues the author can expect, the more she is
likely to invest time, effort, or money in creating new works. As the
statue and symphony examples suggest, achieving internalization of
benefits for intangibles largely depends on rights not tied to physical
touching.
Doctrinally, the Supreme Court seems not unduly distressed by differences between rights to exclude physically, on the one hand, and
rights to control or profit from the benefits that flow from use, on the
other. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,200 the Court held that intellectual
property rights (there, trade secrets) could constitute "property" enti198. It might be suggested that control over the physical wQrk will in fact give the author
or artist the same control as would copyright. See text accompanying notes 326-369 infra.
199. Demsetz, supra note 21, at 450; see also Arrow, supra note 21.
200. 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984).
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tled to the protection of the fifth amendment's "takings" clause. 20 1
When the government, without prior notice that confidentiality would
not be respected, obtained one company's trade secrets and then allowed other companies to use them, the Court required the government to pay compensation. 20 2 In treating an occasion in which the
government had simply made it possible for one entity to take physically nonintrusive advantage of another as a taking of property, the
Court demonstrated its comfort with the different liability criteria for
tangible and intangible property.
4. Economicfunctions of the entitlement package.
We can easily see why each of us should have dominion over our
bodies. Under all of the normative perspectives one could name-natural law, 20 3 Hegelian philosophy, 20 4 utilitarianism, 20 5 economics, 20 6
common sense-it is easy to defend the notion that a soul should have
dominion over the body it inhabits, in particular, a right to say "no" to
intrusions. But it is not so clear why persons should be given the right
to control things that lie outside their bodies, things as to which other
persons might also have claims. Many theorists, including John
Locke, 20 7 have attempted to justify dominion over property as an out201. See also Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (confidential information
is "property" under the mail fraud statute).
202. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1013-14.
203. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27, in Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT 283 (P. Laslett ed. 1970) (arguing that persons have "natural" rights in self and
products of the self.
204. See Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-78, 986-88
(1982) (exploring Hegelian notions of property).
205. A utilitarian argument might run as follows: Someone else's action that affects my
body will probably affect me more than it does them, so giving me control over my body is
likely to help me more than it frustrates that other person, thus leading to an increase in
utility. Giving me a legal right to exclude will cause less social disruption than will leaving me
to rely on my own efforts to effectuate this control. (This argument adapts and extends Mill's
argument for liberty regarding self-regarding acts, which pertained to the privilege of being
free from state control, seeJ.S. MILL, supra note 194, to include rights to call upon the legal
system to prevent other private parties from interfering with the self.) In addition, loss of
control over the self injures dignity, which causes disutility.
Of course, this is simply an argument to show how a right over one's body might be derived from considerations of utility. There may be circumstances where it is controversial
whether such a right could be so derived. Supporters of the military draft, for example, might
try to use utility arguments to justify giving the state certain rights over one's body, particularly in wartime.
206. Economists might adopt the utilitarian argument in part, although the relationship
between "wealth maximization" and "utility" is always problematic. See generally JULES L.
COLEMAN, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maeimization, in MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAw 95-132
(1988). Alternatively, their argument might stress information and other transaction costs:
Decisions about interferences with a body are not easily monetized; the person with the best
information about the applicable costs is likely to be the person whose body it is, and this
person will probably be better able to act on any decision reached than a third-party decisionmaker. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1096-97.
207. Although Locke's view of property is often perceived as not based on "personality"
interests, his basic argument was that a right of property in the things one labors to produce
or appropriate grows out of one's right to control the labor of one's body. SeeJ. LOCKE, supra
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growth of rights over one's personal self;20 8 and an argument of that

sort might also be used to justify intellectual property. 20 9 In addition,
many property rights clearly serve also to encourage desirable patterns
of resource use. Since much of the criticism copyright faces is economically based, I shall explore the latter function and inquire into whether
the institution's role in providing incentives differentiates it from tangible property.
The market-promoting and internalizing character of the legal institution known as "property" has been noted frequently in regard to tangible resources. 2 10 As suggested above, the copyright statute similarly
facilitates the use and development of copyrighted works through markets. 2 1 Putting the matter most simply: 'Just as a farmer will not voluntarily cultivate land if any other person can come along and harvest
the land, an author without copyright will not have sufficient pecuniary
incentive to engage in the productive act of artistic creation. ' 21 2 The
following discussion will show how the various components of the intellectual property package-the privileges, powers, and rights-all have
distinct economic functions that allow authors to market their works
and thus share in the benefits their works provide.
Privileges. Privileges have at least three sorts of value for the creator,
even when considered without reference to rights over copying. First,
with the liberty to use 2 13 a work, the creator can enjoy the work herself.
note 203, § 27; see also Karl Olivecrona, Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of
Property, 35J. HIST. IDEAS 211, 215 (1974) (examining how notions of property and personality were intermixed for several natural law theorists: "We have the feeling of our personality
being in some inexplicable way extended to encompass the objects we own."); Karl
Olivecrona, Locke's Theory of Appropriation, 24 PHIL. Q. 220, 225 (1974) (suggesting that for
Locke, "Ithe spiritual personality is extended so as to encompass physical objects").
208. For an argument that the "personal" element should remain an active and explicit
part of property law, see generally Radin, supra note 204.
209. Immanuel Kant is often associated with the view that authors' personal interests
can justify copyright, though the implications of Kant's'views are far from clear. See EMANUEL
KANT, Of the Iyustice of Counterfeiting Books, in 1 ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL,
AND VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 225 (W. Richardson trans. 1798), discussed in Breyer,
supra note 3, at 288-89.
210. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Calabresi
& Melamed, supra note 64, at 1099 (rights of exclusion and powers of transfer facilitate markets); Demsetz, supra note 21, at 347-48, 354-58.
211. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1605-10 (general overview of the market
model), 1610-14 (analysis of copyright markets). For recent analyses usefully discussing the
parallel functions performed by legal and physical modes of exclusion in market formation,
see Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 21; Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopyingand Price Discrimination, supra note 21; Palmer, supra note 6.
212. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying and Price Discrimination,supra note 21, at 184.
Economic critics of copyright ask whether in the absence of property rights strangers would
indeed be able to capture enough remuneration to undermine creators' incentives. A similar
critique is often made of private property. Other entitlement packages might, in particular
circumstances, facilitate desirable exchanges even better than the private property model. See,
eg., Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41, at 717-39.
213. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) (listing copyright holder's privileges, powers, and
rights).
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A creator wants to be able to sing her own song just as she wants to be
able to eat her own apple.
Second, value stems from the privilege not to use one's own work.
Nondisclosure is perhaps the most economically significant privilege,
for the threat of nonavailability gives the author leverage with which to
exact payment from potential users for access to the work. That threat
is credible as long as the author possesses the only copies, for she can
use tangible property law to keep those copies secure from prying eyes
and photocopy machines. Once copies of the work are in hands other
than the author's own, however, the creator may lose control of it unless the law gives her more than a mere privilege of nondisclosure and
tangible property rights. Depending on the nature of the work and the
market, once a copy of a work is provided even to one customer, strangers may obtain access to it through that customer. They then may
either use it without paying or, even worse for the author, copy it and
become competing sources of the work. The nondisclosure privilege
thus gives the author some power to demand recompense, but the extent of the revenues that she can generate after the first customer has
received a copy is uncertain.
Finally, creators may be able to charge others a fee for sharing in
their privileged use. For example, a composer can obtain significant
fees from an audience if she can use physical strength to exclude
nonpurchasers ("pay to hear me play my music or I'll have my bouncers
throw you out") or if she can piggyback protection of the intellectual
product on other legal rights like the right of exclusion from real property ("this is my concert hall and I'll call the cops if you try to come in
without paying").
Rights. The right to exclude-for intellectual property, the right to
refuse others the privilege of using the work in specified ways-supplements the privileges that an author has in crucial ways. An exclusion
right against copying greatly increases the copyright owner's ability to
prevent strangers from interfering with her ability to market the work.
Since others are prohibited from copying the work, strangers cannot
reproduce the copies to which they may have access and thus cannot
directly compete with the author in selling the work. This right raises
immensely the ability of the nondisclosure privilege to effectuate internalization, for the right counteracts the first-publication consequence
of making the author vulnerable to pirates.
The "trespass" character of infringement suits2 14 makes the exclu-

sive rights in copyright easier to use. As compared with trade secret or
trademark plaintiffs, a proprietor can more easily prevail in a copyright
infringement suit. She does not need to prove, in each individual case,
that the defendant's copying leads to a socially undesirable result, unlike the trademark plaintiff, who ordinarily must prove a likelihood of
214. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra (nature of action of trespass to land).
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confusion. She also need not show that the defendant committed any
independent bad act, unlike the trade secret plaintiff, who usually must
prove that defendants knew they were obtaining the contested information through someone's breach of trust. 2 15 This "formal" methodology, in which violation of the exclusion right is per se actionable, is a
typical example of the common law's ownership model. Rather than
inquiring independently into whether plaintiff or defendant should
control the contested use, as a prima facie matter the court defers to
the owner as to a sovereign whose will is law over the owned territory.2 1 6 The copyright plaintiff need not even prove that defendants
knew they were copying; as in trespass to realty, where a good faith and
reasonable belief that one is on one's own land will not protect a de7 even unconfendant who ignorantly crosses a neighbor's boundary, 21
2 18
scious copying gives rise to liability in copyright cases.
Limits on exclusion rights also have an economic dimension, in both
tangible property law and copyright. Just as a landowner's prima facie
trespass claim can be defeated by a defendant who bears the burden of
proving an applicable privilege, such as necessity, a copyright owner's
infringement claim can be defeated by a defendant who bears the burden of proving "fair use." 21 9 Implicit in both sorts of privileges is the
judicial decision that, when special circumstances are present, a court
should inquire into the merits of what the intruder or user intends to
do with the property, thus guarding society from potentially disastrous
assertions of the exclusion right. The privileges act as a "safety valve"
in the event the self-regulating character of property fails to keep it
220
within tolerable bounds.
The privileges to trespass have evolved over the years into a discrete
215. See text accompanying notes 117-119 supra (trademarks and trade secrets).
216. Comparing trespass with negligence, for example, William Powers notes:
Ownership embodies a formal methodology, since ...questions concerning appropriate use are answered wholly by asking whether a proposed use has been sanctioned by the owner. A decision by the landowner... concludes legal debate under
the ownership model. On the other hand, a duty of reasonable use embodies a
nonformal methodology because it makes direct, ad hoc reference to efficiency [or
other measures of social desirability]. Under this model, a decision concerning the
landowner... would depend on a comparison of relative costs and benefits in the
specific case.
William C. Powers, Jr., A .lethodological Perspectiveon the Duty to Act (Book Review), 57 TEx. L.
R~v. 523, 526-27 (1979). He notes that this formal and deferential approach "enhances predictability, is easier to apply, and controls bias or other sources of error in the decisionmaking
process," but that a formal approach also has costs, such as the "social cost of tolerating uses
that do not maximize aggregate welfare in the short run." Id. at 527.
217. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 47, at 74-75.
218. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (George Harrison found liable for having "subconsciously" copied the song "He's So
Fine" in composing "My Sweet Lord.")
219. See notes 137-140 supra and accompanying text (fair use); see also Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (commercial copying is "presumptively"
unfair, in cases of noncommercial copying, plaintiff has initial burden to show defendant's use
has future to harm plaintiff's future market).
220. See note 216 supra (costs of the "formal" approach); see also notes 62-64 supra and
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set of defined privileges. 22 1 But copyright law is newer, and "fair use"
appears amorphous largely both because one doctrine is doing the
work of many, and because the judicial understanding of appropriate
grounds for privilege in copyright is still evolving. Eventually there are
likely to be as many discrete privileges to use others' works as there are
22 2
privileges to enter land.

Powers. Because the exclusion right is coupled with powers to change
the entitlements in the work, the copyright proprietor has an increased
ability to demand significant payment from those who want to use the
work. First, an exclusion right imposes on the public a duty not to
copy; and if the proprietor is the only person empowered to void this
duty, she can charge a fee for doing so. So, for example, persons who
want permission to perform a musical composition publicly or to make
numerous duplicates of it for use in their professional choirs will pay
the copyright owner for her permission (a nonexclusive license). Similarly, the proprietor's powers mean that the composer who wants to
extract money for performances of her work would no longer have to
rely on her ability to control physical access to the place where the music is played. With a right to prohibit strangers from publicly performing the work and a power to change their duty not to perform into a
privilege of performance, composers can exact payment from performers other than themselves who give concerts over the airwaves or in
buildings the composers do not control.
Second, in addition to enabling copyright owners to void otherwise
applicable duties not to copy, powers also enable the copyright owner
to transfer entitlements in full. Purchasers may pay significantly more
for receiving the copyright owner's own exclusive rights than they
would for mere permission to use. For example, if a novelist merely
waives his objections to publication, without transferring to the publisher any of his exclusive rights, the publisher might be unwilling to
pay a great deal for the license out of fear that the author might later
privilege other persons to publish the same work. Giving authors the
power to terminate their own privileges and powers, to assign com2 23
pletely their entitlements in their work, eliminates such problems.
accompanying text (privileges for socially desirable behavior); notes 523-526 infra and accompanying text (exigency-based exceptions to copyright).
221. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 167-213 (1965) (privileged entries on
land).
222. Fair use has often been called the "most troublesome in the whole law of copyright." Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam). I do
not contend that fair use will ever be a matter of bright line categories. But much of the sense
of mystery surrounding fair use might dissipate if one recognized that this single doctrine,
though supplemented by a number of more specific statutory limits on copyright owners'
rights, does the work that many separate privileges do in other areas of property law.
223. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Haelan, a suit between two chewing gum companies over the
use of a baseball player's picture on bubblegum cards, illustrates the importance of assignability. The player had purported to sell the "exclusive" right to use his photograph to one gum
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Third, authors can use their exclusion rights to demand a share in
the new value created by the technology, talent, or entrepreneurial activity of others, regardless of whether the authors personally could have
implemented the new use. Since copyright proprietors have the power
to transfer the rights and powers in their work to others, they can make
transfers to persons who may be better situated than they to utilize the
work to serve the demands of the paying public and who may earn
more for the authors than they could earn for themselves. Thus, an
author who knows nothing about movie making can still sell the motion
picture rights for his novel to a film company. The right of exclusion
allows the owner to act as a gatekeeper, demanding license fees from
others who wish to apply their talents or resources to the works; 2 24 economic theory suggests that over time authors will probably respond to
the new possibilities created by such developments, and the prospect of
these new revenues will induce the creation of works adapted to filling
the new needs.
The entitlement package is more than just a way to give the author
incentives to produce in the first instance. It also organizes the way
already-produced works are rationed and coordinated. Owners "ration" the works by selling the privileges or rights to the highest bidder,
thus allocating the entitlements to those economically best able to satisfy public tastes. 2 25 Also, by taking steps to maximize their own profits, the owners through rationing and coordination control exploitation
226
of the resource to encourage appropriate development.
company, but then he also entered into a contract with the other. Resolution of the dispute
depended in part on whether the athlete had the power to assign the right or whether he had
simply waived a right that he lacked the power to sell.
224. The owner has no economic power, however, to exact license fees for unprotected
aspects or uses of the work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
225. To illustrate,
consider the example of movie producers who wish to purchase the motion picture
rights to a best-selling novel. Smithian economists would posit that each producer's
ability to raise funds from investors depends on the amount of revenue that his or
her movie-making is expected to generate. Among producers of varying levels of
skill, the producer best able to use the book to satisfy consumer tastes will be in a
position to raise the most funds and thus to offer the highest bid. Similarly, the
author or other owner of copyright in the novel will sell the rights only if the revenues he could anticipate by exploiting the work himself would be less than the purchaser's bid. Control over the resource will therefore gravitate through consensual
transfers to the person in whose hands the resource can best be used to satisfy consumer desires.
Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1606 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1615 (users who
plan economically valuable applications of the work are likely to be able to pay for their use).
The Court seems to accept that, at least in some contexts, persons who can use a work to
serve social needs (economically defined) will be the persons most able to pay license fees for
its use. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985).
226. The classic article on the employment of intellectual property rights to rationalize
production and exploitation is Kitch, supra note 21; see also Denicola, supra note 21, at 640
(arguing that coordination in trademark use may be necessary to preserve the value of the
mark); Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus, 23
J.L. & EcoN. 197 (1980) (commenting on Kitch's analysis); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Pros-
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This internalization, rationing, and coordination process does not
necessarily lead to ideal allocations from a normative point of view,
given, among other things, patterns of income distribution which may
prevent certain groups from expressing their tastes. 2 27 After all, "If
wealth is very unequally distributed in a community, then the fact that a
rich man buys caviar while a poor man goes without bread does not
mean that the community as a whole values the caviar more than the
bread. ' 2 28 Nor does willingness to pay necessarily best indicate value.
For example, trash novels regularly outsell classics, yet literature
courses still spend more time on the latter. For another example,
adopting strong trademark rights may make trademarks worth a great
22 9
deal of money; but persons opposed to conspicuous consumption like the beleaguered parents of teenagers demanding sneakers with
"Reebok" and "Adidas" labels-might be delighted to see the drawing
power of popular trademarks diminish. And, most generally, economic
efficiency is not the only goal that law in general, 23 0 or intellectual
property in particular, should legitimately serve. 23 1 Yet in promoting
market formation, copyright serves the same function as the law of tangible property. Copyright seems no "sport" but an ordinary example
23 2
of a common pattern.
II.

ALTERNATIVES TO COPYRIGHT

This section will seek to illuminate the nature of the choices that
must be made if copyright is to be eliminated, by briefly discussing
some of the conceptually available alternatives to copyright. The discussion will first examine possible alternatives to copyright, focusing on
three: (1) "copy-privilege"-eliminating copyright and all equivalent
rights; (2) "no direct or indirect rights"-making unenforceable any
pecis, and Economic Suiplus: A Reply, 23 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1980) (responding to McFetridge and
Smith's critique).
227. The governing principle of markets might be described as "To each according to
how much he benefits others who have the resources for benefiting those who benefit them."
ROBERT NoziCR, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 158 (1974) (commenting on the views of F.A.

Hayek).
228. RONALD DWORKIN, A MA1rER OF PRINCIPLE 222 (1985).
229. Roughly speaking, "conspicuous consumption" is the process of making wasteful
purchases in order to demonstrate wealth or status. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF
THE LEISURE CLASS 68-101 (1934).

230. For a discussion sensitive to many of the virtues and flaws in economic analysis, see
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to
Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980).

231. See text accompanying notes 407-413, 444-445 & 516-533 infra; see also Fisher, supra
note 5, at 1686-92 (discussing the underlying objectives of the fair use doctrine).
232. That copyright takes the form of property and serves functions that property serves
does not mean that it deserves unquestioning deference on that account. Property entitlements vary with circumstance; courts and legislatures are continually faced with the question
of what entitlements should attach to a given species of property in a particular context and
are quite willing to vary entitlements as policies dictate. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 74, 7778 (warning against the reification of "copyright as property"). In this regard, too, copyright
is no exception.
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right, even if not equivalent to copyright, whenever enforcing it would
restrain or punish copying; and (3) "mandatory sharing"-imposing
duties on authors to share their work. 23 3 I will then compare these

three options to one another, showing where the alternative most often
favored by the commentators, eliminating rights specifically directed
against copying, fits among the available choices. This "copy-privilege" option will provide the focus for the last half of the article, where
I critically examine the major arguments advanced in favor of that option and against copyright.
A.

GeneratingAlternatives to Copyright

Evaluating any legal institution requires identifying and understanding the possible alternatives. Commentators on copyright usually focus
on only two systemic choices: copyright as we know it, or an absence of
copyright. 23 4 Yet other potentially important options exist.
Beginning with the most global set of alternatives, one might question all private property, whether in land, tangible personalty, or intellectual works, and examine a number of alternative property regimes.
The law might be revised, for example, to substitute for private property a regime in which all property was owned in common, with varying
degrees of restrictions on resource use set by the community. Another
alternative might substitute for private property a regime of no property at all, i.e., a partial state of nature where self-help and voluntary
assistance from others would replace police and courts as the primary
means of protecting one's claim to resources. 23 5 One might examine,
as further examples, how property of various kinds would be handled in
a regime governed by John Rawls's principles of justice, 23 6 in Bruce
233. Other options exist. For example, one might examine a regime of"copy payment."
(I owe the term to Jane Ginsburg.) Currently, copyright grants exclusive rights that are
backed by injunctive rights as well as rights to monetary relief. Eliminating the possibility of
injunctive relief would leave creators with the right to remuneration but without a veto over
how their works are used (a regime of "copy payment"). I explore that alternative here only
insofar as it is a component of other regimes. Because the focus here is to show that some
authors' rights, as opposed to an absence of rights, are normatively desirable, my analysis
does not consider "copy payment" separately from copyright.
234. See generally Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3 (advocating that copyright not be
extended); Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 25, at 425-32 (exploring various alternatives but
primarily questioning intellectual property's exclusive rights); Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,supra note 21 (suggesting that nonenforcement of copyright
might be desirable where societal benefits of enforcement outweigh societal costs); Palmer,
supra note 6 (arguing that copyright and patent are normatively inferior to legal schemes that
would depend solely on creators' ingenuity in utilizing their common law entitlements in tangible property and contract).
235. I say a "partial" state of nature because an absence of property can coexist with
state enforcement of contracts and other forms of government. For an interesting discussion
comparing the efficiency of private property regimes with state-of-nature and things-ownedin-common regimes and suggesting that each model's comparative efficiency depends on empirical questions rather than on any inherent virtue or limitation of the models themselves,
see Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41.
236. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971).
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Ackerman's liberal state, 23 7 or in Robert Nozick's minimal state.23 8 Finally, one might take any of these sets of global guidelines and apply
them solely to intellectual property.
Some rough observations can be made about the relation between
certain of these global choices and copyright. Given a choice between a
communitarian regime with extensive central control and a state-of-nature regime, copyright critics would probably prefer that the latter govern intellectual property, since copyright's supposed evils stem from
too much control over copying rather than too little.23 9 The critics
might be attracted to much of Rawlsian theory, such as the priority
given to liberty240 or the way Rawls's "difference principle" would focus on the welfare of the worst-off, who might need to use what others
produce. 2 4 1 Since "''[t]he difference principle represents, in effect, an
agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common
asset ...., "242 this could lead to a greater degree of sharing than in our

237. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 69-80, 100 (1980) (role
of dialogue). To the extent that the legitimacy that can sanction ownership arises out of dialogue, it seems highly arguable that the elements of dialogue should not themselves be
owned.
238. R. NOZICK, supra note 227, at 109-10.

239. This assumes that in a state-of-nature regime, some incentives for the production
of new works would remain. Otherwise, those critics who take an economic stance might not
favor abrogation of rights against copying. See, e.g., Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at
283-306, 350-51.
240. SeeJ. RAWLS, supra note 236, at 60-61, 541-48. His first principle ofjustice is that
"each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a
similar liberty for others." Id. at 60. His second principle, the "difference principle," is that
"[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity." Id. at 83. Rawls gives liberty first priority, so that
"a departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle cannot be
justified.., or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages." Id. at 61.
The principle of liberty does not per se favor users of creative works over the authors of
those works, for among "the basic liberties of citizens" appear not only "liberty of conscience
and freedom of thought," the form of liberty with which persons seeking access to works of
authorship might want to be aligned, but also "the right to hold (personal) property." Id.
Nevertheless, particular such preferences could be constructed. Thus, Rawls argues that
[a]ll citizens should have the means to be informed about political issues. They
should be in a position to assess how proposals affect their well-being.... The liberties protected by the principle of participation lose much of their value whenever
those who have greater private means are permitted to use their advantages to control the course of public debate.
Id. at 225. Concerns such as this might give rise to rules limiting, for example, the copyright
of materials useful in political debate.
Rawls believes that in the Original Position (a hypothetical situation in which rational
beings of equal liberty are to choose principles ofjustice to govern them), the participants
would "set a particularly high value on the pursuit of their 'spiritual and cultural interest.' "
T.M. Scanlon, Rawls' Theory ofJustice, in READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 169, 186 (N. Daniels ed. 1985). Arguably, in order to relate to one's culture, one
must use its cultural creations-whether such use takes the form of reading, quotation, response, or adaption. The greater the importance to a society of cultural involvement, the
greater its privilege to use intellectual products may be.
241. J. RAWvLS, supra note 236, at 83; note 240 supra.
242. MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS

OF JUSTICE

70 (1982) (quotingJ.

RAwIs, supra note 236, at 101). Of course, it might be argued that an intellect would not be
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current legal system.
But even if a wide range of alterations in the legal pattern could be
implemented, most copyright critics tend to avoid fundamental rearrangements. 243 They concentrate on alterations in the law that are specifically designed to decrease creators' abilities to control the use that
others make of their intellectual products and that operate within the
framework of current legal institutions. 244 But even if one refrains
from essaying a wholesale redesign of the legal system, the choices are
broader than copyright or no copyright.
If there were no copyright, creators would have no exclusion rights,
and users would have privileges to copy 24 5 without fear of the restraint

that creators could have exercised with exclusion rights. As already
noted, that regime might be called one of "copy-privilege." As a second alternative, the law might give users privileges to copy which were
good against any right whatsoever. Finally, the law might give users
rights to the legal system's assistance when they wish to copy. Restating
these noncopyright alternatives from authors' point of view, they
amount to: (1) eliminating copyright and all rights equivalent to copyright ("copy-privilege"); (2) rendering unenforceable any tort or contract right, even if not equivalent to copyright, whenever its
enforcement would restrain or punish copying ("no direct or indirect
rights"); and (3) imposing duties to share on authors ("mandatory
sharing"). The following material will describe these three options and
then suggest why copy-privilege tends to be the commentators' favored
choice.
1. Entitlements revisited.
As a preliminary matter, it will be useful to highlight certain aspects
of the Hohfeldian entitlements out of which these alternatives to copyright are to be built. Hohfeldian rights and privileges are commonly distinguished by describing privilege-holders as entitled to liberty and
right-holders as entitled to enlist the state's force. A privilege roughly
treated the same for all purposes as other "common assets" in a Rawlsian state. It is nevertheless possible that a society that shares a sense that the creative person is "not really the
owner but merely the guardian or repository of ... assorted assets and attributes," id. at 82,
might impose significant limitations on such a person's intellectual property rights, if any were
granted at all. The difference principle might not lead in this direction, however, since the
principle is also consistent with granting significant legal rights over works if those rights
create incentives benefiting the worst-off, provided that the liberty principle is respected. See
J. RAWs, supra note 236, at 100-08. Fisher briefly explores the applicability of the Rawlsian
difference principle to copyright. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1756-62.
243. One reason may be fear of hubris. For example, William Fisher has offered to recast
copyright in light of his "utopian" vision of the role that intellectual products should play in
modem life; but he admits the difficulties in trying to develop and implement a substantive
vision of "the good life and the good society." See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1697.
244. See sources cited in note 234 supra.
245. For simplicity's sake, the discussion will employ "copying" as a proxy for the various uses of the work over which the copyright statute now gives creators control.
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parallels what Isaiah Berlin termed a "freedom from" (although recall
it is only a "freedom from" the state); and, correspondingly,
a right
' 24 6
roughly parallels a state-guaranteed "freedom to."
One should not be distracted by the connotation of "undeserved
advantage" that sometimes adheres to use of the word privilege in intellectual property debate. For Hohfeld, a privilege is simply a liberty.
Nor should one be confused by American constitutional law's occasional identification
of privilege with "favor" or "gratuity" and right with
"entitlement. '2 47 In the Hohfeldian lexicon, a privilege is also an entitlement-an entitlement to be free from governmental interference.
Neither rights nor privileges are matters of "mere benefit" that can be
disregarded at whim.
Every privilege is accompanied by a particular set of rights that operate to protect that privilege from erosion by the state. Thus, behind
every privilege is a right, of some degree of strength, that restricts how
the government may impinge on the privilege. For example, most of
the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights analytically are
Hohfeldian privileges backed by rights against governmental interference. 24 8 In property law, the most notable of these back-up rights is

the fifth amendment's takings clause, which sometimes protects privileges with a requirement that compensation be paid for their abrogation. 24 9 Some privileges are less strongly protected but, even so, the

entitlement holder will have some rights, such as a right that the entitlement's abrogation comport with due process, a right to demand proof
that the abrogation is authorized by the state's police power, and a right
that the restraint's imposition comport with the substantive and proce246.

See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).

247. In the constitutional law area, the terms "right" and "privilege" have been most
closely identified with the debates over what kinds of restrictions the government can lawfully
impose as conditions for receiving benefits, and over what kind of benefits it can withdraw
without due process or cause. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29
N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (Holmes, J.) (policeman fired because of his political activities held to
have no valid suit, since "[he] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman"). The classic article on the topic is William W. Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Pivilege Distinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439,
1439-42 (1968) (discussing the fate of the .M1cAuliffe-like distinction between constitutional
right and "mere privilege").
248. For example, the first amendment creates a wide range of privileges to speak and
publish. Other privileges are created by state law and protected by the Constitution's more
general guarantees. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971), as interpreted by Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976) (state action depriving person of privilege to purchase liquor was an alteration of legal status that, when coupled with injury from
state's defamatory statement, must meet due process clause requirements).
249. For a familiar (because classic and controversial) example of the Court's willingness
to hold that eliminating a privilege (called a "right" by the Court) constitutes a compensable
"taking," see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (state abrogation of a
privilege to use certain land for subsurface mining held a taking requiring compensation).
Although the Supreme Court has recently held that a law very similar to the one at issue in
Pennsylvania Coal did not constitute a compensable taking, the opinion there takes care to
distinguish rather than overrule Pennsylvania Coal. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484-97 (1987).
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dural constraints of local law. Thus, for example, federal intellectual
property law currently contains both weakly and strongly protected
privileges. The privilege to copy "unfixed" works is weakly protected.
Although such copying is privileged by copyright, any state is free to
replace that privilege with a duty not to copy within its borders, so long
as the state does so by a proper legislative or judicial act. 2 50 By contrast, patent law grants a privilege 25to copy nonsecret unpatented inventions that states cannot abrogate. '
Although privileges are accompanied by weak or strong rights
against government, they might not be accompanied by any rights at all
against private parties. As between private parties, one's ability to
make fruitful use of a privilege unaccompanied by rights may indeed be
a matter of "favor" or fortuity, for either party is free to restrict the
other's use of her privileges. Thus, if person X has a privilege to eat a
plate of shrimp salad, by definition no one has the right to call upon the
state to stop X from doing so. However, other persons may lawfully eat
the shrimp salad before X gets to it, unless X's privilege to pursue eating shrimp salad is accompanied by a right to that salad. 25 2 That is,

where one private party has only a privilege, others have "no right" to
interfere 2 53 but they are privileged to interfere all they want. Privileges, like liberties of all sorts, can thus be valueless if the privilege25 4
holder lacks the economic or physical strength to use them.

In any field of endeavor, some acts will be privileged, some forbidden, and some required. For example, one might be free to copy a
work of art or prohibited from doing so; one might be free to restrict
one's work to a particular favored market and mode of presentation, or
required to license it to all comers. The alternatives to copyright that
follow represent differing combinations of privileges, duties, and
rights.
250. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (b)(1) (state protection for unfixed works not preempted).
251. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989). One way to
analyze preemption controversies is to ask whether a gap in federal protection creates merely
a weak privilege that states are free to alter, or a strongly protected privilege that binds the
states.
252. See W. HOHFELD, supra note 40, at 41 (the shrimp salad example); Some Fundamental
Legal Conceptions, supra note 40, at 41-43; Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41, at 752-53; see
alo Walter Wheeler Cook, Privileges of Labor Unions in the Strugglefor Life, 27 YALE LJ. 779
(1918).
253. Hohfeld labels the correlative of a privilege a "no-right." If X has a privilege to
act, 1 has "no-right" to stop him; and the law will not intervene on I's behalf. Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 40, at 32-37.
Thus, someone who wishes to interfere with a privileged action cannot call upon the state
to help him accomplish that interference. Hohfeld has been credited with helping the legal
community realize more quickly that the law leaves much harm remediless-harms done by
one person to another while pursuing their private mutual, antagonistic privileges. See Singer,
supra note 4 1.
254. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1095-96 (making a similar point).
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2. Elimination of copyright: "Copy-privilege.'"
The most modest course of the three options would be merely to
eliminate copyright and equivalent laws which affirmatively grant creators rights to prohibit others' use of their works, and to leave intact
the various doctrines in the standing law which might indirectly augment authors' abilities to control or profit from their work. In such a
regime, copying per se would not violate a creator's rights. A state
would be free to enforce confidentiality contracts, however, or to restrain the publication of materials obtained through unlawful trespass
or invasion of privacy, even if such enforcement might restrict access to
some creative works. In other words, such a regime would grant privileges to copy that were strongly enough protected to void assertions of
copyright, but not strongly enough protected to withstand rights
grounded in policies unrelated to copying.
As a result, authors in a realm of copy-privilege would have those
rights in their creative works which could ride piggyback style on other
legal doctrines. If copy-rights were simply transformed into no-rights,
for example, the law of conversion could nevertheless prohibit burglars
from profiting from their thefts, thus precluding thieves from selling
multiple editions of purloined letters, or the law of contract could nevertheless be employed to discourage persons who had signed confidentiality agreements from breaching their contracts. A desire to
discourage trespass, breach of confidence, fraud, and the like, might
therefore yield piggyback prohibitions against copying, not out of concern with copying itself, but because of a desire to avoid rewarding
wrongful behavior.
Under this option, all persons would be presumptively free to copy
whatever works of art or expression they could lawfully obtain; and
states would have to determine the lawfulness of actions by criteria other
than mere copying. The only governmental restraint on copying would
be enforcement of duties arising out of an individual's behavior that
involved more than simple copying (e.g., behavior inducing and violating a fiduciary relationship) or the individual's agreement. When no
contractual or similar duty bound a potential copier and he violated no
independent state law, he would be privileged to copy. The simple
duty not to copy, now imposed by copyright law, would be imposed in a
realm of "copy-privilege" only upon individuals who consented to accept it.
Thus, a publisher who wanted an author to submit her manuscript
for possible publication might well promise not to publish the piece
unless the two of them reached a mutually acceptable agreement about
royalties. This promise would bind the publisher not to copy, even in a
realm of "copy-privilege." Once a book was publicly available, however, any person who obtained a copy without having promised not to
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duplicate it would be free to make as many copies or adaptations as he
wished.
Just as users would be prima facie privileged to copy anything to
which they had lawful access, in a realm of "copy-privilege" creators
might be prima facie privileged to use any available mode of self-help
to discourage copying. For example, publishers might try to come to
informal or contractual agreements among themselves to respect each
other's exclusive relationships with authors.2 5 5 They also might attempt to structure the industry to maximize an authorized publisher's
lead-time advantage, use advertising to persuade customers there is
special merit in the "authorized" edition, link their intellectual product
(e.g., software) with a product that copiers cannot easily duplicate (e.g.,
customer service and updates), or issue low-price "retributive strike"
editions to try to drive copiers out of the marketplace. 25 6 (Of course,
continuous publication below cost would ruin any publisher; the hope
is that the mere possibility of retributive strike editions may deter
piracy before it begins.) Another alternative is the use of "technological fences," ' 25 7 such as programming copy protection into computer
software, or building copy protection into videotapes or audio material
to make them difficult to replicate accurately. These and similar devices might result in authors and publishers earning significant
revenues.
In the eyes of many commentators, resolving the question of
whether particular uses of creative works should be subject to the rights
of authors and their assigns, or subject to the privileges of all, depends
on estimating the likely outcome of struggles between authors and
users holding equivalent privileges. If the income from privileged publication would be high enough to provide an adequate return on investment, such critics argue, authors should have no rights to prevent
piracy. An inquiry into the likelihood that authors could earn enough
revenues to support continued creation and publication even in a world
of copy-privilege is the foundation of the position of Professor, now
Judge, Breyer, whose 1970 article is probably the most important of the
modern criticisms of copyright.
Judge Breyer expressed doubt about the desirability of copyright in
particular areas and qualifiedly recommended that copyright not be expanded. He argued that existing common-law and self-help devices
would enable at least some significant segment of publishers to restrain
copiers sufficiently for the publishers to obtain an adequate return on
255. In a real world context, all such modes of self-help would be subject to the antitrust
laws.
256. When threatened by a "pirate" edition, an authorized publisher may respond with
a "retributive strike" edition at below cost, in an effort to drive the copier out of the market.
See Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 300-01.
257. See Palmer, supra note 6, at 288-89 (discussing a range of technological "fences").
Prior to the invention of printing, the necessity for laborious hand copying was itself a technological "fence" that rendered copyright largely unnecessary.
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their investments. 25 8 Among those devices, Judge Breyer envisioned
preserving contract rights that enable authors and publishers to be paid
by persons wishing to obtain particular kinds of works, such as book
clubs or subscription groups. 2 59 His analysis also depended upon the
26 1
continued availability of privileges of nondisclosure 2 60 and reprisal,
and on informal arrangements of various kinds. 262 He clearly recognized that the extent of self-help's viability would depend on circumstance. For example, in some industries, there might be a lead-time
advantage making the first publisher relatively free of the need for
copyright. In other industries, where marketing arrangements and
technologies for reproducing intellectual works were available to allow
copiers to enter the market immediately, this advantage might be unavailable. As he therefore noted, recommendations for and against
copyright in one kind of intellectual product (trade books, for example)
might not follow for other kinds of products where factors such as leadtime advantage, publisher customs, or alternative revenue sources are
different.
Judge Breyer's survey of noncopyright devices illustrates how the
copy-privilege regime might look,2 63 though his emphasis on empirical

questions to which there are no clear answers kept him from going so
far as to urge that copy-privilege govern all intellectual products. More
recently, an attack on patent and copyright by Tom Palmer, 2 64 premised primarily on grounds of liberty but also making Breyer-like arguments that intellectual property is unneccessary for incentives, takes
258. Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 300-06 (publishers' use of "strike editions,"
informal agreements and custom, and private subscription arrangements); see also id. at 309-29
(applying the analysis to varying classes of books); Breyer, Copyright: A Reoinder, supra note 3,
at 76-82; Tyerman, supra note 21, at 103-07. Judge Breyer similarly argued that the creators
of computer programs might not need copyright protection if, among other things, time sharing and other industry developments made it easy for program suppliers to negotiate with
potential users. Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 346.
259. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 306 (discussing book clubs). Thus, a
contract that said, "Our subscription group will pay you X number of dollars if you research
and write a particular volume for us," would be enforceable.
260. See id. at 300 ("lead time advantage").
261. See id. at 300-01.
262. See id. at 302.
263. Copy-privilege includes the possibility of contractual duties not to copy. Although
Judge Breyer focused on contracts regarding payment rather than on contractual clauses that
limit one's publication privileges, his general reliance on contract as an alternative to copyright clearly indicates that he would not question the enforceability of either type of agreement. This is implicit in many of his arguments. For example, a credible scheme of privately
commissioning works through book clubs or subscription groups might depend on authors
having some assurance that if they send drafts to potential publishers, they would have some
right to prevent the publishers from printing the material until they paid the agreed contract
price. The same point applies to interpublisher modes of self-help. Reprisals against piratical
competitors are of little assistance to a publisher unless the publisher can receive manuscripts
and develop relationships with authors in the first instance. Without being able to enforce
promises not to copy, publisher relations with potential manuscript sources will be difficult. It
therefore seems clear that Judge Breyer imagined that in a world without copyright, the enforceability of contractual promises not to copy would be preserved.
264. See Palmer, supra note 6.
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this further step. In Palmer's view, intellectual creators should have no
independent exclusion rights in their intangibles and should rely solely
on common-law and self-help means of protecting their work.
If Congress seriously desired to implement the copy-privilege option, it might be able to do so. The Constitution empowers Congress
to enact copyright and patent legislation but does not require it. 26 5 As

mentioned earlier, legislation already contains provisions that affirmatively make some intellectual products unprotectable, granting 26
privi6 If
leges to copy strong enough to override inconsistent state rights.
conceptions of what was needed to "promote the progress of science"
changed significantly enough, Congress conceivably could repeal the
copyright statute and, under the copyright, commerce, and supremacy
clauses, enact legislation preventing the states from reinventing copyright or giving other forms of rights over copying. 2 67 (A drastic expan2
sion of the first amendment might even accomplish a similar result.

68

265. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
266. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971 (1989) (state law
prohibiting use of direct molding process to duplicate unpatented boat hulls held preempted), in which the Court stressed that "the federal patent laws do create a federal right to
.copy and to use,'" id. at 985, and that this right privileges the public to duplicate any nonsecret invention not protected by a patent; see also 17 U.S.C. § 301 (preemption of state
rights); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA

L. REV. 1070, 1092-9 (1977) (arguing that the copyright and patent statutes affirmatively place
certain matters outside the scope of federal or state protection); text accompaning note 251
supra.

267. It could well be argued that such federal legislation would have to be based on the
Constitution's commerce clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cI. 2, rather than the copyright and
patent clause, since the latter simply empowers Congress to grant monopolies "for limited
times" to authors and inventors, rather than giving Congress plenary power to regulate intellectual products as it sees fit, id. cl. 8. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)
(copyright and patent clause did not give Congress power to create trademark law). In dicta,
however, the Supreme Court has intimated that the copyright and patent clause could also
provide adequate authority: "Where the need for free and unrestricted distribution of a writing is thought to be required by the national interest, the Copyright Clause and the Commerce Clause would allow Congress to eschew all protection." Goldstein v. California, 412
U.S. 546, 559 (1973). Of course, these dicta, like the abrogation of state rights effected in
Bonito Boats, see supra note 266 and accompanying text, must be viewed with caution since
neither appeared in contexts where Congress was abandoning all of its own intellectual property protections.
Independent of whatever support might be lent by the copyright clause, the commerce
clause power might be a sufficient basis for a congressional ban on rights equivalent to copyright. In some sense, rights against copying can be seen as inhibiting commerce, and the
commerce clause power is quite broad. See S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15
(1984) (concluding that legislation protecting semiconductor chip design could be premised
upon commerce clause powers); Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co., 133 F.2d 663, 668 (7th Cir.
1943) (upholding the constitutionality of substantive federal trademark regulation under the
commerce clause: "Many things not themselves goods moving in interstate commerce are
held to exert such a substantial influence upon the flow of commerce that they are 'instrumentalities of interstate commerce,' and as such subject to regulation by Congress .... "); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Creatinga New Kind of IntellectualProperty:Applying the Lessons of the Chip Law
to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 473 n.6 (1985) (discussing use of the commerce
clause as basis for sui generis legislation regarding semiconductors).

If validly enacted, federal legislation granting privileges to copy could bind the states
through the supremacy clause.
268. The courts have so far held that there is no necessary conflict between the first
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It is already clear that the amendment invalidates some state law rights
that impede the distribution of creative works. 26 9) The takings, 2 70 due
process, 27 1 and contract 2 72 clauses might restrict the elimination of existing rights; but making the changes prospective, applicable only to
rights had not yet
newly created intellectual products in which property2 73
vested, would minimize conflicts with these clauses.
As for already-created intellectual products to which the government might wish to mandate free access, the government could subject
them to eminent domain, 2 74 much as it now condemns privately owned
real estate and then opens it to the public as parkland. Constitutional
arguments that such an action is an impermissible exercise of governmental power are likely to fail. In Hawaii HousingAuthority v. Midkif,27 5
the Court concluded that "[r]edistribution of fees simple to correct deficiencies in the market determined by the state legislature to be attribamendment and copyright, primarily because copyright gives authors control only over expression and not over ideas and because the "fair use" doctrine integral to copyright is capable of incorporating first amendment policies. See 1 M. NiMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11,
§ 1.10 (suggesting that, in addition, there should be a first amendment privilege within copyright). Speaking literally, however, all copyright restrains free communication.
Although the Constitution grants Congress the power to give copyrights to authors, the
first amendment postdates the patent and copyright clause. If one were willing to ignore the
historical context in which the first ten amendments were adopted, the first amendment could
conceivably be interpreted to constitute an implicit repeal of the copyright power or a sharp
limitation on it. To the extent that the first amendment applies to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the amendment could also have the effect of
striking down state rights equivalent to copyright.
269. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988) (public figure's emotional distress claim directed at defendant who published an offensive caricature is subject to
certain first amendment limitations).
270. Restricting or eliminating rights in intangibles can constitute "takings" which trigger the compensation requirement of the fifth amendment's takings clause. Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1000-04 (1984) (trade secrets are "property" within the meaning of the takings clause).
271. Since rights in intangibles can be "property" under the takings clause, id. at 100004 (trade secrets), there is every reason why they should also be so under the due process
clause.
272. Contracts purporting to transfer exclusive rights in intellectual products presuppose the existence of those rights. If copyright were eliminated in all currently existing works
of authorship, many contracts would become valueless.
273. The Supreme Court recently held that governmental disclosure of trade secrets
submitted under assurances of confidentiality constituted a compensable taking but indicated
that a prospective disclosure requirement constituted an exercise of the police power which
would not require compensation. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-11. The Court took the position that when a new statute warns of the possibility of disclosure, the warning prevents the
formation of "reasonable investment-backed expectations" that would trigger the takings
clause compensation requirement. Id. at 1005-07. How far the Court would be willing to take
this approach is unclear. Its treatment of Monsanto was undoubtedly influenced by the health
and safety aspects of the issue presented. The contract clause issue is somewhat more
straightforward. Since contract clause cases focus on the impairment of eisting contracts, see
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), making any anticopyright law
prospective should avoid most contract clause problems.
274. See, e.g., Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 986.
275. 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (statute redistributing land ownership from lessors to lessees
in order to reduce concentration of land ownership held an appropriate exercise of eminent
domain power so long as compensation is paid).
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utable to land oligopoly is a rational exercise of the eminent domain
power." 2 76 Similarly, if Congress were to abolish copyrights in order
to correct market distortions attributed to them,2 77 the Court would
likely find this a valid public purpose achievable so long as compensation was paid.
Furthermore, although quite credible arguments could be made
that abolishing copyright would increase only the public's short-term
wealth by making works cheaper and would disserve the public's longterm material and cultural interest, 2 78 such a challenge to Congress's
wisdom in choosing this method of responding to the necessary imperfections in copyright markets would be unlikely to succeed. The Court,
in a case analyzing a sort of eminent domain in trade secrets, stated that
"The optimum amount of disclosure to the public is for Congress, not
the courts, to decide." 2 79 Though recent case law suggests a tightening
of the public purpose requirement may be in the offing, 28 0 there is as

yet no obvious constitutional bar to a massive legislative abrogation of
intellectual property entitlements as long as compensation is paid.
3. No direct or indirect rights.
If freedom to use others' works is sufficiently important, why stop
with copy-privilege? There is a host of legal doctrines, from privacy law
and trespass through fiduciary duty and contract law, whose enforcement in particular contexts could lead to restraints on the use of intellectual products. For example, Jerry Falwell recently sought to use the
state tort doctrine of intentional infliction of emotional distress to obtain damages when he was featured in and offended by a parodic cartoon by Hustler magazine. 28 1 Had Falwell been victorious, the state's
concern with protecting emotional repose would have had the potential
to chill the distribution of caricatures and other parodic material. Since
276. Id. at 243.
277. Of course, the issues presented by Midkiffand by copyright are far from identical,
but both involve market distortions. As noted earlier, see note 23 supra, copyright provides
incentives by making it possible for copyright owners to reduce the quantity of copies available and thus receive a higher per-copy price. This is a market distortion, in the sense that
fewer copies are sold under copyright than would be sold in a hypothetical freely competitive
market in the created work.
278. See generally Easterbrook, supra note 143, at 10-12, 21-29 (arguing that expost forms
of analysis, which might favor sharing what has already been produced, are less desirable from
an economic point of view than cc ante perspectives concerned with incentives); Roland N.
McKean &Jora R. Minasian, On Achieving Pareto Optimality-Regardlessof Cost!, 5 W. ECON.J. 14,
22-23 (1966) (although exclusion rights in public goods such as recordings and inventions
give rise to imperfect markets, the costs of these imperfect markets can be less than the costs
of permitting no exclusion).
279. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1015; see also id. at 1014 ("The role of
the courts in second-guessing the legislature's judgment of what constitutes a public use is
extremely narrow." (citation omitted)); id. at 1015 n.18 ("The proper inquiry before this
Court is not whether the provisions will in fact accomplish their stated objectives.").
280. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 (1987); see alsoJohn
M. Payne, From the Courts, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 258, 263 (1988).
281. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
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Falwell is a public figure, his state tort rights were "trumped" by the
first amendment. Using an analogous approach, advocates of free access to intellectual products might urge that free access policies should
trump any rights that restrain copying, whether such rights are based in
copyright itself or whether the restraint is direct or indirect. In other
words, they might argue that the privilege of copying should be so
strongly protected that all inconsistent entitlements should give way
before it.
Such a regime, which we might dub a regime of "no direct or indirect rights," would not only affect copyright law itself (which it would
eliminate) but would also prohibit the state and federal governments
from enforcing other copy-restraining doctrines whenever such enforcement would assist someone who seeks to restrict, obtain damages
for, or penalize the free circulation of works of authorship. For example, if this option were implemented, suits like Falwell's would be dismissed whether or not the plaintiff was a public figure. As another
example, a promise by a fiduciary or an employee not to copy or disclose material revealed in the course of a relationship with an author
would be unenforceable. The possibility that the public might need the
information would privilege an otherwise wrongful act. 28 2 In the re-

gime of "no direct or indirect rights," authors and others would have
no rights to call upon the government to prevent copying, whatever the
context.
This is not an unthinkable possibility. The law already refuses to
enforce at least one kind of confidentiality contract, the agreement between blackmailer and victim to exchange money for silence. Laws
against blackmail have been justified on the ground that though contracts of silence may satisfy the interest of the blackmailer and victim,
such contracts sacrifice the interests of those third parties who could be
affected by the concealed information. 28 3 Analogously, it might be argued that a promise not to copy a creative work impermissibly sacrifices
the interests of those members of the public who might benefit if copies
were made. Similarly, contracts embodying promises not to copy might
be analogized to contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. Under the
antitrust law, such contracts are unenforceable.
Tort rights too are commonly sacrificed when the interests they represent conflict with the Constitution or with congressional goals. In
Hustler itself, the Supreme Court held that Falwell's state tort claim had
to give way because allowing public figures to succeed in such suits
282. At most, an author might bring a "fair labeling" suit to obtain correct attribution of
authorship, cf Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (states given
little latitude in protecting unpatented light fixtures); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225 (1964) (lamps), for more extensive remedies might inhibit the act of free publication
itself.
283. See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 670
(1984) (exploring this and other explanations of blackmail law).
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would conflict with "the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern. ' 28 4 Federal intellectual property policy as well has frequently preempted state
tort rights. In a pair of cases commonly known as Sears/Compco, the
Court held that the federal policy of encouraging free competition in
the manufacture of unpatented products is so important that states cannot grant any rights that restrain the replication of innovative product
designs, even if this means compromising state tort rights founded on
legitimate state concerns, such as the desire to avoid consumer confusion as to the source of distinctively shaped products. 28 5 The Court
has not been so willing to sacrifice independent policies to intellectual
property goals in recent years. 28 6 Even its recent reaffirmance of Sears/
Compco was accompanied by the suggestion that states retain some latitude in their efforts to prevent confusion as to source. 2 87 Conceptually,

however, the old approach suggests that if Congress made its intentions sufficiently clear, the Court would be willing to implement a
broad scheme of preemption. 28 8 If free use of others' intellectual products were considered a sufficiently important goal, therefore, it is likely
that federal law could require inconsistent tort and contract doctrines
to give way.
4. Mandatory sharing.
A third option, which one might call a "mandatory sharing" regime,
284. Hustler, 108 S. Ct. at 879; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(defamation claims). Note that adopting a regime of "no direct or indirect rights" would
disable even nonpublic figures from bringing claims that interfered with the free dissemination of works of authorship.
285. Compco, 376 U.S. at 234; Sears, 376 U.S. at 225 (cases together striking down use of
state tort rights against confusing product imitation on the ground that when a state policy of
preventing confusion interferes with a federal policy of allowing free copying of unpatented
utilitarian objects, the federal policy is supreme). Note that the actual evidence of confusion
in the two cases was quite thin and could be ameliorated in similar cases by labeling. At least
on their face, therefore, these cases may have appeared not to pose a conflict with a state
interest of major importance.
Although in the years following Sears/Compco the Supreme Court withdrew from its aggressively preemptive stance, the Court recently reaffirmed the holding in Bonito Boats, Inc.
v. Thunder Craft, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 971 (1989). Even prior to Bonito Boats, preemption retained
some judicial "bite." Also, in the 1976 Act, Congress extended the preemptive reach of the
copyright law in 17 U.S.C. § 301. See, e.g., Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 676 (7th Cir. 1986) (state law right of publicity preempted by federal
copyright law), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1593 (1987).
286. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265-66 (1979) (contract
for royalties on keyholders held not preempted although no patent was granted on the
keyholders); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) (state trade secret
law held not preempted); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (state prohibition
of record piracy, at a time when sound recordings were not protectable by federal copyright,
held not preempted).
287. Bonito Boats, 109 S. Ct. at 985.
288. But see New Era Publications Int'l, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493,
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (suggesting that the Constitution might not give Congress the "power
to override the state law function of determining privacy rights") (dicta), aff'd on othergrounds,
Nos. 88-7707, 88-7795 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 1989).
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would not only strike down any direct or indirect governmental protections for intellectual property but would also give new rights to persons
who want access to works of authorship. This approach would substitute for existing privileges of nondisclosure a set of duties to disclose.
Such a regime might be employed in an effort to compensate for the
loss of copyright's positive incentives by providing a set of negative in28 9
centives to force publishing to occur and to keep prices down.
There might be laws, for example, to break up any informal agreements that publishers might seek among themselves to respect each
other's exclusive relationships with authors. Such laws would not only
make that sort of agreement unenforceable, as in a regime of "no direct
or indirect rights," but would also penalize participants for attempting
to make one. Similarly, the law might penalize publishers who tried to
use other self-help methods, like "retributive strike" editions.2 90 There
might even be a governmental commission to require recalcitrant creators to make their drafts and sketches public, or to subsidize free distribution of literature to those who could not pay for it.
In such a regime, authors would not only lack rights to prevent
copying but would also be deprived of freedoms they would otherwise
have. Instead of liberties to refrain from disclosure or to use self-help,
for example, creators might have affirmative duties of disclosure and
publication.
In many ways the mandatory sharing option treats the author's work
as common property, owned by both the creator and the public. For
example, under the law of tenancies in common, consent of one's coowners is not a prerequisite to use; 29 1 further, any co-owner can employ the courts to guarantee her access to the property.2 9 2 Members of
the public, as hypothetical co-owners in such a tenancy, would have a
privilege to use the resource, as well as a right to have access to the property, good against any effort by the author or any other co-owner to
prevent use of it. Thus, although the parallels are not complete, 29 3 a
289. For a discussion of how the different issues raised by positive and negative legal
responses (such as rights to reward as compared with liability for damages) in restitution and
torts affect intellectual property law, see W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55.
On the differing roles of positive and negative legal responses in general, see generally Saul
Levmore, ExplainingRestitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65 (1985); Donald Wittman, Should Compensation
Be Based on Costs or Benefits?, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 173 (1985).
290. See note 256 supra.
291. In the real property context, see 4A R. POWELL & P. RoHAN,supra note 78, § 603(l);
4 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1793 (J.
Grimes replacement ed. 1979). In the copyright context, see I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER,
supra note 11, § 6.10. See also Oddo v. Ries, 743 F.2d 630, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1984) ("A coowner of a copyright cannot be liable to another co-owner for infringement of the
copyright.").
292. In real property, a co-owner has a range of options available if a cotenant blocks
her from the property. See 4 G. THOMPSON, supra note 291, § 1809.
293. For example, in a true tenancy in common, each co-owner owes some duties to the
others, such as a duty to account for profits, that are not part of the mandatory sharing regime. See Oddo, 743 F.2d at 633.
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regime of mandatory sharing largely follows a common property
model.
The mandatory sharing approach is extreme but not without precedent. Many current regulatory regimes have mandatory disclosure
characteristics, particularly in the environmental area. Federal law requires disclosure of pollution-related data, for example. 29 4 If disclo-

sure of works of authorship were considered as important to the public
weal as disclosure of pollution data, a regime of mandatory disclosure
might be implemented. Note, however, that existing disclosure requirements tend to be applied to industries that will have an incentive
to manufacture or transport goods whether or not they are forced to
disclose pollution or health data. Although the Supreme Court has upheld disclosure requirements even when such data is valuable to the
company concerned, 29 5 that data was not itself the industry's primary
stock in trade. Whether authors would have sufficient incentives to
produce new works in a world mandating their uncompensated disclosure raises quite different empirical questions.
As for the elimination of self-help privileges, the common law itself
provides some relevant precedent. Tort law penalizes landowners who
use self-help to eject strangers during emergencies when the strangers'
lives depend on staying on the land. 29 6 As for contracts, some forms of

contract are unlawful as well as unenforceable. On the statutory level,
the antitrust laws penalize both formal and informal agreements that

interfere with designated social goals. 29 7 If free copying and use of in-

tellectual products were considered an important enough goal, otherwise legal acts that blocked public access to works might be outlawed,
protections
and duties of disclosure imposed, subject to constitutional
2 98
for the author's privacy and right to be silent.

The "mandatory sharing" alternative would become more attractive, both in terms of incentives and fairness, if the government were to
offer authors a payment along with imposing an obligation to publish.
294. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136a-I(c) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1982).
295. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (government requirement that
pesticide information be disclosed as a prerequisite to registration is not a taking for which
compensation must be paid, despite the possibility that the mandated disclosure might deprive the company that generated the valuable data of a competitive advantage, as long as the
company has no statutory basis for expecting the government to keep the submitted data
confidential).
296. See Ploofv. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1906);seealso RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 197 comment k (1965) (possessor of land under a duty to let entrant privileged by

necessity remain).
297. In the antitrust area, "contracts in restraint of trade" (such as price-fixing agreements) are not only unenforceable but also prohibited and subject to the imposition of civil
and criminal penalties. Blackmail is also a criminal matter, though typically only one of the
parties to a blackmail contract goes to jail.
298. See L. TRIBE, supra note 127, § 12-14, at 889-90 (right of privacy with regard to
personal information); see also Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559
(1985) ("the right to refrain from speaking").
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The payment could take the form of a governmental subsidy, fifth
amendment "compensation," or compulsory license fees.
Compulsory licenses in particular are familiar from current law.
Under them, the government sets fees, and any eligible private party
who pays the fee is entitled to copy regardless of the copyright owner's
preferences. For example, the Clean Air Act provides that patentees
may be compelled to offer licenses on those patents that would not
otherwise be "reasonably available" and for which there are no "reasonable alternative methods" where necessary for certain Clean Air Act
compliance. 29 9 Current copyright law itself imposes compulsory
licenses on some intellectual products. For example, certain copyrighted television broadcasts are subject to compulsory licensing for
cable rebroadcast.3 0 0 The copyright statute also gives compulsory license rights to any musician who wishes to record a song once it has
been publicly distributed in phonorecords with the composer's authorization,3 0 1 as long as the user pays the governmentally set license fees
and complies with requisite procedures. The compulsory licenses imposed by copyright, however, are generally limited to works that are
already distributed, or are in the process of being distributed, to the
public. Furthermore, in contemporary times American law has usually
adopted compulsory license schemes only in cases of special need (as in
the pollution context) or as a compromise when creators ask Congress
to extend existing rights to cover new technological methods of transmitting or reproducing works (as with cable television)302
At bottom, payment requirements are not a likely component of a
"mandatory sharing" scheme. Opponents of copyright vehement
enough to seek mandatory sharing would be unlikely to enact licensing
payment rules, since, after all, any requirement of compensation would
sharply inhibit the public's use of intellectual products. In a regime of
noncompensated mandatory sharing, the career path of artist or author
thus becomes somewhat uninviting. To provide the missing incentives,
conceivably the mandatory sharing model itself might be taken a step
further: Not only might our law be amended to treat works of authorship as common property, but it also might be amended to treat creative persons' talents as common property as well.30 3 As Vermont's good

Samaritan law requires persons who are well situated for rescuing im299. 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (1982). Whether compulsory licenses will work to discourage the
inventors of antipollution devices from using the patent system, or how they might affect the
long-term prospect of antipollution research and development, are open questions.
300. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see notes 135-136 supra and accompanying
text (compulsory licenses).
301. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982 & Su/pp. IV 1986); note 135 supra. On the "compromise"
nature of compulsory licenses, see, e.g., HousE REPORT, supra note 143 at 88-89 (cable); Second Supp. Report, supra note 135, ch. 9, at 3 (phonorecords); see also id. ch. 7, at 18-20
(typefaces).
302. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 115 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
303. To view the genius of individuals as a sort of "common pool" in which we all have
an interest is not unusual. See, e.g., note 242 supra and accompanying text (discussion of
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periled victims to give those victims aid,3 0 4 statutes might require talented persons who are well equipped to produce art to do so. Of
course, there are significant constitutional problems with such a step
(the first and thirteenth amendments leap to mind), but conceptually
this is a logical extension of the mandatory sharing model.
B.

Comparingthe Noncopyright Options

Copy-privilege has a number of advantages over the other two
noncopyright options, particularly in regard to publishing practicalities.
For example, in a regime with a rule against enforcing promises not to
copy (the regime of "no direct or indirect rights"), post-publication
piracy by strangers is not the only threat to incentives. Authors might
be reluctant to submit their works for publication out of fear that the
publishers or the publishers' employees will steal whatever they see.
Not all publishers will find it in their long-term best interest to create a
reputation for dealing with authors fairly. Similarly, some editorial and
clerical employees might consider retention of their jobs less important
than the chance of making a one-time killing by stealing a "hot" manuscript, particularly if they interpret the lack of legal rights against such
behavior to indicate that it is morally permissible. If such behavior became the norm, initial agreements between potential buyers and sellers
of intellectual products might not occur. Unless there is a custom of
living up to agreements, or moral, community, or industry sanctions
against those who break agreements, legally enforceable agreements of
the "look but don't publish until you pay" variety will be a prerequisite
for successful dealings between potential authors and buyers.3 0 5
The "mandatory sharing" regime would outlaw voluntary intraindustry sanctions, further decreasing the possibility that workable publishing arrangements would evolve. While private or governmental
subsidy schemes or compulsory licensing might provide some compensation under mandatory sharing, there are dangers both in patronage
and in leaving it to government to choose works "worthy" of sponsorRawls). To require a sort of slave labor from those with talent is, however, a far-from-inevitable implication to draw from that premise.
304. VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 519 (Supp. 1971) (imposing a duty of easy rescue and
imposing a fine of$100 for its violation); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West 1986 Supp.)
(similar statute). Although the Vermont statute does far less than impose a general "duty to
aid" on all persons with resources, the common law resistance to imposing duties to aid is
increasingly subject to exceptions. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND
ALTERNATIVES 117-51 (4th ed. 1987). Any imposition of a duty to aid implicates questions of
liberty similar to those raised by the extension of the "mandatory sharing" model I discuss in
the text. See Epstein, supra note 82, at 197-201 (1973) (introducing a hypothetical "parade of
horribles" to dramatize liberty issues that would be raised by imposing a duty to aid).
305. Courts sometimes read implied understandings of this sort into the dealings between the parties, even regarding uncopyrightable subject matter such as ideas. Werlin v.
Reader's Digest, 528 F. Supp. 451,465-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (magazine required to pay author
a finder's fee when, after rejecting her article for publication, it used the underlying idea).
Where copyright applies, such contracts and obligations implied from a course of dealings are
unnecessary; no one, including the potential publisher, can publish without permission.
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ship or to set prices.3 0 6 As for the extension of the mandatory sharing
model that would compel creative activity, practical problems (such as
identifying who among the general populace should be forced to write
what) and fundamental concerns with personal liberty (imagine a species of debtors' prisons for those novelists afflicted with writer's block)
307
probably place the mandatory sharing approach outside the pale.
The copy-privilege regime, in contrast, preserves the enforceability
of no-copy agreements and allows self-help. That option further seems
to avoid the additional practical difficulties and the new layer of coercion that characterize the regime of mandatory sharing. As compared
with copyright, copy-privilege may make it hard for a creator to demand payment when strangers copy; nevertheless, copy-privilege at
least preserves the possibility that creators might enter into decentralized market bargains with publishers and users secure from piracy by
the very people with whom they have dealt.
There is an additional set of possible reasons for the commentators'
reluctance to argue for regimes such as "no direct or indirect rights"
and "mandatory disclosure." Privacy rights, laws against burglary, or
laws against breach of confidence or contract are not directed against
copying. They serve independent policies, and developing exceptions
to these laws for the purpose of fostering access to creative works
would be costly. It could play havoc with the policies favoring security
of dwellings, for example, to allow a burglar to profit from her theft by
publishing a manuscript stolen during the burglary (as would occur in
the regime of no direct or indirect rights). Copy-privilege, in contrast
to the other procopying options, preserves these independent interests.
It avoids difficult policy balancings by consistently deferring to any policy unrelated to copying.
The examination and comparison of various copyright alternatives
demonstrate that the copy-privilege option, which eliminates copyright,
does not outlaw self-help, and preserves independent private law rules
that might affect copying, is the most obvious candidate for replacing
copyright. It also would require the least change to implement and
consequently is the most politically credible of the three alternatives.
This option preserves independent state law policies and is likely to
have less negative impact on the production of books, music, art, and
other works of authorship than the other two noncopyright options, yet
it eliminates the do-not-copy restraint on liberty inherent in copyright.
306. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1611-12 (dangers of governmental subsidies); id. at 1622-24 (judicial price-setting); T. MACAULAY, supra note 1, at 198 (dangers of
private subsidies (patronage)).
307. See W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55 (exploring reasons why the
law imposes no duties to create and discussing whether this is consistent with granting creators rights over their works); cf. Saul Levmore, Waitingfor Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and
Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REv. 879 (1986) (exploring why
the law generally imposes no duty to aid).
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COMPARING COPYRIGHT WITH COPY-PRIVILEGE

This section compares copyright with copy-privilege, the alternative
most commentators seem to envision when opposing copyright or suggesting that it be limited. The most powerful advocates of copy-privilege come from the ranks of those who view copyright and patent law in
economic terms 3 0 8 -I call their particular use of economics "encouragement theory." Their position hinges on empirical judgments that,
given current industry structures, a copy-privilege system would provide sufficient incentives to induce new creativity while allowing the
public more access to what is already created than the copyright system
now permits.
Obtaining proof of such empirical contentions is difficult. Further,
as an industry's technology or conditions change, a legal structure that
once gave sufficient incentives without copyright might no longer do
so. For example, advances in reprography might eliminate previous
lead-time advantages, or someone might "invent around" previous
technological fences and sell devices that enable consumers to overcome copy-protect methods, descramble signals, or otherwise obtaifi
easy access to what was previously physically unavailable. The comparative merits of copyright and copy-privilege might therefore have to be
reassessed frequently.3 0 9 Given the decades of legislative struggle necessary to produce the 1976 replacement for the 1909 Copyright Act, it
would be unrealistic to expect Congress to meet such a continuously
moving target.
Of course, it might be argued that the lack of convincing empirical
data makes copyright as uncertain a venture as copy-privilege, and that
when such information is lacking, neither governmental position (copyright or copy-privilege) can be recommended over the other. 3 10 Yet
wealth-maximization defenses of copy-privilege all depend on findings
that eliminating copyright will not trigger a large degree of free riding
because alternative legal or practical restraints on copying exist. Once
it is conceded that as an overall matter free copying is not desirable and
that the relevant questions are instead how much free copying should be
allowed and when copying should be permitted in which works, copyright
seems to have the advantage, for the following reasons.
First, at least some of these economic choices can be made prospectively and with generality. To take an obvious example: Forbidding the
308. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3; sources in note 25 supra. See also Fisher,
supra note 5, and Palmer, supra note 6, who premise their recommendations on noneconomic
as well as economic grounds.
309. Thus, for example, Judge Breyer notes that the decision whether or not to extend
copyright protection to computer programs should depend on projections about likely developments in the way computers are used and programs marketed; he uses the "next decade or
two" as the relevant time frame. Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 346-48.
310. This is, roughly speaking, Judge Breyer's position, when he argues that, in the absence of more information, copyright should neither be extended nor abolished. Id. at 28384.
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copying of general concepts would involve greater costs than forbidding the copying of particular ways of expressing concepts. A property-based system can be tailored to implement such choices, while a
privilege-based system ordinarily cannot. As the prior discussion suggested, the impact of copy-privilege will depend on factors outside the
legal system's control; it would seem largely serendipitous if those factors were so configured as to conform private behavior with public
3 11
need, even if that need is defined in economic terms.
Second, if any of the choices that an intellectual property system
must make should be resolved by issues of noneconomic principle or
right, other than a principle of liberty to use one's tangible property,
then, too, copyright has an institutional advantage over copy-privilege.
If the choices between copying and not copying are made simply as byproducts of ever-changing technologies and industry structures, a legislature would have to review those results regularly to assure that the
patterns of restraints on copying that emerged over time remained normatively acceptable. A property system, by contrast, can be tailored to
312
express principles in a systematic way.

These observations implicitly raise the several issues that will be discussed in the remainder of this article. First, is there a defense of copyprivilege that is not dependent upon empirical outcomes? The most
likely such defenses are arguments that focus on liberties to use one's
tangible property and on consent. I examine these arguments and suggest that neither suffices to indict copyright. In particular, I suggest
that a focus on consent can no more justify copy-privilege than
copyright.
Next, to what extent does wealth-maximization provide an adequate
normative guide to the allocation of intellectual property entitlements?
In examining this issue, I conclude that economics is an inadequate basis for setting any initial scheme of entitlements, in part because of its
insensitivity to distributional issues. I then go on to explore whether
any distributional premise could be supplied to remedy this gap in a
way that would lead to outcomes consistent with the encouragement
theorists' method or results. I identify such a possible premise but conclude that it is normatively unacceptable. I further suggest some of the
311. Although the decentralized market system has great flexibility, it responds only to
costs and benefits that have an impact on decisionmakers. Thus, the notion that private behavior will serve public needs (the notion of the "Invisible Hand") depends, among other
things, on the internalization of all relevant costs and benefits. See Demsetz, supra note 21.
Where significant costs and benefits remain "external"-where, for example, producers of
desirable things are not able to capture a significant share of the benefits generated-the
"Invisible Hand" will not function.
312. Recall that a property system can also grant privileges to copy that "trump" inconsistent rights. The Supreme Court sees such enforceable liberties as granted by the patent
system. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 985 (1989); see also
note 266 supra. Thus a property system can protect both creators' entitlements and users'
entitlements.
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noneconomic values that should be taken into account but which "encouragement theory" defenses of copy-privilege ignore.
Finally, I explore copyright's better ability to take noneconomic
rights and principles into account as compared with copy-privilege and
argue that only by utilizing a copyright system can legal decisionmakers
pay due respect to authors and users in their capacities as authors and
users.
A.

The Gap Between the Contract Nature of Copy-privilege and the Property
Nature of Copyright. Whose Consent Matters?

The common imagination places great stress on rights of tangible
property and contract, and much of the hostility to copyright stems
from the feeling that copyright inhibits one's liberty to use one's own
tangible possessions in ways to which one has not consented.3 1 3 This
perception probably plays a background role in much intellectual prop31 4
erty criticism and it is most explicit in the works of Murray Rothbard
3
15
and Tom Palmer.
Rothbard seemed to argue that intellectual property is justified only when it replicates the results that would occur
through the consensual agreements of creators and users. He thus approved of copyright (which he thought was contractual or mimicked
contract-like results) and disapproved of patent (which he realized was
inconsistent with a contractual approach).3 1 6 Palmer would go further.
He suggests that any legal restraint on copying is impermissible except
where it results from contract or from piggybacking onto rights in tangible property. 3 17 He opposes both copyright and patent as improper
incursions into a voluntary regime.3 18
To analyze such positions, it will be helpful to begin by exploring
whether copyright will produce the same results as would contract in a
world of copy-privilege. Showing why Rothbard is incorrect in assuming an identity between copyright and contract will give us a new per313. See text accompanying notes 9-20 supra.
314. See 2 M. ROTHBARD, supra note 17, at 650-60, 908-16, where Rothbard saw an identity between copyright and contract, id. at 653; that is my focus here. In later work, Rothbard
took a somewhat different position on copyright. See M. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY
123-24 (1982) (discussing what he referred to as "common law" copyright).
315. Palmer, supra note 6.
316. 2 M. ROTHBARD, supra note 17, at 653-56. It is not entirely clear whether Rothbard
would have accepted contract-like results, or whether he would have demanded actualcontracts
as a prerequisite for enforcing a duty not to copy. I here assume the prior interpretation.
Admittedly, Rothbard seemed to think that copyright notices actually ensured that purchasers
agreed not to copy. Id. at 654. However, seeing a copyright notice on an item before
purchasing it is not identical to consenting to all of copyright law's restrictions.
317. These points run throughout Palmer's analysis. For his conceptual framework, see
Palmer, supra note 6, at 262-63, 280-87, 303-04; for his survey of contractual and technological means of restraining copying, see id. at 288-302. Palmer argues that "[lI]aw in a liberal
society.., emerges out of contract and interaction among interested parties, and not as a
result of state edicts handed down from on high, as in the case of intellectual property rights."
Id at 280.
318. See generally Palmer, supra note 6.
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spective on the differences between a property-based system like
copyright and a contract-based system. After concluding that copyprivilege, with its focus on user consent, gives creators less protection
than does copyright, I examine whether the importance of consent itself justifies this lesser degree of protection.
1. Is copyright a form of contract?
As I already made clear, the world of copy-privilege allows some
legal rights against copying to exist, including rights arising out of contract.3 19 Since having a privilege means that one is free only of state

interference, not the interferences of other people, in such a world
there can be something worth contracting about. For example, individual users may be willing to pay a creator to waive her privilege of
3 20
nondisclosure.
Having transferable value does not necessarily make something
"property," however,3 2 1 for contracts over privileges generally give the
participants no right to employ affirmative state power against third
parties. 32 2 Only a contract signed by everyone could create rights good
against the world. Using Hohfeld's terms, the rights and duties arising
out of contract, like the rights and duties arising out of confidential
relationships, tend to be "paucital" rather than "multital" entitlements:3 2 3 They are entitlements created by particular circumstances,
319. The world of copy-privilege is thus different from a complete state of nature, where
there are no legally enforceable means of preventing copying. See, e.g., Kennedy &
Michelman, supra note 41, at 715 (describing a state of nature regime in which even contract
rights cannot be created).
320. One can make contracts over both privileges and rights. Compare "Ifyou pay me,
I will not use my privilege to withhold this work from view" (leading to a contract over privileges) with "I want to sell you my ability to call on the state to exclude others from this
resource" (leading to a contract over rights). Even if only a privilege is transferred, the transferor can bind herself to exercise it no longer, thus giving the transferee a legal right against
her which did not before exist.
321. "Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable-a
matter of fact. Many exchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally without compensation." International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (opposing a holding that in certain circumstances
transferable but noncopyrightable "hot news" should be treated as property).
322. Two persons can allocate an otherwise privileged activity between themselves and
to that limited extent create a set of rights and duties between themselves that resemble the
rights and duties between property owners and nonowners. Sometimes, albeit rarely, the
positive law will treat aspects of the parties' dealings with regard to a resource as the basis for
entitlements good against everyone. For example, depending on circumstance, the positive
law sometimes imposes duties on third parties to respect others' contracts-the doctrine of
tortious interference with contract.
323. Hohfeld defines the terms as follows:
A paucital right, or claim, (right in personam) is either a unique right residing in a
person (or group of persons) and availing against a single person (or single group of
persons); or else one of afew fundamentally similar, yet separate, rights availing respectively against a few definite persons. A multital right, or claim, (right in rein) is
always one of a large class offundamentally similaryet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of persons) but availing respectively
against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people.
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good against particular persons, rather than generally applicable entitlements presumptively good against the world. Though there may be
occasions when it suits the purposes of a statute 3 24 or a constitutional
guarantee 3 25 to treat a paucital right as "property," rights premised on
contracts or confidential relations between particular persons have effects potentially quite different from in rem rights good against the public in general. Yet Rothbard thought he perceived in the copyright
area
32 6
an identity between the property and contract categories.
One can understand praise for American copyright law based on a
belief that its prohibition against copying merely reflects the agreement
the typical creator and user would voluntarily reach. 3 27 Focusing on
the way American copyright law restricts only the user's privileges to
copy material to which he has had access, and gives no rights against
independent recreation (unlike patent law), it is plausible to suggest
that copyright does no more than provide a substitute for the contractual conditions that the author would normally impose, and that users
would normally accept, as a condition of allowing access to the work.
Thus, since the typical user wants to read a book, not republish it or
make it into a movie, the standard contract for persons who want access
to the intellectual product for their own immediate use would presumably contain a do-not-copy prohibition and a low price.3 28 Persons who
want to copy would contract to do so, but at a higher price. Under this
view, copyright law's prohibition against unauthorized copying merely
provides "standard terms" for a convenient unwritten standard contract and requires unusual
users (those who want to copy) to bargain
3 29
over their special needs.
Hohfeld, supra note 35, at 718 (footnotes omitted). Although I am obviously drawing on
Hohfeld's treatment, my mode of employing his paucital/multital distinction is not identical
to his. For example, he speaks of rights against a "very large and indefinite class" where I
speak of rights good "against the world."
324. Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987) (confidential information treated
as "property" under the mail and wire fraud statutes). This opinion exhibits an unfortunate
willingness to label an overly large category of rights as "property"-whether those rights are
paucital or multital and whether or not they embody the "formal" mode of control characteristic of property law. See note 216 supra.
325. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (confidential information
treated as "property" under fifth amendment takings clause); cf Martinez v. California, 444
U.S. 277, 281 (1979) ("Arguably, the cause of action for wrongful death that the State has
created is a species of 'property' protected by the Due Process Clause.") (dicta).
326. He argued that in copyright a "plaintiff must prove that the defendant stole the
former's creation by reproducing it... in violation of his or someone else's contract with the
original seller." 2 M. ROTHBARD, supra note 17, at 653.
327. Id. at 652-60. Rothbard's treatment of the copyright issue is somewhat unclear,
since his main interest seems to have been to argue against patent law that it did not follow a
contractual model. My interest in his views centers on that contractual model.
328. Whether the transaction is a purchase or something else matters little. Any requirement of payment-whether a requirement that a ticket for viewing be purchased (e.g., for
concerts and plays), that a copy be purchased (e.g., for books), or that a copy be rented (e.g.,
for movie videocassettes)-potentially gives the creator opportunities to extract agreements
not to copy.
329. Of course copyright law itself allows and encourages a "contracting out" alterna-
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The implicit fulcrum of such a position is the author/owner's physical control over access, for it is this control that gives the author power
to extract agreements not to copy. If one accepts Rothbard's apparent
assumption that all persons who want access to a creative work can obtain it only by bargaining with the author or those with whom she has a
contractual relation,3 3 0 the results achievable by contract in a copyprivilege regime would be essentially the same as those achievable
under a copyright system. 3 3 ' If Rothbard is correct, then copyright law
merely codifies the legal relations that persons would create among
themselves in a realm of copy-privilege. Dissolving copyright would
then matter little, for equivalent private contracts would take its place.
In addition, Rothbard's analysis temptingly seems to suggest that copyright law can be morally justified by the implied consent of all.parties.
If copyright and contract would not come to the same results, however,
then we need to analyze whether that divergence itself is a ground for
3 32
condemning copyright.
In some circumstances contracts can substitute for copyright. For
example, though the copyright statute allows libraries to do a great deal
of photocopying for their patrons without copyright owners' consent,3 3 3 Stanley Liebowitz suggests that libraries today may pay largely
the same monies to those who own the copyrights in scholarly journals
as they would have paid had copyright law not granted libraries a photocopy privilege. His research shows that scholarly journals charge institutional libraries a higher subscription rate than they charge
individuals, apparently because of the amount of photocopying likely to
be done by the libraries and their patrons.3 3 4 The high subscription
rate amounts to an implicit license fee for photocopying. 3 35
tive: By giving the copyright proprietor an exclusive right to do or to authorize copying, 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1982), the copyright law gives the proprietor the ability to prohibit or to permit
the copying that users might desire. See text following note 343 infra.
330. Presumably the author could extract from the first purchaser an agreement that,
upon reselling the resource, he would (1) similarly bind any later purchaser to the same nocopy agreement and (2) similarly require the later purchaser to agree to extract similar agreements from the next person in the chain of title. (Given the hypothetical nature of the inquiry, I shall not examine whether such clauses would be valid under current law.)
331. In later work Rothbard seems to argue that any initial contractual limitation on
copying that is agreed to by someone who purchases a copy of the work should remain attached to the copy and should restrain anyone who happens to be exposed to the copy.
M. ROTHBARD, supra note 314, at 123-24. Such a position would come closer to yielding copyright-like results, but it has drifted fairly far from "consent."
332. See text accompanying notes 357-388 infra for this analysis. Even if Rothbard were
correct that copyright and contract came to the same results, a person who placed great stress
on autonomy might nevertheless object to copyright on the ground that only actual consent by
users should suffice as a basis for imposing duties on them. It may be that Rothbard really
believed that the use of a copyright notice assures that actual consent is present. But see note
316 supra.
333. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982) (certain photocopying by libraries permitted).
334. See Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,supra note 21, at
191-94; see also Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals, supra
note 21.
335. Liebowitz, Copyright and Indirect Appropriability: PhotocopyingofJournals,supra note 21.
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In addition, the legal rules that govern at least one type of intellectual product-trade secrets-follow the consent/contract line rather
closely. The originator of industrial secrets has little more than a nondisclosure privilege as far as the general public is concerned. The trade
secret originator's ability to redress unauthorized copying legally depends on a showing that the defendant has violated rights other than a
per se right against copying, such as a showing that the defendant is an
employee who breached an agreement of confidentiality or an outsider
who bribed employees who signed contracts not to disclose. Someone
who learns the industrial knowledge of another by reverse engineering
or by innocent observation is not liable. 3 36 Thus, a safety pin discloses

its "secrets" upon use, so it is not protectable under trade secret law. If
a soft drink's taste, however, depends on a step in its manufacturing
process that cannot be discovered by a chemical analysis of the end
product, trade secret law can protect the secret formula. This results
not because the formula is more valuable than other "advances in
knowledge," but simply because using the drink does not give knowledge of its contents; and those few who know the formula are bound by
contractual duties not to disclose.
Copyright, however, works differently. Contemporary copyright is
valuable precisely because it extends beyond the place where the proprietor and his contractual extensions can stand guard.3 3 7 When a
copyrighted book falls into the hands of an innocent nonpurchaser, the
property regime's prohibition against copying binds him just as closely
as a person who has promised the author not to copy.
This distinction would be unimportant if creators in a noncopyright
world could rely on their initial customer being willing to offer such a
high payment that fees from future copiers would be irrelevant. But
such customers are rare. Liebowitz's research results do not indicate
otherwise. 33 8 Libraries can charge their patrons membership fees or, if
affiliated with institutions such as universities, can obtain institutional
budget funds to buy subscriptions to the journals that will be photocopied by the students and staff of the institutions. Libraries thus receive implicit payment from copiers in the same way as they pay implicit
fees to copyright owners. But in a world without any copyright, publishers are the creator's most likely "big price" customers; and their
336. See 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 119, §§ 2.03-.06, 5.04.
337. Copyright can be understood as a historical response to creators' decreasing abilities to control personally their creations. Thus, Liebowitz suggests:
The role of technology in disembodying the intellectual property from its creator
must not be underestimated. The printing press is so familiar that it becomes difficult to imagine authors not being disembodied from their work. However, prior to
the printing of words on paper, authors had to tell their tales in person. Only someone with an exceptional memory would have been able to reproduce a story in all its
nuances. Copyright was probably unnecessary at the time ....
Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,supra note 21, at 184.
338. See note 334 supra and accompanying text.
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situation is quite different. Unlike libraries, publishers have no institutional ties to potential copiers that would allow them to pass on relevant costs. Publishers could be vulnerable to free rider copiers eating
into their profits-potentially as vulnerable as the creator himself
would have been-and if so would be unlikely to offer the author signif33 9
icant remuneration.
The distinction between having privileges of nondisclosure and having rights over copying is also important because rights constitute a
form of wealth. Authors with copyrights are able to make different bargains than authors without. 340 An impecunious artist might lack the

bargaining power to extract a no-copy promise 34 1 or a price high
enough to cover copying from her customers.
At bottom, copy-privilege and copyright lead to different results because of the many occasions on which persons have access to copyrighted works without needing to purchase them and thus have the
means to copy independent of a contractual nexus. Wherever one
could have access to a copyrighted work without asking consentwhere one views statuary in a public square,3 4 2 receives a free broadcast
of an advertiser-supported concert, 3 43 or picks up a book that someone
else has dropped-ordinary contract rules would not support restricting what the person with access can do with what he receives. The person has had access without needing to ask the creator's permission and
thus has been free of the creator's leverage. Since this potential consumer or copier has already received what he wants, the work's originator has nothing with which to bargain.
The "consent nexus" so central to Rothbard's conceptual scheme
thus fails at many points. In some cases, like the libraries studied by
Liebowitz, a lack of direct control over copying will not reduce the creator's revenues from the copying that occurs. In other situations, such
as those explored by Judge Breyer, a lack of legal control will not pre339. In fact, the Statute of Anne, from which Anglo-American copyright descends, appears to have been a response to publisher, not author, pressure. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 8,
at 5-8.
340. It is well recognized, the Coase Theorem notwithstanding, that income or wealth
effects created by granting legal entitlements can change the allocational patterns resulting
from bargaining. See, e.g., E.J. Mishan, The PostwarLiterature on Externalities,9J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1, 18-21 (1971) (examining the allocative impact of "welfare effects"--more commonly
known as "income effects"-flowing from alterations in legal entitlements).
341. Copyright is open to the challenge that it offers no more protection than a
noncopyright regime if the artist lacks bargaining power: She may well be forced to sell the
copyright. A right good against third parties, however, is more valuable than a privilege of
dominion (for reasons already suggested); therefore copyright gives the author something of
value that should be worth more than a privilege in the marketplace.
In addition, American copyright law has long contained paternalistic provisions to protect the legendary artist in the garret (who might be tempted to sell too cheaply) and to protect that artist's family. See notes 143-144 supra and accompanying text.
342. See Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1303
(N.D. Ill. 1970) (declaratory judgment action to invalidate defendant's claim of copyright in
monumental sculpture designed by Picasso for the Chicago City Center).
343. See note 11 supra.
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vent an author or publisher from inhibiting copying by other methods.
Yet the lacunae which would result from a contract-only system may be
significant. In a copy-privilege regime even one person free of a contractual duty not to copy can make thousands of copies, and all who
purchase their access from her would similarly be free of the author's
restrictions. Is there some way to avoid this problem consistent with a
focus on contractual rights?
2.

Changing the form of noncontractualrights and duties to enlarge the
domain of contract.

One way to finesse the problem of contractual nexus might be to
introduce contracts into most occasions on which persons have access to
copyrighted works by imposing on users a duty to obtain the creator's
permission before enjoying the work. But that is a far cry from a realm
of privilege supplemented by a willingness to enforce contracts. It
would be, in fact, a form of supercopyright. The fulcrum of the contract system would simply have been shifted from physical control to
control of the intangible.
To see this, consider: If copyright were eliminated and replaced
with privileges restrained by contracts, each person would have: (1) a
privilege "to enjoy and copy whatever is open to my sight or senses
without my breaking through physical barriers or otherwise breaking
the law," (2) a privilege "to conceal what I can of my own creations
from the access of others," and (3) a power to make state-enforceable
contracts and a corresponding obligation to obey contracts made.
Users would thus be privileged to copy whenever the creator lacked a
bargaining lever with which to obtain a contract to refrain.
If the law were to create a duty to obtain the creator's permission
before enjoying and make that duty applicable regardless of what was
physically accessible, then the user would no longer be entitled "to enjoy whatever is open to my sight or senses without physical barriers."
The user would now be entitled only to "enjoy what the artist gives me
permission to enjoy." After such a change, the patron of sculptural arts
would indeed probably contract for the privilege of enjoying the sculpture in the plaza; as part of the payment, the sculptor may extract from
the viewer a promise not to duplicate the piece of art. But to get to that
point, the law will have had to replace the privilege of enjoyment with
the duty to restrain oneself from enjoying until the owner's permission
was secured. And that is largely what copyright itself does. In fact,
imposing a duty to get a creator's permission before enjoying is an even
greater incursion on users' liberty than is the copyright duty to get a
creator's permission before copying.
Neither copy-privilege nor copyright nor any other mode of allocating resources is "equivalent to" contract, for the content of contracts
depends on the starting points from which the contracts are made. A
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contract scheme in which the author's leverage depends on physical
control will yield different results than a scheme in which a creator has
independent rights over the intangible. Copy-privilege leaves creators
vulnerable in a way that copyright would not, and it gives users liberties
to copy that copyright would not.
B.

Compulsion and Consent

As we have seen, without a set of state-imposed multital duties not
to copy and a corresponding set of state-imposed multital rights against
copying, gaps in contract protection could leave room for free riders to
operate. Persons who favor copyright on economic grounds argue that
under copy-privilege the presence of free riders would make the economic return on intellectual products too low to support a desirable
level of creative activity. Yet if copyright yields extra economic return,
it does so because it empowers the author to restrain others from using
the work in particular ways. Thus, the increase in incentive is
purchased at the price of imposing this compulsion on potential users.
The following discussion will examine the question of whether that
incentive is purchased at the price of an impermissible sacrifice of liberty. I first address the conflict that can occur between intangible rights
and persons' privileges to use their tangible possessions. I argue that
restraints on persons' liberties to use their tangible property are both
common and inherent in a legal system that grants some people legal
rights that operate against others. I then address the emphasis that is
sometimes placed upon consent as a justifying criterion for treating
creative works and conclude that it cannot adequately fulfill this role
since copyright shows no less a respect for consent than does copyprivilege. I conclude that copyright's restraints on liberty do not make
that regime morally inferior to the regime of copy-privilege.
1. Conflict between entitlements.
Intellectual property rights often operate to restrain the owners of
tangible things from their ordinarily privileged uses of those things.
With copyright, the legitimate owners of paintings, floppy disks,
records and papers, computers, tape recorders, 3 44 and videocassette
recorders3 4 5 cannot do with them as they wish. For example, A may
purchase a word processing program embedded on a floppy disk. If A
copies the program just purchased, using the computer A saved for
months to buy, onto another floppy disk for which A has also paid good
money, A will probably think that she was doing nothing wrong. "After
344. 3 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 13.05(F)(b)(ii), at 13-124 to -129
(home audio taping may not be fair use).
345. Although the Supreme Court in Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 417, held that certain home
uses of videocassette recorders (VCRs) constituted "fair use," other VCR uses can constitute
infringement. See, e.g., Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) & 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
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all," thinks A, "I have paid for all these things." Yet the author of the
word processing program may have a copyright that makes A's act unlawful. Palmer argues: "[A]ny system of 'property rights' that requires
the violation of other property rights, e.g., the right to determine the
peaceful use in one's home of one's own videocassette recorder or to
purchase blank tapes without paying a royalty to a third party, is no
system of rights at all." '3 46 Is this correct? Does the restraint that copy-

right imposes on the privileges of use which ordinarily accompany tangible property make copyright illegitimate?
Clearly not. All entitlements limit each other. Recall in this regard
Justice Holmes's brief summary of a property owner's presumptive entitlements, quoted earlier.a4 7 He suggested that property owners were
completely "accountable to no one." If this were true without qualification, an owner could use his property as he wished, even if the usage
hurt another's property in the process. Yet Justice Holmes also suggested that owners are "protected" by the legal system against other
persons' "interference" and are "allowed to exclude all." '3 48 Left un-

modified, the two statements are inconsistent, leading to two legal results-say, a reservoir owner being privileged to use his reservoir free
from any liability and a neighboring mine owner having a right to keep
the mine free from flooding 34 9 -that could not coexist between the
same two parties as to the same physical event. When the reservoir
owner would
overflows into the neighbor's mine shafts, each property
350
seem to have a claim inconsistent with the other's.
What saves this specification of entitlements from paradox or indeterminacy are the "limits prescribed by policy" that specify an ordering
among entitlements. 3 5 ' For example, in England, prior to Rylands v.
346. Palmer, supra note 6, at 281.
347. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 36, at 246; text accompanying note 36 supra.
348. Id.
349. Under the first statement, an owner "accountable to no one" could, for example,
build a reservoir on his land which overflowed into a neighbor's mine shafts without being
subject to liability. Under the second, the neighboring mine owner "protected against interference" and "entitled to exclude all" would possess a right to have agents of the law take
action against the threatened flooding or a right to obtain relief in the courts when damage
occurs.
350. Hohfeld makes the logical impossibility clear. For X to have a right against Y
means by definition that Y has a duty, not a privilege. If Y instead has a privilege, X must, as a
definitional matter, have a no-right. See note 253 supra.
351. See text accompanying note 36 supra. Because Holmes admits that limits exist, he
escapes the paradox. Since in the excerpt from The Common Law quoted above, see text accompanying note 36 supra, he leaves the nature of the limits unspecified, however, it yields an
indeterminate result. When Justice Holmes turned his attention more specifically to tort law,
he refined his description of property owners' entitlements in a way that eliminated the indeterminacy, at least at the prima facie level. In Privilege, Malice and Intent, Justice Holmes suggested that everyone in society (including, presumably, property owners) had a duty to refrain
from intentional infliction ofharm and that the law gave privileges to do such harm only when
justified by particular policies. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1894). Under this view, the example of the flooded mine shafts would no longer have
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Fletcher,3 52 some of the mine owner's property entitlements would have
been subordinate to the neighboring reservoir owner's privileges to use
property nonnegligently. The mine owner could not legally redress the
reservoir owner's nonnegligent and indirect flooding of the mine
shafts.3 5 3 In Rylands itself, the reservoir owner's privileges were curtailed and the mineowner's rights expanded. That case held the reservoir owner strictly liable for damage caused by the reservoir escaping
into the neighbor's mine. Some ordering, some curtailment, is logically
3 54
necessary.
If property entitlements cannot be unlimited without potentially
leading to paradox, one sort of entitlement can clearly restrain another.
Since two pieces of adjoining land can be put to inconsistent uses, tort,
nuisance, and environmental protection laws mediate among them, forbidding certain otherwise privileged uses of one piece of land in order
to protect the other. Similarly, since cars can strike each other, the law
of negligence says an automobile owner cannot drive as fast or as carelessly as he might like. Analogously, too, since copying can interfere
with a copyright owner's interest, the law says that photocopy machine
owners cannot make as many photocopies as they like and that computer owners cannot make as many copies of programs written by
others as they might like. And as zoning can restrict even nonharmful
privileges to use one's property, and as the law of intentional trespass
forbids even nonharmful intrusions onto land, copyright can restrain
the violation of a proprietor's exclusion right even when the copying
to yield an indeterminate result; if the release of the reservoir was intentional, then the owner
of the reservoir would lose unless special circumstances or policies were present.
Justice Holmes also clarified his position on unintentional harm, but in the opposite direction. He seems to have envisioned a presumptive privilege to do unintentional harm that
would be lost by negligence. See O.W. HOLMES, supra note 36, at 77-99. Under this view, if
flooding the mine involved neither intentional acts nor the reservoir owner's negligence, then
the mine owner would have no remedy unless special factors appeared.
The indeterminacy was thus resolved for Holmes: The owner had a prima facie right
against intentional and negligent harms but none against unintentional, nonnegligent harms.
Similarly, the owner had a prima facie privilege to inflict unintentional nonnegligent harm but
was not privileged to inflict intentional or negligent harm. These were some of the more
prominent outlines of"the limits prescribed by policy." 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 36, at 246;
see also Singer, supra note 41, at 1027-28, 1040-42 (discussion of Holmes).
The current law is tending toward resolving the indeterminacy in a somewhat different
fashion-namely, that in an increasing number of cases today, even unintentional and nonnegligent harms are not privileged. See note 85 supra. More important for our purposes is the
general point that no property entitlements can be unlimited and that one person's set of
rights can limit another's privileges.
352. Rylands v. Fletcher, 1. L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), aft'd, 3 L.R.-H.L. 330 (H.L.
1868).
353. For a discussion of why other forms of action were unavailable to the plaintiff in
Rylands, see M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, supra note 304, at 438.
354. Even a court's refusal to judge a dispute between two inconsistent land uses implicitly specifies entitlements: The person who would have been the defendant prevails. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64; Robert L. Hale, Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 603, 612 (1943) (discussing the inevitability of compulsion); Singer, supra
note 41 (discussing damnum absque injuria).
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poses no threat to the proprietor's preexisting markets.3 5 5 That one
person's intellectual property rights can limit another's privileges to
use his things is no more remarkable than that tangible property rights
can do the same.
Nor does distance matter.3 5 6 One who copies another's work miles
away from where the author resides may still be liable for copyright
infringement, but there is nothing remarkable about that; liability has
long stretched across the continent. If one who places a dangerous defective product in the stream of commerce should be liable regardless
of where the product causes injury, then one who sends a work into
commerce should be able to demand a fee for the benefits it brings,
wherever the beneficial uses occur.
2.

Consent as a criterionfor moral adequacy.

Part of the popular resistance to copyright is a protest against being
restricted in using one's tangible personalty. The last section discussed
how such restraints are inherent in any system that gives some persons
legal rights that operate against other persons. But even if copyright
involves the same kinds of compulsions and restraints as do other kinds
of property, are these compulsions nevertheless an evil to be avoided?
Discussions of copyright and of other property rights systems are sometimes structured as if only the institution of property, but not systems
built on other legal foundations-consent, for example-requires special justification. For example, Alan Ryan writes that "[alnyone's property limits the freedom of everyone else to acquire and use what he
feels like acquiring and using. It is an institution which therefore requires justification. ' 3 57 Such statements are negatively pregnant with
the implication that realms of liberty and consent (where one could use
any resource desired as long as one had not bound oneself to refrain)
are self-justifying.
Is this true? If the compulsions of copyright were eliminated so that
the only restraints on intellectual property use would be those to which
individual users had consented, would that give rise to a morally more
desirable legal regime?
It is tempting to think that it would. Consent sometimes appears to
provide a sufficient ground for moral acceptability: "If you've agreed,
how can you complain?" Some consent theories therefore attract adherents because the theories offer an alluring illusion of providing legi355. It could be debated whether or not to characterize as a "harm" an act of copying
that interferes with none of the copyright proprietor's preexisting expectations. See text ac-

companying notes 190-195 supra. My point in the text here is that, given the common law
analogues, there is nothing illegitimate in using copyright law to require even such a copier to
pay license fees, regardless of whether his act is viewed as "harmful."
356. Justice Holmes's doubts about copyright had a spatial aspect. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
357. See A. RYAN, supra note 7, at 8.
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timization without the need for determining independent criteria for
legitimacy. 358 But the lure is false. One needs to know and evaluate
the background entitlements upon which choices and consents are
based in order to know if such consents are worthy of serving as guides
for the legal order. 35 9 Without making an independent normative
judgment about background conditions and starting points, one cannot
be sure that consent is a necessary or sufficient basis for normative
3 60
acceptability.
For example, one might consent in a specific context to receive less
than one is entitled on moral grounds to receive because one believes
that, in that context, the moral entitlement will not be honored. The
decision does not, however, erase the original entitlement. The classic
example is the robbery victim who is given the choice, "Your money or
your life." Few would suggest that the victim's assent to give the
money should bind him later, however deeply the victim might have
desired to make the trade. Because in our legal system all would agree
that the victim is entitled to keep both money and life and that the robber is not entitled to use force, most people would not even view the
victim's assent as "consent," regardless of What may have been the victim's own subjective state of willingness. Conversely, lack of consent
does not indicate lack of legitimacy. For example, the robber would
not consent to give up his spoils, yet few would think that a thief's lack
of consent morally taints retrieval of the goods. Similarly, a driver on
358. The popularity of the law and economics view is at least partially attributable to the
common but mistaken intuition that using a market model enshrines in the details of private
law the noble models of consent on which many of our political orthodoxies are based.
Among the several errors inherent in this intuition is its refusal to recognize that all contracts,
even "social contracts," are not "immune from criticism in the light of pre-existing principles
ofjustice." M. SANDEL, supra note 242, at 109. A second is to underestimate the differences
between hypothetical and actual compensation. A third is to equate actual compensation with
consent. On the latter two points, see generally J. COLEMAN, supra note 206, at 95-132; JEFFRIE MURPHY &JULES COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 255-72 (1984).
Even those most adept at debunking these errors can fall prey to similar ones. As just
suggested, not all of the people who use efficiency as a criterion do so solely because of a
reasoned belief in its normative or descriptive powers. Some are influenced by the central
image or "story" of law and economics: market deals which are consensual and not facially
illegitimate leading to efficiency. Such market bargains are the discipline's constant reference
point. From this attractive image emanates the illusion that in using criteria linked to efficiency we will respect legitimate entitlements and individual choice. Coleman, supra note 230.
359. M. SANDEL, supra note 242, at 104-13; see also Hale, supra note 354; cf Anthony
Kronman, Contract Law and DistributiveJustice, 89 YALE L.J. 471, 474 (1980) (distributive justice
"must be taken into account if the law of contracts is to have even minimum moral acceptability").
As John Raw'ls notes:
Acquiescence in, or even consent to, clearly unjust institutions does not give rise to
obligations. It is generally agreed that extorted promises are void ab initio. But similarly, unjust social arrangements are themselves a kind or extortion, even violence,
and consent to them does not bind.
J. RAwLs, supra note 236, at 343; see also id. at 14-22, 137-42 (original position and veil of
ignorance).
360. See M. SANDEL, supra note 242, at 104-13.
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the highway may not want to pay a toll; but her distaste does not by
itself disentitle the highway fund of its mite.
In these examples, using consent as a guide to moral adequacy is
clearly unreliable, largely because there is consensus about who is entitled to pose what choices. When questions of entitlement are not so
clear, the temptation to use consent as an independent criterion can be
strong. Yet "consent" does not become a more reliable criterion just
because other guideposts have lost their clarity. Consent simply cannot
stand alone.
Thus, when Palmer suggests that it is improper to impose an independent duty not to copy on a user who has not willingly acceded to
such restraint, 361 we must question: Should the user's consent matter?
The answer is that it depends. Is the author who employs copyright to
demand payment more like a highwayman, or more like a highway authority toll collector? Or, to use a different analogy, is the person who
wishes to use the intellectual product and who chafes at copyright's restraints more like a potential thief who resents that the law keeps her
from raiding her neighbor's hencoop, or more like a homeowner who
resents having to pay a local thug "protection" money to keep the
house windows intact? Unless we know the relationship of persons to a
resource, we do not know whose consent is required to stamp a given
disposition of the resource "morally acceptable."
Sometimes consent is inferred from a finding that to consent would
result in an excess of benefits over costs. 36 2 But that benefits outweigh

costs is not a sufficient basis for moral ratification of a given condition.
Allocation B may give more benefits than allocation A, but one may be
entitled to something even better than B. 3 63 And if harm is a relevant
361. See Palmer, supra note 6, at 280-83, 303-04. Palmer would accept restraints arising
out of tangible property entitlements, id. at 279-83, 287-89, though he would not accept restraints directed specifically against copying. The answers he gives to the questions I pose
would therefore not be as indeterminate as the answers I believe would flow from a position
accepting no restraints at all.
362. Where for some reason it is impractical to obtain someone's actual consent, it is
often nevertheless considered fair to impose a result on her as long as it appears to work to
her long-term best interest. See Kronman, supra note 359, at 483-93 (Paretianism);
Michelman, supra note 172, at 1176-81. For use of the implied consent m9de of analysis in a
copyright context, see Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1615-18.
A finding of "implied consent," so common in the law, shares the same potential flaws as
any hypothetical consent analysis. Among other problems, people sometimes consent to
things that are not in their self interest; and welfare-based arguments are substantively different from arguments premised upon autonomy. SeeJ. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358,
at 200-01. Also, there are difficulties inherent in having a third-party factfinder try to gauge
whether conditions exist (such as no harm done, or an excess of benefits over harms) upon
which a reasonable person would have been expected to give consent. For discussion of the
difficulties and possibilities inherent in any third-party estimation of what another person's
harm or benefit might be, see, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64 (particularly the discussion of "liability rules"). But see BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 44-47 (1965) (sug-

gesting that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible).
363. To illustrate, in a regime of copy-privilege an author may be willing to sell her
manuscript to a publisher for a low price because the author recognizes that the publisher
may be subjected to the competition of pirated editions; this may be the best deal the author

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581843

1428

STANFORD L4 W REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1343

question, lack of consent does not even prove that the unconsenting
person is being harmed. Absence of consent may mean no more than
that the person withholding consent is angling for strategic advantage3 64 in order to maximize her benefits or that she is envious of another person obtaining something that (aside from envy) would do the
objecting party no harm.3 6 5 Also, "harm" is a relative notion that obtains its content solely from comparison with a specified baseline, often
the preexisting status quo. 3 66 This is another reason why consent should

be used as an ultimate criterion only by persons willing to accept the
entitlement structure with which the parties began their negotiation.
Admittedly, consent can help safeguard autonomy. Whenever
someone withholds consent, no matter what the motivation, any overriding of that person's objections implies some lack of respect for his
autonomy. Thus, philosophers who stress the independent value of
consent may not care whether envy, strategy, or even perverseness
motivates a refusal.3 6 7 But this focus on autonomy also fails to aid the
copy-privilege proponent, because virtually all entitlements necessarily
involve a lack of consent on the part of some persons affected.3 68 The
can make. The author's consent in that context would not mean that the author lacked any
entitlement to a right against piracy or that the author would consent to the same terms if
such an entitlement were secured. Like the victim in the robbery hypothetical, the author's
consent is given only against a set of real-world constraints which may or may not be normatively appropriate to impose on her.
To illustrate again with the robbery example: Temporarily isolated from the legal system, which enforces his entitlement to be free from intentional killing, the victim temporarily
and accurately perceives that he cannot expect such an entitlement to be honored. Rather, his
only options are to be killed (which we might call allocation A) or to trade his possessions for
his life (which we might call allocation B). That he chooses allocation B does not erase his
entitlement to something better.
The question of who receives the benefits can also be important to the status of consensual agreements. A contract of silence between a blackmailer and victim may make those two
people better off but at the expense of those persons who would be interested in learning the
concealed information. Thus, under the law of blackmail the person who learns an unsavory
secret may be entitled to be silent about it-but he is prohibited from selling that silence.
Here a consensual agreement between a willing seller and willing buyer is not only unenforceable but criminal. See generally note 283 supra and accompanying text.
364. For example, the government's power to condemn land that it needs for public
projects is frequently justified as a response to the danger of strategic behavior by the land's
owners. Strategic threats can prevent parties from arriving at mutually beneficial outcomes.
See Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & EcoN. 427, 429 (1972).
Similarly, the free rider problem that can exist under copy-privilege results from individuals
seeking to take strategic advantage of someone else's willingness to purchase a first copy of
the work.
365. Those observers who are committed to the position that individuals are the only
accurate judges of their own welfare may refuse to guess whether envy or strategy motivates a
refusal.
366. On the importance of a "baseline" and the related question of how to distinguish
between being harmed and being prevented from obtaining a benefit, see J. FEINBERG, supra
note 190, at 53, 135-43.
367. See J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 204 (discussing the position that
"[c]oercion fails to treat the person with proper respect, as a rational autonomous agent capable of promoting his own ends"); id. at 255-75 (different approaches to consent).
368. See generally Hale, supra note 354; see also Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. ScI. Q. 470, 470-74 (1923) ("[Tlhe conduct is motivated,
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copier's autonomy may be overriden in the intellectual property system, but the creator's autonomy receives insufficient respect under
copy-privilege. Whether the entitlement is to keep or to share, right or
privilege, someone will object. There is no way to avoid making entitlement choices on some normative ground other than consent.
That is why it is often so difficult to determine what should count as
consent and what as compulsion. For example, an author might argue
that there is no compulsion in property rights because a copyright
owner gives potential copiers the freedom to choose whether or not to
use a given work. When potential copiers encounter a work marked as
owned, the argument would run, they can decline to reproduce it if
they think the privilege not worth the price; the choice is theirs. The
copiers might reply, in turn, that no one should force them to choose
between paying for the work and doing without. But then the author
might retort that she should not be forced to choose between keeping
her work off the market and making it vulnerable to copying by freeriders. Behind both parties' assertions are implicit claims about substantive entitlements.
Unfortunately, the courts are not particularly helpful in illuminating
the nature of what should count as a free choice. For example, the argument just mentioned raises issues similar to those that frequently
arise under the "assumption of risk" doctrine when a plaintiff, who has
engaged in a risky activity knowing of its dangers, argues that her
knowledgeable choice should not bar her suit because the activity
should have been available to her in a less risky form. 36 9 Rather than
explicitly addressing the normative issues raised, however, the courts
sometimes simply punt to the jury as a "question of fact" the question
3 70
of whether the plaintiff "voluntarily" encountered the risk in suit.

not by any desire to do the act in question, but by a desire to escape a more disagreeable
alternative." Id. at 472.).
369. The question also arises in regard to explicit agreements to waive rights. See Tunkl
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (clause
purporting to exculpate hospital from negligence held invalid). As an example of where the
normative question is perhaps less obvious than in the hospital context but equally interesting, consider a hypothetical loosely based on the facts in Verduce v. Board of Higher Education, 9 A.D.2d 214, 192 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1959), rev'd, 8 N.Y.2d 928, 168 N.E.2d 838, 204
N.Y.S.2d 168 (1960). In a college dramatics class conducted in a theater with extremely steep
steps, assume that the drama coach has told a student she must "hold her head up" when
stepping down from stage "or lose the part." The student knows she will not graduate if she
loses her role in the play and also knows she might fall because of the extreme steepness of
the steps. Continuing with head high might be considered a form of consent, or at least, a
knowing encounter with the danger; she seems to have judged that the danger is less important to her than keeping the role. If she indeed falls and sues the teacher, the court or jury
will have to decide whether or not she had "assumed the risk" of falling. It will probably
make this decision by inquiring (implicitly or explicitly) into whether students should be entitled to safe places in which to complete their graduation requirements or, put another way,
into whether teachers should be entitled to give their students a choice between physical danger and graduation. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 54-57 (1987).
370. See Ierduce, 8 N.Y.2d 928 (1960), rev 'g and implementing the dissenting opinion below,
9 A.D.2d 214, 220, 192 N.Y.S.2d 913, 919 (ambiguously defined set of inquiries, apparently
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But since the only "fact" involved is psychological willingness, and
since even a psychologically willing consent can be found nonbinding, 3 7 1 this judicial response only helps to conceal the true issue of
whether the plaintiff was entitled to a less risky form of activity.
An approach that says "favor liberty and avoid compulsion" without
specifying the kinds of liberty and compulsion is thus radically indeterminate. "[A]ll money is paid, and all contracts are made, to avert some
kinds of threats. '3 72 Compulsion's unavoidability is implicit in the
Hohfeldian categories: One person's privilege is another's vulnerability, and one person's security is another's restraint. 3 73 The question is
therefore not whether compulsion is present, but whether the particu37 4
lar type of compulsion at issue in a given case is acceptable.
The weakness of the consent criterion is not always obvious because
courts usually assume the justice of the background of liberties and
compulsions against which consent is given or withheld. 37 5 This tendency is due more to judicial acceptance of those background patterns,
set by legal traditions sanctioned by precedent and unlikely to be overturned, than it is due to any independent virtue in "consent" itself. For
example, consider what would happen if a person P wished to challenge
the frustration that a grocer imposes on P by keeping food locked up
behind the counter until customers pay for it. Even if P has money with
which to pay, P is forced to choose between (a) having the food and
including the question of whether the student was "free to act as she chose," to be left to the
jury).
On the general question of whether voluntariness or consent can ever be an objective
concept free of normative presuppositions, see Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward a FeministJurisprudence,8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
371. See text following note 360 supra.
372. Hale, supra note 354, at 612. Many commentators seek to distinguish between
threats and offers. See, e.g., A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 369, at 204-21 (1987) (arguing for use
of a moral baseline to "distinguish[ ] coercive and noncoercive proposals in cases which involve the ascription of responsibility." Id. at 217.); Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 101, 112-20 (P. Laslett, W.G. Runciman & Q. Skinner eds. 1972) (exploring various baselines to distinguish threats from offers).
373. See Singer, supra note 41.
374. See generally Hale, supra note 354. My conclusion here is linked to the sometimes
controverted view that coercion is a "moralized" concept that should not be defined solely by
reference to empirical criteria. See A. WERTHEIMER, supra note 369, at 251-55 (suggesting that
particular arrangements of property rights should not be judged as coercive without making
reference to an underlying moral theory); id. at 257-58. A "moralized" approach to coercion
can be consistent with the position that threats and offers are distinguishable. See id. at 204-21
(threats and offers); 305-06 (arguing that whether a proposal increases one's range of voluntary options, or decreases them, should be initially evaluated in terms of moral baselines).
Even Robert Nozick, who has strongly taken issue with the notion that all constraints are
threats, see Nozick, supra note 372, at 112, has recently argued that whether the constraints
other people impose on an actor make the actor's conduct "non-voluntary depends on
whether these others had the right to act as they did." R. NOZICK, supra note 227, at 262.
375. Similar assumptions play a role when courts uphold seemingly consensual agreements against one party's later claim of invalidity on grounds of, for example, economic duress. There are circumstances in which courts will invalidate terms of a bargain even where
the bargain was entered into without threats of physical force. Cf U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978)
(unconscionability provision).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581843

July 1989]

MERITS OF COPYRIGHT

1431

paying money and (b) not having the food and keeping the money,
when P would prefer (c) having the food for free. A "property privilege" regime (analogous to copy-privilege) would allow persons to take
the food without paying. Absent extremely unusual circumstances, P's
challenge to the compulsion is unlikely to get very far, not because P
has consented to the restrictions that make choice (c) unavailable, but
because long precedent has determined that in the ordinary case it is
the grocer's consent that matters.
That compulsion is inescapable is as characteristic of the property
area as it is elsewhere. If property rights were unenforceable, then
armed and hungry strangers who wished to take a farmer's corn would
not be subject to property's compulsions-but the farmer would be
subject to the strangers' compulsion. Eliminating property does not
eliminate compulsion. The same is true of intellectual property. If
compulsion were sufficient grounds for the copier to object to a legal
regime of copyright, then compulsion would also be sufficient grounds
for the work's creator to object to the regime of copy-privilege. After
all, if the copier is not subject to the compulsion of the creator's copyright, the work's creator will be subject to the user's compulsion, because the user will employ his privilege to do things with the work
which the creator would prefer he not do. In many ways, then, the
users' and creators' interests in being free from compulsion appear
37 6
symmetrical.
Someone who wishes to copy others' created works might nevertheless strenuously deny that the important issues are symmetrical. For
example, a copier's advocate might argue that there is a real difference
between being stopped from doing something (which he might call a
"true" compulsion) and being frustrated in one's ability to stop others
from affecting one's interests. Persons who desire to copy will, under
copyright, be stopped from physically doing something that they desire
to do, while under copy-privilege, authors may merely find themselves
unable to collect as much profit as they desire. The advocate thus
might suggest that property rights are suspect because they impose
"true" compulsion on copiers, while privileges merely impose on creators a less objectionable form of compulsion.
Furthermore, the proprivilege commentator might point out that
harm done by the state in enforcing rights is potentially much greater
than the harm done by private persons pursuant to state-granted privileges. For example, a person who wants to use a resource that is subject to another's property right can be sued or arrested if he takes the
property without permission. This state-decreed harm is often inescapable and usually carries stigma. In contrast, the harm that private
376. The person in the law and economics movement most closely associated with the
position that the two sorts of costs are symmetrical is Ronald Coase. See R.H. Goase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. I (1960).
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parties do can often be undone by self-help and is less likely than government-imposed harm to bring with it an aura of moral condemnation. Thus, although a copier might decrease an author's revenues,
that is nevertheless much less painful than being arrested. Furthermore, an author subject to piratical copying is not being injured by the
state; and individuals in our culture by and large expect more fairness
from the government than from individual strangers. Many of us may
be willing to accept the old saw that "life isn't fair," but we believe that
the law should be. In fact, law, like morality, has often been explained
as an attempt to impose human notions of fairness on an arbitrary universe. Similarly, the Constitution imposes many fairness requirements
on the government as agent of the law that are generally inapplicable to
private entities. 3 77 The copier's advocate thus might urge that state action needs a justification that private actions do not and that stategranted rights require a kind of justification that privileges do not.3 78
An author's advocate might reply that it is not only the exercise of
377. On the other hand, someone arguing that privileges require more justification than
rights might claim that federal constitutional law provides no analogical support for copyprivilege. The Constitution's tendency to require certain kinds of behavior more from government than from individuals may simply be a product of the document's nature and the
institutions involved and may not embody a substantive decision by legal decisionmakers as a
whole that individuals should be free to act badly. The federal scheme is not indifferent to
individuals' behavior, it could well be argued; rather, sources of law other than the Constitution, such as federal and state statutes, control individual behavior.
Thus, other aspects of American law may demonstrate more willingness to require fairness from individuals. This can be true even at a state constitutional level. The California
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and assembly constrains the actions of private
parties more than does the first amendment to the federal Constitution, and the similar New
Jersey provision appears to as well. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 2 Cal.3d 899,
592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aft'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); State v. Schmid, 84 NJ.
535, 559, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (federal constitutional issue reviewed but decision based on state
constitution), appeal dismissed, 455 U.S. 100 (1980).
378. The advocate of copy-privilege might seem to be exaggerating in viewing private
property "rights" as forms of state action. Such rights are in fact different from direct expressions of governmental will, a point which a copyright advocate might advance in an effort to
show that special burdens applying to governmental action should not be applied to her. Yet
the differences between specifically directed governmental action and the government lending its force to assist a private plaintiff are not always determinative. The Supreme Court has
held, at least in some circumstances, that when a private party asserts rights through the judiciary, the judiciary's enforcement of those rights is an act of the state. See, e.g., New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (state libel law is subject to certain constitutional
limits); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Constitution prohibits state enforcement of
racially restrictive private covenant). Shelley makes particularly clear how the difference between privilege and right can be relevant to determining when constitutional guarantees of governmental fairness should apply:
We conclude.., that the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded
as violative of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment.
So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence
to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State....
But here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of the restrictive
terms of the agreements.
Id. at 13-14. The Court has not gone so far as Shelley's dicta suggested. Not all assertions of
private right will be treated as state action subject to constitutional scrutiny.
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state power against defendants (which occurs in a rights regime) that
might require justification. A refusal by the state to act (which occurs in
a privilege regime) also implicates moral and economic issues. 37 9 State
inaction can have consequences as coercive (depending on one's definitions) as state action. In the area of constitutional law, for example, as
Seth Kreimer has observed, a "conception of negative rights as freedom from coercive violence has questionable value in shaping constitutional restraints on a government that more often exerts its power by
withholding benefits than by threatening bodily harm." 38 0 Thus, the
assumption of symmetry in rights and privileges might be attacked from
the opposite direction, and a procopyright advocate might try to put
the burden of persuasion on those who would give private persons liberties to affect others' interests.
For example, a creator arguing for copyright might draw on the
common law's tendency to give rights against harm and contend that
privileges that permit persons to do harm are wrongful unless justified. 3 8 ' Ironically, the private law theorist most often associated with
the view that such issues are not symmetrical is Richard Epstein, who
stresses the value of liberty yet makes precisely this opposite contention: He suggests that the state has an obligation to give tort rights to
private persons who have been caused direct harm by the acts of
others.3 8 2 A creator taking his cue from Epstein might argue that it is
government passivity in the face of private parties causing injury that
requires special justification 38 3 and that, at a minimum, the creator
should be protected from copiers' damage. Rights against injury would
protect authors substantially, even if less so than the copyright statute . 8 4 (Copiers can and do cause damage. For example, unauthorized
379. A privilege arguably embodies the state's affirmative decision not to take action.
See Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 252, at 769-70 (the common law property and contract
systems are modes of regulation).
380. Seth F. Kreimer, AllocationalSanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State,
132 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1295 (1984).
381. For common law dimensions of this question, see, e.g., Epstein, supra note 82; Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 252; Singer, supra note 41. For constitutional aspects of this
question, see, e.g., David P. Currie, Positive and .Vegative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864 (1986); Kreimer, supra note 380; see also note 378 supra.
382. See Epstein, supra note 82, at 160-66 (arguing that causation should trigger liability
where excuse and justification are absent); id. at 166-89 (analyzing force, fraud, compulsion,
and dangerous conditions). In arguing that liability should be imposed when certain harms
are directly caused, Epstein demonstrates the irony of a proliberty commentator taking a
strong stance in favor of liberty-limiting rights to protect current possessions.
Epstein's list of ways harm can be caused does not include harm done by copying. Adapting Epstein's argument to the intellectual property context thus extends his basic theory.
Also, his argument is so oriented to physical events that he might reach quite different conclusions about harm to intangibles. Nevertheless, his antisymmetry argument is applicable to the
general points made here.
383. This seems to be the core of Epstein's position regarding tort law. See id. (suggesting strict liability for "direct" harm).
384. In addition, copyright actually gives owners a share in the profits defendants draw
from their work. 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a)-(b) (1982).
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persons who make copies can sell them at a price lower than that
charged for the authorized edition since the pirate pays no royalties
and need not cover the cost of generating the work in the first instance;
the unauthorized edition will have a price advantage and could thereby
drive the unauthorized but higher priced equivalent out of the market.)
Alternatively, an authors' advocate might abandon the debate over
whether rights or privileges need justification more. She might argue
instead that "the law ought to do what is morally required" 3 8 5 and contend that it is morally wrong for users to take unconsented advantage of
others' efforts. This argument also could support
placing the burden
38 6
of justification on copy-privilege proponents.
But neither the copier seeking privileges nor the creator seeking
rights could make more out of their respective arguments than a rebuttable presumption of entitlement. Even the most ardent proponent of
liberty seems obliged to concede that there are some occasions when
liberty should be constrained. Even strong proponents of the view that
the law should protect creators and all other persons from harm would
probably shy away from enshrining the status quo in a presumptive entitlement unless there were some inquiry into how the status quo was
reached3 8 7 or into the question of which status quo holdings are prima
facie entitled to protection. Similarly, proponents of a "law as morality" view would have to explain what rights morality does and does not
justify. As long as justification is possible, a need remains for a theory
of entitlements to describe what kinds of justification are required or
relevant.
Thus, whatever the starting place, the presence or absence of consent means little. Either consent by one party will be balanced by lack
of consent by the other (the symmetry position), a presumptive privilege will be subject to rebuttal by a showing of a justified right (the
proprivilege position), or a presumptive right will be subject to rebuttal
by a showing of justified privilege or excuse (the proright position).
Perhaps no flat presumption can be laid down, and everything should
depend on the particular rights or privileges in question. In all these
formulations, it is the underlying question ofjustification, the question
of what entitlements rightfully attach to interests, that should determine an observer's normative recommendation of whether a right or a
388
privilege should govern in that particular context.
385. J. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 191.
386. Philosophic arguments based on the laborer's claim to deserve a reward are explored at length in W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14, and W. Gordon, Restitutionary
Impulse, supra note 55.
387. See, e.g., R. Nozicx, supra note 227, at 149-52.
388. Once a basic entitlement structure is determined legitimate, then consent can indeed be a quite useful building block in expanding it. For example, Congress has given the
creator of a new work of art a prima facie right to control all copies made of that work. With
acceptance of that entitlement, possible further doctrinal developments can be usefully explored by investigating the allocative patterns arising from the consensual relations between
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In the end the choice for privilege is as freighted with moral charge
as the choice for rights. Clearly, many have believed that private property entitlements are justified. 3 8 9 We must therefore move on to examine the normative appropriateness of the underlying entitlement
structures on which proponents of copy-privilege base their arguments.
C.

Economics and Entitlements

Most of the literature discussing the desirability of intellectual property systems has focused on economics, and to some extent the analysis
takes the same form as it does in regard to tangible property. Thus,
supporters of private property often argue that, in a realm of pure priv39 0
ilege, exchange is unlikely to occur at an economically optimal level.

39 1 is picIn these arguments, a world without specified property rights
tured as potentially quite disruptive. Resources that could not be physically protected from marauders would not be produced, potential
buyers who feared they might be too weak to protect their purchases
from third parties would discount their willingness to pay by the likelihood of loss, and so on. These problems would not vanish if buyers
and sellers of resources had a state-enforceable contract between them,
for even binding contracts are enforceable only against the people who

sign them.3 92

Merely privileged dominion is insecure, it is often ar-

gued, since it is open to the equally privileged depredations of other
persons. People will probably not invest in production or enter into
contracts if the anticipated benefits are likely to be leached away by
third parties.
As we have already seen, the economic arguments commonly made
on behalf of intellectual property are essentially of the same sort. Freeriding and other strategic behaviors may preclude effective coordination among potential purchasers.3 9 3 Even persons who might othercreators (who hold the exclusive right to copy) and users (who have the corresponding duty
not to copy). See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14.
389. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, supra note 203, at §§ 25-51.
390. Compare R. POSNER, supra note 210, at 27-54 (2d ed. 1977), with Kennedy &
Michelman, supra note 41.
391. Property rights do not have to be privately owned in order to be specified and
stable; as long as the state or other equivalent source of power guarantees a given allocation,
the problems of a world with no rights will be avoided. Of course, varying sorts of problems
are introduced with varying forms of ownership. See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in
Society, 35 Am. ECON. REv. 519, 524-25 (1945) (contending that without the pricing system
that decentralized private ownership makes possible, needed information will not be transferred and the economic system will suffer from lack of flexibility and inability to respond to
local conditions).
392. One of the parties could, however, sell "protection." To the extent this protection
was effective against other strong parties, such as competing protective associations, this privately provided protection would mimic property rights in impact. If the protection is a privileged activity, the activity will also be free from interference by any state that exists. Cf R.
NozicK, supra note 227, at 10-25 ("protective associations" in the state of nature).
393. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 763-64 (D. Del.
1981) (discussing the free-rider problem), aff'd mer., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982); sources
cited in notes 21-23 supra; see also Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundationfor Exchange, 14J.
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wise be willing to pay for access to a new intellectual product might be
unwilling to do so if they expect to be able to duplicate their neighbor's
copy. 39 4 As a result, revenues may be low, the resulting incentives to

produce intellectual products may be low, and fewer intellectual products may be produced than the public desires.
If free-riding and other forms of depredation will not so easily occur, then property is less necessary to secure adequate incentives. In
the realm of tangible property, a growing number of commentators are
pointing3 9out
areas where a lack of private property need not be
"tragic." 5 In the realm of intangibles, commentators such as Judge
Stephen Breyer,3 9 6 Tom Palmer,3 9 7 and Stanley Liebowitz3 9 8 take the

position that, at least in some branches of the publishing industry,
property in works of expression is unnecessary to deter depredation or
to provide incentives for creators. In addition, since a market in copyLEGAL STUD. 321 (1985) (suggesting that entitlements assigned to an "open class" of persons-for example, a privilege assigned to the public to use creative works-are less likely to
lead to effective markets than are entitlements assigned to a "closed" class-for example,
exclusion rights assigned to individual creators).
394. For tangible property, fences and physical force can enable owners to exclude
others even absent state-enforced property rights, and exclusion in turn encourages market
bargains. (Someone who wants an object locked in a warehouse will pay to obtain it, for
example.) Inexpensive reproduction methods, however, make intangible property especially
vulnerable to excludability problems. The more difficult it is to exclude nonpayors, the more
tempting free-riding becomes. See Gordon, FairUse, supra note 14, at 1610-14 and the sources
cited therein (the public goods problem).
395. Garrett Hardin employed a "tragic common" abstract model to dramatize the difficulty of using voluntary coordination to solve population problems, and property teachers are
now accustomed to using the model to demonstrate why private property rights in land might
be more desirable than treating land as a commons. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, in ECONOMIc FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAw 2 (B. Ackerman ed. 1975); see also
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1975) (demonstrating that the

self-interest of all individuals in a group can be frustrated by group coordination problems).
It is simply a model, however, showing one of several possibilities. Commons may not be
tragic. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently PublicProperty,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). See generally Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41 (suggesting
that a mixed regime can be more efficient than a "pure" property regime). Further, eliminating even inefficient commons can impose very real human costs. See BARRINGTON MOORE, JR.,
SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 20-29 (1966) (historical account of the

human costs imposed by the enclosure movement in England).
396. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3. Judge Breyer examined several aspects of
the book publishing industry and expressed doubt about the need for copyright in some of its
segments. He did not go so far as to recommend that copyright be abandoned. Rather, he
recommended, to no avail, that Congress not adopt the extensions of copyright it was then
considering.
397. See Palmer, supra note 6. Palmer argues that a range of devices exist to "internalize
the externalities" of intellectual products without intellectual property rights, such as technological fences, tie-ins with noncollective goods, and contractual arrangements. Id. at 287-300.
Though he believes copy-privilege is therefore more consistent with efficiency than is copyright, id. at 303, his preference for that regime is also grounded in his belief that intellectual
property poses unacceptable conflicts with tangible property entitlements and the "voluntary
regime" based upon them, id. at 303-04.
398. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination,supra note 21 (recommending the "fair use" doctrine to implement an efficiency criterion). He suggests that price
discrimination by journals may make copyright relief against photocopying by libraries unnecessary. Id. at 192-94.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3581843

July 1989]

MERITS OF COPYRIGHT

1437

righted works is likely to impose significant "deadweight losses" 39 9 and
transaction CoStS, 400 these and like-minded commentators, such as Arnold Plant, and Robert Hurt and Robert Schuchman, suggest abandoning copyright protection where these costs are not outweighed by
40
positive incentive effects. '
The economic focus of intellectual property criticism is not surprising. As the prior discussion has made clear, the entitlement structures
of intellectual property, like the structures underlying all forms of private property, enable economic markets to form. 4 02 The relevant Constitutional clause exhibits an instrumental approach to intellectual
property, authorizing Congress "To promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ' 40 3 In
the copyright area, at least until very recently, the Supreme Court has
consistently stressed copyright's economic role, stating that reward to
in a system aimed primarily
the author is a "secondary consideration"
40 4
at increasing social welfare.
399. With tangible property, it is at least conceptually possible to have "perfect competition." For example, for tangible property, marginal cost, long run average cost, and price can
(hypothetically) all be equal. When this occurs, anyone who is willing to pay a price above
marginal cost can obtain the resource, and the producers' costs will be covered. With intangibles, this alternative is unavailable. The choice is between allowing free-riders (which
will raise the prospect of producers' costs not being covered and thus potentially result in
undercreation of new works) or giving the creator a right to control copying and other particular forms of use (which, barring perfect price discrimination, can result in fewer copies or
uses of those works that are made). "Deadweight loss" represents the economic costs of the
second choice. To explain further:
[C]onsumers who value the work at more than its marginal cost but less than its
monopoly price will not buy it.... [This] results in a "deadweight loss," measured
by the total of the consumer surplus that would have been reaped by the excluded
consumers and the producer surplus that would have been reaped by the copyright
owner had he sold the work to them.
Fisher, supra note 5, at 1702 (footnotes omitted).
As a result of intellectual property rights, the price charged can be greater than the marginal cost of copying. For example, when a competitor copies a computer program written by
someone else, the marginal cost per copy will likely be low: the costs of a new floppy disk and
of using a computer or other copy device for a few minutes. Yet the person who invested a
great deal in initially creating that intangible will need to charge more than the marginal cost
of copying in order to recoup her investment. Copyright excludes the competitor from putting identical floppies on the market, making it possible for the owner of the program's copyright to charge a price that more than covers marginal cost, but at the expense of the
deadweight loss. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14; Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying,
and Price Discrimination,supra note 21, at 183-88.
400. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 316-18, 329-50; Hurt & Schuchman,
supra note 25, at 430-32.
401. Plant, supra note 25, and Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 25, set forth what has become the basic form of the normative economic inquiry into the merits of copyright.
Liebowitz shows how an inquiry balancing deadweight costs against incentive benefits might
be conducted on a systemic level. See Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, supra note 21, at 183-88. Fisher suggests how the inquiry might be conducted on a
case-by-case basis. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1698-1744.
402. See text accompanying notes 210-231 supra.
403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
404. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); see also Twentieth
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But it is one thing to suggest that the system serves economic goals
and employs markets to achieve a rough compromise between authors'
claims to reward and the public's needs, and quite another to suggest
that intellectual property rights for creators are only justifiable when the
public gains something it would not otherwise have had. Yet most economically oriented commentators ordinarily take the latter stance.
Sometimes even the Supreme Court seems to take that position. For
example, the Court wrote of patent rights: "The patent monopoly...
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge ....

The

inherent problem was to develop some means of weeding out [and rewarding with a patent] those inventions which
would not be disclosed or devised
40 5
but for the inducement of a patent."
Under such a view, an inventor or author could not claim to deserve
property rights as a reward for her effort or in recognition of her psychological investment in the creation. Instead, a creative person could
claim property rights only if those rights would help the public. One
might call persons holding these views "encouragement" theorists, because they are united in believing that copyright is justified only to the
extent that it encourages authors to generate new works.
The extent to which intellectual property rights are in fact necessary
to bring forth new works and the question of whether on the whole or
in particular industries intellectual property rights do more harm than
good are matters that raise complex empirical questions beyond our
ability to resolve here.40 6 But we can make some important observations about the premises of such economic positions. To do so, the
material in this section will first describe the underlying structure of the
encouragement theorists' arguments and explore its potential justifications. I conclude that the most plausible defenses for the encouragement theory are inadequate. I then go on to suggest that the most
attractive feature of encouragement theory-its sensitivity to the public's interests-can be better integrated into copyright law by other
means.
1. Structure of the encouragement theorists' argument.
Essentially, the encouragement theorists adhere to the principle of
wealth maximization, under which one asks "whether a policy seems
likely to give its beneficiaries the equivalent of more dollars than it
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954). But cf. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (stating
that copyright law is also designed to assure authors a "fair return for their labors"); see also
notes 447-450 infra and accompanying text.
405. Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1965) (emphasis added).
406. There probably is no set of data available to answer the question on a general basis.
See Priest, supra note 24, at 19-20.
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seems likely to take away from its victims." ' 40 7 William Fisher has re-

cently applied this economic criterion, suggesting that an economically
oriented judge should aim to refuse copyright protection whenever
such protection would not yield sufficient incentives to outweigh the
deadweight losses 40 8 that society would have to bear if the copyright
owner's suit succeeded. 40 9 Sole reliance on the wealth-maximizing criterion to grant or deny copyright is highly questionable.
The dominant purpose of American statutory copyright is to provide incentives, and copyright can properly be viewed as an economic
doctrine. But developing a coherent economic theory does not require
blind pursuit of untrammelled wealth maximization, even if that were
possible. Rather, we may seek to maximize wealth, subject to some
constraints. One such constraint may be some creators' claims to deserve a degree of control or payment; while desert may not be the only
component ofjustice, it does have a weight that deserves respect.
The normative ambiguities inherent in using the wealth maximization criterion are well known. One is the difficulty of using the criterion
to set initial entitlements. Wealth maximization depends on prices; and
prices depend on, among other things, the distribution of resources. A
search for "the" wealth-maximizing distribution is likely to fail because
of its inherent circularity. 4 10 Putting that foundational difficulty aside,
another problem with wealth maximization is its apparent failure to
take into account issues of distributional justice or noneconomic measures of desert. Some proponents of the wealth maximization approach
seem to suggest that any action that leads to a larger gross total is desir407. Richard S. Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of ParetoResource Misallocation,
28 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1975) (footnotes omitted); see also R. POSNER, supra note 210, at 10-12.
For a critical review of this criterion of many names (it is variously called "wealth" or
"value" maximization, "potential Pareto superiority," "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency," "efficiency,"
and even, most erroneously, "Pareto optimality"), see J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, supra note
358, at 262-72; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 64, at 1093-94; Fisher, supra note 5, at
1699 n.194. Under this criterion, one asks not if the affected parties consented, or even if
they are unharmed; rather the inquiry is into whether the gainers could compensate the losers
and still come out ahead, as a hypothetical matter.
For the conceptual relationship between wealth maximization and Pareto superiority, see
note 426 infra.
408. See note 399 supra (explaining deadweight loss).
409. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1698-1744; see also note 440 infra (discussing Fisher's
analysis). Fisher suggests that his economic approach is only one possible ground for granting users of copyrighted works the privilege of fair use treatment. He also advances substantive noneconomic conceptions of what might constitute the good life, and recommends that
his pure economic approach be modified (but not abandoned) accordingly. Fisher, supra note
5, at 1744-79. References to Fisher in the following discussion apply to him when he is wearing his economist's hat.
Fisher is well aware of the normative problems in using economics as he does, see id. at
1695-97, 1698 n.190, which is in part why he presents a "utopian" analysis, id. at 1744. To
the extent that Fisher stands by the antienforcement recommendations of his economic approach, see id. at 1766-83, 1794-95, 1795 n.586, he is fairly grouped among the encouragement theorists for our purposes. To the extent that he does not, he is nevertheless an
accurate expositor of the encouragement theorists' presuppositions.
410. J. COLEMAN, supra note 206, at 108.
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able, regardless of its impact on individuals. 4 11 For example, if group A
would bear the burdens of a change that benefits only group B, most
observers would demand some showing that group B deserved to receive this boon and that there was some reason why members of group
A were the appropriate persons to provide it. However, advocates of
the wealth maximization criterion tend to argue that as long as group
B's economic gain exceeds group A's economic loss, the change is desirable. Such a focus on aggregate wealth unjustifiably 4 12 ignores the
moral claims that the members of group A have to be recognized as
4 13
individuals.
Often "law and economics" advocates temper their approach by
suggesting that persons disadvantaged by a wealth-maximizing move
can be compensated after the fact. 4 14 However, the encouragement
theorists do not urge that creators be compensated for a lack of copyright protection. The absence of a principle to justify the distribution
of gains and losses is therefore telling.
But even if a wealth-maximizing economist possesses no explicit distributional preferences, distinct distributional patterns do result from
any given programmatic recommendation. One can identify that pattern and then use independent standards to judge whether the distribution is appropriate. The encouragement theorists' arguments appear
consistent with this particular distributional principle: Consumers are
entitled at a minimum to have whatever price and quantity of intellectual products would be available to them in a world without intellectual
property rights.
This normative stance has long been apparent. For example, Hurt
and Schuchman inquire whether the "copyright system induce[s] the
creation of new goods which would not have been created in the absence of copyrights. '4 15 Similarly, Stanley Liebowitz argues that
"under a more 'optimal' copyright law," copyright protection would
not be extended to creators who require no remuneration for their efforts. 4 16 As noted above, the Supreme Court took this position toward

See, e.g., J. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 273.
412. Various attempts have been made to supply an ethical basis for the criterion; none
has thus far proved convincing. See, e.g., J. COLEMAN, supra note 206, at 111-22 (analyzing
Judge Posner's defenses of the criterion); see also Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiencv?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 563, 573-84 (1980) (analyzingJudge Posner's defenses of wealth maximization); id. at
584-90 (outlining further questions to be addressed if wealth maximization were to be justified by Kantian principles).
413. SeeJ. COLEMAN, supra note 206, at 105-22, 355-56 n.25; Dworkin, supra note 412, at
583.
414. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOmics 7-10,
105-21 (1983) (discussing equity and efficiency).
415. Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 25, at 425.
416. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Pice Discrimination,supra note 21, at 188.
Note that although Liebowitz uses solely economic criteria, he never says explicitly that he
believes such economic analysis is all that should matter in the area.
411.
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17
patent law. 4

Copyright law, unlike patent, historically has not conditioned its
grant of legal protection on an inquiry into each work's novelty or other
level of contribution to "science and the useful arts."'4 18 Nor have
judges considered it permissible to deny copyrightability when a defendant proves that the plaintiff would have created the work without
the incentive of copyright protection. 4 19 Rather, fairly broad rules
grant copyright to virtually all works within specified classes. Nevertheless, these broad rules have been subject to analysis by encouragement
theorists, who have had to go beyond an inquiry into whether individual works need intellectual property incentives.
An illustration of their approach may be helpful. Liebowitz suggests
the following method of analyzing the economic effects of copyright
rules. Some works come into existence only because copyright allows
their creators to maximize their revenues by limiting the number of
copies available to the public and thus receiving a higher price per
copy. 4 20 As to these works, Liebowitz implicitly argues, the concept of
deadweight loss is irrelevant and should be disregarded. This is plausible; after all, society does not lose when copyright protection results in
a low quantity of copies produced if the work would not have been introduced at all but for the protection. Anything is better than zero. As
to works that would have come onto the market even without copyright,
however, deadweight losses do make society worse off than it would
have been in a world without copyright. Liebowitz therefore recommends weighing the costs of the "unnecessary" loss against the benefits
bestowed upon the public by those works that exist only because of
copyright incentives. 4 2 1 Where the positive economic value of a particular extension of copyright protection is less than the "unnecessary"
deadweight loss it causes, he argues that an economic inquiry would
417. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971, 973 (1989); note 405 supra and accompanying text.
418. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 859-60 &
n.20 (5th Cir. 1979) (copyright protection can be granted regardless of individual work's contribution to science and useful arts; patent law distinguished), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
419. Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding telephone book that plaintiff was statutorily mandated to produce was copyrightable,
reversing District Court denial of copyright on the ground that copyright protection was not
necessary as an incentive to produce the work); see also Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 11112 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (governmentally commissioned work held copyrightable), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 948 (1982).
420. It is well known that a single producer, shielded from competition and able to
charge only a single price, would produce [a quantity lower than the quantity that
would be produced under conditions of pure competition where free entry were allowed] and sell at [a price higher than the price that would be received under conditions of pure competition].
Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Pice Discrimination, supra note 21, at 185. When
copyright is introduced, therefore, and to the extent it provides some shield from competition, an "increase in the quantity of intellectual products is accompanied by a decrease in the
quantity of physical embodiments produced of any particular intellectual product." Id. at 186.

421. See id. at 186.
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recommend abandoning the right. 4 2 2
Liebowitz's calculation is again built upon a distinct premise: Consumers should not be made worse off by the adoption of intellectual
property rights than they would be in a world of copy-privilege. The
economic analysis may be appealing in its intricacy, but why should a
world with copy-privilege provide the baseline for comparision? This
distributional premise, the only one consistent with the encouragement
theorists' work, is equivalent to asking whether the consuming public
would consent to adopt an intellectual property system if it understood
where its own best interest lay. 4 23 Why should consumers be entitled

to demand that copyright give them compensation (in the form of new
works) for any diminution in the access the consumers would have had
in a world without copyright?
2.

Potentialjustificationsfor encouragement theory.

Perhaps we should use a copy-privilege regime as the baseline because a safe, agnostic starting point forjustifying an entitlement pattern
(here, copyright) is to ask whether those who seem to be its immediate
losers (here, potential copiers and other users) will in the end be better
off than they otherwise would have been. Anthony Kronman names
this general approach "Paretianism," after Vilfredo Pareto, the economist whose seminal work on the criteria of social welfare has been important to today's law and economics movement. Kronman defines
Paretianism this way: "[Paretianism] states that a particular form of advantage-taking should be allowed if it works to the longrun benefit of
those disadvantaged by it, but not otherwise. '4 24 Kronman adds,
"[T]he baseline against which we are to measure changes in the welfare
of the disadvantaged .

.

. is represented by the situation in which the

advantage-taking in question is legally forbidden. '4 25 More familiarly,
a move from allocation X to allocation Y is commonly said to be
"Pareto superior" if no one would be harmed by the change and at
4 26
least some would benefit.
422. Id.
423. The encouragement theorists would probably disclaim the use of any distributional
premise and instead claim to be applying only the wealth maximization criterion. See text
accompanying note 411 supra. I am attributing to the encouragement theorists a distributional criterion which those theorists themselves have not explicitly adopted but which is most
consistent with the structure of their arguments.
424. Kronman, supra note 359, at 486.
425. Id. at 491-92.
426. If the change is Pareto superior in the sense that no one is made worse off by the
change, then an economist following Pareto could recommend that the change be adopted.
To illustrate how this and related criteria operate, assume that in allocation X, Lincoln has
seven bushels of wheat, and Washington has four bushels. Assume further that under some
proposed law regarding land usage their respective wealth will change. Call the output under
the proposed legal allocation Y, and assume that the law might have either of two possible
results, allocation Y-1 or allocation Y-2. Under allocation 1"1 both farmers will have seven
bushels. Allocation Y-1 is Pareto superior to allocation X. Lincoln is not hurt, and Washing-
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Demanding that legal rules work to the long-term advantage of the
have-nots, 42 7 or at least leave them substantially unharmed, eliminates
most grounds of complaint the have-nots might assert. 428 When one
has no way to distinguish between the haves and the have-nots, it therefore makes some sense to adopt Paretianism as a criterion for judging
whether a specific change should be adopted. If one were to concede
for argument's sake that there were no way to distinguish the claims of
authors and users, 4 2 9 then one might indeed be tempted to ask (as the
encouragement theorists seem to do) whether adopting copyright benefits users in the long run.
Pareto, however, offered no guidance on the question of what 4an
30
appropriate starting point might be from which to measure harm.
ton has gained. Pareto superiority would support adopting the new law if it were certain that
allocation Y-1 would result from it.
What if the result were different? Assume that in allocation Y-2 both farmers will have six
bushels. Then the law will hurt Lincoln, who had seven bushels under allocation X. The total
amount of wheat in allocation Y-2 (12 bushels) is greater than the total in allocation X (11
bushels), and is thus wealth-maximizing. Nevertheless, a Paretian economist would not recommend adoption of the law. Allocation Y-2 is not Pareto superior to X because Lincoln
would be hurt by the shift.
If trades are possible, then any increase in the total amount of resources could be Pareto
superior. To obtain allocation Y-2, for example, Washington might agree to trade some of his
prospective wealth increase in exchange for Lincoln's consent. If Washington agrees to pay
Lincoln 1.5 bushels if the new law is adopted, the "final" distribution in allocation Y-2 would
be 7.5 and 4.5, which is Pareto superior to seven and four. Thus, when trades are possible,
Pareto superiority and wealth maximization converge. When trades are not possible-as they
often are not in the real world-applying the individualistic Paretian criteria does not always
produce the same results as applying an aggregative efficiency criterion.
If any alteration in an allocation X will harm someone, then that allocation X is "Pareto
optimal." Pareto was quite aware that there would be "an infinite number of non-comparable
optima[l points]." R. CIRILLO, THE ECONOMICS OF VILFREDO PARETO 43 (1979). An economist strictly following Pareto could make no recommendations about what might be preferable to a Pareto-optimal point. Id. at 43-44. On the other hand, an economist willing to "sum"
the welfare of all affected persons and unconcerned with how that welfare was distributed
would feel free to recommend the allocation that yields the highest gross total. This economist might recommend switching to allocation Y-2 because it increases the community's total
food supply (from 11 bushels to 12) even though in the process one farmer suffers deprivation without compensation. If the resources in the allocations to be compared differ from
each other (wheat and butter, for example), a wealth-maximizing economist followingJudge
Posner would use prices to measure their comparable value.
427. Thus, a copy-privilege proponent might apply Paretianism to ask what legal rules
would in the long term benefit the public who wants, but may not have, access to a work.
428. Some complaints might remain-inequality, for example. The have-nots might argue that even if the change does not reduce their material well being, they would object to it if
the increase in others' level of welfare is likely to sharpen already existing disparities. Also, a
governmental decisionmaker's judgment about whether a change makes someone worse off is
likely to be less reliable than that person's own judgment; further, the objection might be
raised that whatever the welfare effects, the actual consent of the persons being affected
should be sought. SeeJ. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 193-205 (suggesting that
Kronman's Paretian criterion overlooks the distinction between compensation and consent).
429. See notes 444-445 & 516-533 infra and accompanying text (suggesting that authors'
claims have a distinctly different basis than users' claims).
430. See R. CIRILLO, supra note 426, at 42-44 ("Pareto dismissed the problem of an optimum distribution of wealth as one of concern to social ethics rather than to economics ....
The task of the economist, according to him, is to discover only the maxima of utility for a
community rather than 'the maximum utility of the community.' "). On the importance of
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One might equally well ask, therefore, whether adopting copy-privilege
benefits authors in the long run.
Without a specification of a normatively appropriate starting point,
the Paretian approach offers as little assistance as did the consent criterion, and for the same reasons.4 3 ' Essentially, criteria in both approaches are indeterminate unless joined to a specification of whose
consent or welfare should be guaranteed and which state of affairs
(copyright or copy-privilege) should bear the burden of proving itself
Pareto superior to the other. As Bruce Ackerman has observed,
[u]nless a legal rule is Pareto-superior to all other feasible rules [in the
sense that no one would object to the adoption of that rule], there is a
compelling need to advance one or another normative argument which
one group should be made better off at the exseeks to explain why
43 2
pense of another.
The Paretian approach of asking whether a change is in the longterm interest of those who seem to lose in the short run makes the most
normative sense when there is some satisfactory basis for judging that
the "losers" can appropriately claim to be entitled to what they currently have. It is in this fashion that legal commentators usually employ
Paretian analysis. In the fifth amendment "takings" context, for example, Frank Michelman suggests that property owners might be fairly required to bear without compensation certain losses if, in the long run,
allowing such losses would be in the owners' interest due to benefits
over time from leaving others' similar losses
they would receive
43 3
uncompensated.
In the copyright area, I have employed an analogous approach to
argue that uses of a copyrighted work should be treated as "fair" and
thus noninfringing when such treatment would not make the copyright
owner significantly worse off than she would be if the copyright were
enforced. 43 4 Most notably, when transactional barriers or other factors
cause a market failure that prevents the owner from selling to potential
buyers in that market, and compulsory licenses or other forms of market "cure" are unavailable, the copyright owner loses no revenue that
might otherwise have been available if consumers in that market are
given free use of the copyrighted material. Granting fair use in that
context largely yields a "Pareto superior" result: helping the public
starting points in determining harm, discussed in a criminal law context, seeJ. FEINBERG, supra
note 190, at 31-64, 127-86 (notions of "harm" are dependent on specification of baseline
from which harm is to be measured).
431. See text accompanying notes 357-376 supra.
432. Bruce A. Ackerman, Introduction to ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAw, supra
note 395, at xiii; see also id. at xi-xii (inconsistent states of the world can all be Pareto optimal);
cf J. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 358, at 265-66 (using the Scitovsky Paradox to show
that even inquiries into "net" benefit can yield indeterminate results).
433. See Michelman, supra note 172, at 1194-96, 1222-24; see also Kronman, supra note
359, at 485 n.32.
434. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14.
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43 5
without doing substantial harm to the copyright proprietor.
But such analyses take as their starting point a specification, from
the legal system or from independent normative criteria, that some
possessions are legitimate. In the fifth amendment takings context, for
example, the constitutional text itself designates some protection for
existing property allocations. 4 36 In the copyright context, the statutory
framework within which fair use has evolved and the judicial origin and
history of the doctrine both reflect a concern with protecting the copyright owner's interests. 4 3 7 Thus, an economic view of fair use should
"begin[] with the premise that a copyright owner is ordinarily entitled
to revenue for all substantial uses of his work within the statutorily protected categories. ' 438 From that statutory baseline, a Paretian approach can be used to identify those occasions where granting
defendants a privilege to copy will not result in long-term harm to
43 9
copyright owners.
By contrast, even in the context of a statutory doctrine like "fair
use," the encouragement theorists implicitly begin with the notion that
the public is entitled to the most it can practicably receive. Both
Liebowitz and Fisher suggest that courts concerned about economic
impact should honor only those entitlements whose enforcement will
help to induce the creation of new works and should use the fair use
doctrine to deny relief when enforcing a copyright
owner's rights would
440
not economically benefit the public as a whole.
What is the basis for such a position? It will not suffice to answer
that "the net total of social wealth will be greater if the law works to the
benefit of consumers rather than authors," for this discussion began
with the proposition that such arguments require distributional con435. Id.
436. Michelman, supra note 172, at 1165.
437. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
438. Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1651.
439. See Gordon, FairUse, supra note 14, at 1606 n.38. The inquiry into fair use need not
end with Paretian economics. See id. at 1601. There may be grounds for honoring a public
entitlement to free use even if the use causes harm to the copyright owner-for example, first
amendment considerations or an analogue to the common-law "privilege for extreme need."
See notes 457 & 518 infra and accompanying text (free speech interests); text accompanying
note 75 supra (privilege of necessity); text accompanying notes 519 & 523-526 infra (analogic
privilege to use copyrighted work in situations of exigency).
440. See Liebowitz, supra note 21. Fisher builds on the Liebowitz approach, arguing:
The task of a lawmaker who wishes to maximize efficiency, therefore, is to determine,
with respect to each type of intellectual product, the combination of entitlements
that would result in economic gains that exceed by the maximum amount the attendant efficiency losses. Roughly speaking, the "gains" associated with a given combination of rights are the value to consumers of those intellectual products that would not
have been generated were creators not accorded those rights.
Fisher, supra note 5, at 1703 (footnote omitted, emphasis added); see also id.at 1705 n.218
(quoting Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1613 n.8 1), where he compares wealth-maximization with my approach: "[Gordon argues] that courts interpreting the fair use doctrine should
not strive to achieve 'optimal' levels of copyright protection, but rather should accept that 'the
copyright law treats the outcome of the ordinary copyright transaction as normatively
equivalent to an 'optimal' result.' "
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straints-some guidelines about how the costs and benefits of the "net
total" will be distributed-to be normatively acceptable. 4 41 Is there
some other ground for arguing, as the encouragement theorists and
Fisher 44 2 implicitly do, that consumers are entitled to be made no
worse off by copyright than they would have been in a hypothetical
world of copy-privilege where they would have been free to share in
whatever works were created? In short, is there some ground for arguing that the world of copy-privilege should provide the baseline?
3.

Baseline entitlements: In search of a distributionalprinciple

It is hard to see why the public should be entitled to share in a work
merely because it would have come into existence without the incentive
443
of property rights. True, the public may argue, as did Proudhon,
that persons who have labored at a task for their own reasons should
have no right to claim payment from others for it. But authors may
reply, quoting Mill, that "[i]t is no hardship to anyone, to be excluded
from what [we] have produced: [We] were not bound to produce it for
[a stranger's] use, and he loses nothing by not sharing in what otherwise would not have existed at all."' 444 In my view, defensible and com-

mon sense notions of morality are in accord. Someone who works to
produce something of value would seem to deserve a reward for her
4 45
efforts from those who benefit.

Encouragement theorists have as yet offered no full-scale philo441. See text accompanying notes 411-415 supra.
442. As indicated above, while Fisher is not convinced of the merits of "encouragement" theory, he both asserts it as the correct interpretation of the economic stance and
advances recommendations for nonenforcement of copyrights based upon it. See note 409
supra.
443.

Pj. PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 61 (1966).

444. See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY Rirrs 41 (1977) (footnotes omitted). I have
borrowed this hypothetical exchange between Proudhon and Mill from Becker, and the following discussion of Locke is also indebted to him. The quotation in text is from JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, bk. II, ch. 2, § 6, at 142 (1872); for Locke's
similar sentiments, seeJ. LOCKE, supra note 203, §§ 25-51.
445. John Locke is probably the best known advocate of the view that labor can, in appropriate circumstances, give rise to property rights. His central position regarding property
is as follows: "For this Labour being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man
but he can have a right to what that is oncejoyned to, at least where there is enough, and as
good left in common for others." J. LOCKE, supra note 203, § 27 (emphasis omitted). The
intuitive appeal of Locke's position is well illustrated byJudith Jarvis Thomson's observation:
If "enough and as good" is truly left after the laboring creator claims ownership in what he
has made, then how could the Lockean argument fail to be "a sufficient condition for property
acquisition"? Judith Jarvis Thomson, Properly Acquisition, 73 J. PHIL. 664, 666 (1976) (suggesting that satisfying Locke's proviso that "enough and as good" remain is a sufficient basis-though not the only possible basis-for morally satisfactory property acquisition). Of
course, the intuition contains within it a series of analytic steps--concerning, among other
things, the relationship between normative claims and legal claims-that need to be addressed. Full examination of the question of authors' desert is clearly beyond the scope of
this article. For my current views of the philosophic issues, see W. Gordon, Restituionary
Impulse, supra note 55; W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14 (examining at some length
the Lockean position, particularly the impact of Locke's proviso on intellectual property
issues).
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sophic defense for their position that individual desert should be irrelevant to the allocation of intellectual property rights. 44 6 I shall therefore
concentrate on analyzing the two defenses based in positive law that
they offer to buttress their position that the public should not have to
reward its creative benefactors any more than maximally serves the
public's own self-interest. The first such defense is to argue that the
relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are solely concerned
with providing economic incentives, not creators'just deserts. The second is the notion that copyright is inconsistent with the common law,
which itself is seen as setting a baseline of copy-privilege.
As for the first issue, the Court has indeed often suggested that
Congress has given a primarily economic interpretation to the Constitution's patent and copyright clause. 4 4 7 But economic concerns are not
always viewed as the only goals of the statute. In its most recent decision construing the fair use doctrine, Harper& Row, Publishers v. Nation
Enterprises, the Supreme Court suggested that, although economic and
other measures of social need remain important considerations, even
448
under the statute an author deserves a reward for labor.
In Harper & Row, President Ford had sued The Nation magazine for
having published a short article summarizing highlights of Ford's forthcoming memoirs. As a result of this "scoop," Time magazine, which
had contracted to publish an authorized excerpt, declined to do so,
costing Ford at least $12,500 from Time plus book sales lost as a result
of The Nation's story. The Court held that the Nation article, which included some 300 to 400 words of verbatim quotation, was not a fair
use, despite President Ford's public position. The Court wrote, "The
rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the
store of knowledge a fair return for their labors. '44 9 Fisher has argued
that the Court's fair return language stamps its "imprimatur" on the
446. For brief but stimulating discussions of some of the philosophical issues raised by
intellectual property, see, e.g., the very recent piece by Edwin C. Hettinger,JustifyingIntellectual
Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989) (arguing there are "significant shortcomings in the
justifications for intellectual property," id. at 51); Fisher, supra note 5, at 1744-66 (setting
forth a utopian vision distinct from encouragement theory); Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note
3, at 284-91 (reviewing several potential "noneconomic goals served by copyright law" and
concluding that none "seems an adequate justification for a copyright system," id. at 291);
Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 25, at 421-25 (critically reviewing the extent to which Lockean,
Kantian, and reward theories could provide justification for copyright).
447. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1610 & nn.62-63.
448. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). References to
'just deserts" have previously appeared in the cases, though ordinarily and ambiguously
joined with economics. For example, in Mazer v. Stein, the Court stresses copyright's economic purposes but then concludes its opinion with the declaration that "sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered,"
347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953). See also Whelan Assocs. v.Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1235 n.27 (3d Cir. 1986) ("just merits" and public benefit both a concern).
449. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (citing and giving a new twist to Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). Despite its solicitude for authors' 'just
deserts," Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156 n.6, the Court in Aiken emphasized economics primarily. Id at
156. In Harper& Row, the Court seems to have promoted fair return from being an "immedi-
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theory "that authors and inventors deserve a reward for their labor and
should be given it regardless of whether they would continue their work
'
in the absence of compensation.

4 50

In its treatment of economics, too, the Court did not adopt the encouragement theorists' emphasis on seeking maximum totals of social
wealth. Rather, the Court consistently pointed to authors' entitlements
as the starting points from which markets evolve. Thus, the Court
noted that ordinarily copyright enforcement serves both the author and
the public45 1 and stated that " 'the effect of the use upon the [author's]
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work' ... is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use."' 45 2 The Court went
on to define the author's entitlement over potential markets quite
broadly. 4 53 Finally, the Court seemed to approve the view that for economic analysis to justify nonenforcement of an author's exclusive rights
under the fair use doctrine, a Paretian economic standard, using the
author's interest as the baseline for measuring harm, would have to be
satisfied. It cited the view that fair use should be granted to a copier on
economic grounds only if the copyright holder would lose no substantial revenues as a result-only if "the market fails or the price the copy' 4 54
right owner would ask is near zero."
The Court's double-barreled concern with both public welfare and
authors' claims to deserts, is not unprecedented. 4 55 The most famous
statement of this dual concern is probably James Madison's argument,
in support of the proposed federal Constitution's patent and copyright
clause, that "the public good fully coincides... with the claims of individuals." '45 6 The Supreme Court's recent return to a notion of individate effect" of copyright, Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156, to being an independently important goal for
which copyright was "designed," see Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546.
450. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1688-89.
451. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559.
452. Id. at 566.
453. Id. at 568; see also Fisher, supra note 5, at 1670-71 & nn.53-54.
454. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566 n.9. This approach is proper when using Paretian
economics itself as a basis for awarding fair use, though there can be other grounds for awarding fair use to a defendant, see note 439 supra, such as free speech interests. See note 457 infra
and accompanying text (indicating that the Supreme Court would disregard both economics
and authors' claims of personal desert in the pursuit of free speech interests).
455. The precedent is not unambiguous, however. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 219 (1954) (not only affirming authors' desert claims, see note 448 supra, but also asserting that "[t]he copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration") (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948));
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT

LAW 3-6 (1961) (suggesting that copyright has "an important secondary purpose: To give
authors the reward due them for their contribution to society," id. at 5, but that "the ultimate
purpose of copyright legislation is to foster the growth of learning and culture for the public
welfare, and the grant of exclusive rights to authors for a limited time is a means to that end,"

id.).
456. The full defense of the clause was as follows:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right of common law. The right
to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public
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ual claims makes the copyright statute a rather unsteady base for the
solely aggregative approach of encouragement theory.
Admittedly, the Harper & Row decision would have been far different had President Ford been using his copyright to suppress facts.
Then noneconomic arguments based on "First Amendment values" implicated by writings on "matters of high public concern" probably
457
would have been sufficient to trump the author's copyright claim.

But since Ford and his authorized publishers were "poised to release
[the work] to the public," the Court viewed copyright as fulfilling its
role as "the engine of free expression. ' 4 58 In such a context, they did
not inquire into whether enforcing or denying the copyright owner's
claim would lead to "value maximization." Rather, given the functioning market and the lack of any noneconomic claim that could credibly
be made on behalf of the public, the Court insisted on "deference to
the scheme established by the Copyright Act ' 4 5 9 and indicated that the
appropriate starting point was the Pareto-like inquiry: "[W]ould
the
460
reasonable copyright owner have consented to the use?"
When a noneconomic ground for fair use, such as free speech, is at
issue, arguably neither the "encouragement theorists" nor the Paretians have much to contribute. But when making an economic inquiry, at
least in the absence of an extremely strong public need, Harper & Row
suggests that the correct baseline is an author's entitlement. The apparent public-benefit orientation of the constitutional clause did not
46 1
bar consideration of authors' claims to fair return through copyright.
good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most of them have
anticipated the decision of this point by laws passed at the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Given the reference to
English precedent, it might be argued that Madison's emphasis on individual claims rested on
an (arguably inaccurate) view of the common law. At least one historian suggests that
Madison's view was independently based. See BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 128-30 (1967) (arguing that the founding fathers saw intellectual
property rights as "inherent"); id. at 130-31 (quoting Madison as suggesting that one reason
for his support of the clause was the "dread[] that the few will be unnecessarily sacrificed to
the many").
457. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555, 556, 559 (partially quoting Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983)).
458. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 557, 558.
459. Id. at 545.
460. Id. at 550 (quoting ALAN LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958), re-

printed in SENATE CONM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CoNG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION
STUD. Nos. 14-16, at 15 (1960)).
461. An element of uncertainty is introduced by the Court's very different approach
when patent law, rather than copyright, is at issue. See note 417 supra and accompanying text.
In the patent area, issues of inventors' fair return may receive quite limited solicitude, since in
that area the Court has given significant force to the preamble to the Constitution's grant of
power to Congress, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts." See Graham
v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (the clause imposes limits on what patent standards
Congress may use); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 971,
975-80 (1989) (giving a public benefit interpretation to the "Patent Clause" in the context of
preempting state rights over the duplication of useful objects). The same constitutional
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The second possible foundation for the encouragement theorists'
opposition to rewarding creators is their perception that copyright is
inconsistent with the common law pattern, though one can interpret
claims based upon the common law in several ways. The encouragement theorists might be using a specific historical referent-such as the
period before adoption of the Statute of Anne, England's first copyright statute-to provide either a historical or normative baseline.
Howard Abrams, for example, contends that if there was no common
law copyright in the early period, then public access should be the starting point. 46 2 He scrutinizes two well known early cases that examined
the question of common law copyright 4 63 and concludes that both decisions held that copyright did not exist in eighteenth century England or
4 64
America.
Abrams has brought new light to the interpretation of these muchdebated cases. 4 65 Even if his interpretation is correct, however, and
clause provides Congress its copyright powers. So far, however, the preamble has played a
much smaller role in copyright cases.
One reason for the disjunctive treatment given to copyright and patent may be the belief
that copyright is virtually unable to violate the clause.
[U]nlike patents, the grant of a copyright to a nonuseful work impedes the progress
of the sciences only very slightly, if at all, for the possessor of a copyright does not
have any right to block further dissemination or use of the ideas contained in his
This is not true in the patent area, where an inventor has the right to
works ....
prevent others from using his discovery.
Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 859-60 & n.20 (5th Cir.
1979) (obscenity of plaintiff's motion picture held not a bar to copyrightability; constitutional
clause viewed as applicable, but to be interpreted by "lenient standard"), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
917 (1980). If granting copyright protection does not impede cultural or scientific growth,
then the purposes mentioned in the clause would not be undermined if Congress chose to
give authors more protection than a strict calculation of economic benefit would warrant.
Copyright cases that treat the clause's purpose language as applicable tend to give it no
clear effect. See, e.g., Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1498-99 (11th Cir. 1984)
("We agree that the Constitution allows Congress to create copyright laws only if they benefit
society as a whole rather than authors alone.... [But] a copyright holder need not provide the
most complete public access possible."), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985). Several cases go
further, holding that the phrase "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" does
not articulate purposes that "limit Congress's power to legislate in the field of copyright."
Hutchinson Telephone Co. v. Frontier Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128, 130 (8th Cir. 1985); accord Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 111-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[W]e cannot accept appellants' argument that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on
congressional power." Id. at 112), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982).
462. Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding the
Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119, 1134 (1983) (arguing that if England
and the American states gave no common law copyright in published works at the time the
relevant statutes were adopted, "then the right of the public to easy access to copyrighted
works is properly the dominant theme of our copyright jurisprudence").
463. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Donaldson v. Becket, 1 Eng. Rep.
837, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774); see also 17 LuKE GRAVES HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HisTORY OF ENGLAND 953-1003 (1813).

464. Abrams, supra note 462, at 1185-86.
465. Donaldson and Wheaton are notoriously subject to varying interpretations. Donaldson
has usually been taken to indicate merely that common law rights in published works had
existed but had been preempted by the new statutory rights that substituted for them.
Abrams, supra note 462, at 1156. This indeed appears to be the interpretation the United
States Supreme Court gave to English law in one of its important early copyright decisions.
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even if one grants the appropriateness of using common law as a standard by which to evaluate legislation, the puzzle remains why that particular era in judicial history should matter more than any other. In
fact, that time period seems a particularly inapt choice for making a
judgment about the tendencies of the common law, for an explicit procopyright regime was unnecessary given prevailing institutional structures and the rudimentary publishing technology. English and American legislatures stepped in with statutory copyright as soon as
institutional changes and advances in printing technology made it possible for someone other than an authorized publisher to reap significant
revenues from the mass duplication of manuscripts. 4 66 There was thus
little opportunity for the gradual development of common law rights.
Perhaps the encouragement theory advocates point to the failure of
eighteenth century common law to provide postpublication rights
against copying because they believe that any time a statute is passed,
the legislature is prima facie obligated to guarantee all those affected an
equivalent level of welfare to what they had before. This would be a
novel theory of legislation and one that would make it difficult for injustices ever to be corrected. 4 67 Even if it were valid, it would not explain
the conclusion from the common law starting point that copying should
be permitted, for it is hard to see that the public was able to do any
substantial amount of copying in the prestatutory period.
Common law intellectual property rights clearly have been considered legitimate in the twentieth century United States. In 1912 the
Supreme Court held that common law copyright was a form of "property" that could be used to restrain the public from making copies of
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (referring to "the contest
in the English courts, [which] finally decided ...

whether the Statute of...

Anne ....

which

authorized copyright for a limited time, was a restraint to that extent on the common law or
not "). As for the Court's own decision in Wheaton, it can be interpreted simply as holding
that Pennsylvania did not carry into its jurisprudence a postpublication common law copyright that existed in England, see Abrams, supra note 462, at 1183, and aspects of the Wheaton
opinion "invite[] disbelief of its fundamental conclusion that there was no common law copyright," id. at 1183.
Abrams suggests that the Supreme Court in Wheaton did not have access to the full opinions of the House of Lords in Donaldson and that faulty historiography may have been the
reason both for the commentators' assumption that common law copyright existed prior to
the Statute of Anne and for the Wheaton opinion's "historically incorrect and unnecessary
concession," id., concerning the existence of common law copyright under English law. Even
if so, both the assumption and the concession have nevertheless had their effect on legal
development; by the late twentieth century, at least, some forms of common law copyright in
publicly disseminated works have become well established in the United States. See notes 468476 infra and accompanying text.
466. See B. KAPLAN, supra note 8, at 1-37. Abrams seems to recognize this, noting:
"[T]he common law never developed any law of copyright. This did not result from the common law either accepting or rejecting any particular idea or theory of copyright, but from the
fact that other sources of governmental authority were already regulating the printing and
distribution of books." Abrams, supra note 462, at 1134 (footnote omitted); see also Landes &
Posner, supra note 2 1 at 331 & n. I (discussing institutional as well as physical methods of
controlling copying in early England).
467. Possession does not in itself guarantee legitimacy. See text accompanying note 387.
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material that was not private in any meaningful sense, so long as the
material was technically unpublished, such as musical compositions or
plays that had been widely performed but never distributed in printed
form. 46 8 Though not extended to formally "published" works, this

common law copyright cannot be explained away as a mere outgrowth
of the laws of tangible property4 69 or of privacy. In 1918, applying a
pre-Erie notion of federal common law, the Court held that one news
service could be enjoined from commercially using the publicly posted
and circulated news of its competitor. 4 70 This decision, International
News Service v. Associated Press (INS v. AP), spawned the "misappropriation" doctrine that protects a protean form of intellectual property and
which serves as one of the bases upon which a number of states have
adopted and aggressively expanded state intellectual property rights in
the past two decades. 4 7 1 In 1977, the Supreme Court upheld a performer's state common law copyright in his "human cannonball" performance against a constitutional challenge 4 72 and indicated in dicta
that one basis for the claimed right's legitimacy was its similarity to established common law principles of unjust enrichment. 47" Although
copyright in published, written work remains an exclusively statutory
preserve, 4 74 the evolution of sister doctrines in areas not covered by
statute suggests that had the legislature not acted, the courts could
47 5
have and likely would have.
Whether such common law rights are necessary or wise is not at
issue here. In fact, since state common law intellectual property rights
468. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 434-36 (1912). No commentator questions that
this common law copyright in technically unpublished but nonprivate works both existed and
survived the enactment of the early copyright statutes. State common law copyright in unpublished and unfixed works still exists, though the Copyright Act of 1976 preempted state common law copyright infixed works. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982).
469. As the Court made clear in Ferris, 223 U.S. at 436, common law copyright could be
asserted regardless of whether the infringer had somehow obtained a copy of the work or had
simply memorized what she had heard during a performance.
470. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918).
471. See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411,421-29 (1983); David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 151-54 (1981) ("[fln 1972, the law
seemed suddenly to metastasize." Id. at 153.).
472. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (first amendment does not bar a state from imposing common law liability on a television station that
broadcast a "human cannonball" act in its entirety as part of a news show). Although plaintiff
Zacchini framed his cause of action as a "right of publicity," it was in fact a common law
copyright in an unfixed performance. See Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players,
805 F.2d 663, 674-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (state law "rights of publicity" in performance are
equivalent to copyright).
473. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. "The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is
the straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will." Id. (citing
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?. 31 LAw & Com'Emp.
PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
474. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
475. However, Congress's decision to legislate rights for auth6rs undoubtedly has
helped state judges to feel that such grants are legitimate. Cause and effect in these matters
can be hard to trace.
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supplement a set of federal intellectual property statutes that already
grant creative persons a wide range of legal remedies, a strong case can
be made that the promiscuous grant of state law rights over the last
twenty years has gone well beyond justifiable prudential or even moral
limits and that the courts have sometimes ignored the preemptive effect
of relevant federal law. 47 6 Wise or not, potentially preempted or not,

twentieth century courts seem to consider the issue of common law intellectual property as settled in a direction directly contrary to
Abrams's understanding.
Another strategy of the encouragement theorists might be to identify some more general pattern that has operated among various common law doctrines over time and argue that an authorial claim to
deserve rewards is inconsistent with the basic distribution of entitlements found in this larger scheme. Although such a methodology is
controversial, it has sometimes yielded important insights and, if applicable, might minimize the impact of the particular common law cases
that explicitly grant rights over nonprivate works. For example, an encouragement theorist might argue that economic efficiency is the overall goal of all common law, and that courts which grant intellectual
property rights have done so solely in an effort (however inept) to apply
the efficiency criterion. An argument at such a level of generality is
hard to evaluate. Here we can simply note that most of those who have
examined the claim that the common law solely pursues efficiency have
77
4
rejected it.

On a somewhat less abstract level, some encouragement theorists
seem to prefer arguing that the protections copyright gives are structurally or functionally different from other common law restraints. The
notion may be that if copyright is an "exception[al]" and "queer branch
of our jurisprudence," as some commentators have suggested, 47 8 then
we should view the institution with suspicion, tolerating it only when it
makes the public better off than in a world without copyright. But, as I
demonstrated earlier, such interpretations overlook the fact that copyright is structured in the same way as other forms of property and
serves many of the same functions. It is worthwhile to expand on that
discussion here.
An example of the differences that encouragement theorists see be476. See W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14, pt. III, at 3-13, 26-31; Lange, supra
note 471, at 147 (urging protection for the public domain); note 506 infra.
477. Arthur Leff wrote classic pieces evaluating the then-new "law and economics"
movement; among other things, he argued that economics is only one of several goals that the
law does or should serve and that no culture has a unitary goal system. Arthur Leff, Law and,
87 YALE LJ. 989 (1978); see also Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REv 451 (1974) (book review of Richard Posner's ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF
LAw). For recent scholarship on the question of whether the common law is or should be
primarily concerned with economics, see, e.g., J. COLEMAN &J. MURPHY, supra note 358, at 273;
Coleman, supra note 230; Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 41.
478. The words in quotation marks are adapted from Umbreit, supra note 16, at 932.
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tween intellectual property rights and common law rights in tangible
property is Judge Breyer's argument that "[a]n intellectual creation differs radically from land and chattels. Since ideas are infinitely divisible,
property rights are not needed to prevent congestion, interference, or
strife."'4 79 Yet Judge Breyer's first two asserted distinctions are simply
classic economic problems. As Kitch and Denicola suggest, intellectual
property law, like tangible property law, prevents problems such as
congestive overexposure and wasteful forms of exploitation. 480 As for
"strife," intellectual property law addresses battles to control intellectual products that can be as strife-provoking as battles over any other
source of power or money.
A variety of common law case decisions also rejects the implication,
sometimes found in encouragement arguments, that the common law
gives the public a right to share in what others have made. Ordinary
property and tort are fairly individualistic, and neither gives strangers
claims to others' efforts or possessions without some kind of special
justification. 4 8 1 The most obvious illustration of this individualism is
the tort rule that strangers have no "duty to aid" each other, even in
extreme emergencies. 48 2 If the common law gives people no prima facie claim to each other's efforts, then it would seem to give them no
83
such claim to each other's work product. 4
But even if the common law gives no prima facie rights to share, does
it give the public privileges to take advantage of others' effort? Judge
Breyer argues that it does: "The fact that the book is the author's creation" does not "seem a sufficient reason for making it his property,"
479. Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 288-89.
480. Denicola, supra note 187, at 637-41; Kitch, supra note 21.
481. For example, necessity gives rise to a right and a privilege to enter others' property
only to prevent "serious harm," see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197 (1965); see also
note 483 infra.
482. See Epstein, supra note 82, at 197-201 (discussion of the "no duty to aid" rule).
483. Various forms of public law, most notably taxation, do indirectly give persons
claims on each other's work product, and the government uses tax funds for many purposes
other than the relief of dire need. But public law does not need to be internally consistent.
Legislatures can give, and legislatures can take away. At issue in the discussion here is
whether any pattern in the common law can be utilized as a guide or reference point by
lawmakers, whether legislative or judicial, who might be persuaded of the normative relevance of such patterns.
It might also be argued against the position in the text that the "no duty to aid" rule
serves a limited set of purposes and that outside of the context of personal acts of rescue
those policies are inapplicable. Most notably, it could be argued that the law refuses to impose a general duty to aid because of the intrusiveness inherent in giving rights over others'
efforts, but that no such incursion on liberty would be threatened by a duty to share, which
gives rights over others' things. The law does indeed respond to this distinction, by giving
rights of access to others' property (but not their efforts) in emergencies. But even that right
does not extend to all cases in which invalidating the owner's exclusion rights would serve
"efficiency" but is generally limited to cases of dire need. See Ploofv. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71
A. 188 (1908) (boating family had right to use dock on private island during hazardous
storm). Furthermore, even in cases of dire need the common law requires persons who have
availed themselves of others' property to pay for what they take. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp.
Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W.221 (1910).
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because "[w]e do not ordinarily create or modify property rights, nor
'4 84
even award compensation, solely on the basis of labor expended.
But when labor creates something of value to others, the recipient is
not always privileged to keep the benefit without giving recompense;
48 5 It
the common law of restitution often does award compensation.
does not always do so, of course; there is "no single uniquely explanatory web" 48 6 in the law, and the desire to reward deserving laborers is
one goal among many. Yet were there no common law intellectual
property, restitution law itself might provide the basis for an author to
recapture the value of his effort 4 8 7 from those who intentionally use his
4 88
creative work.

The link between unjust enrichment and intellectual property has
been made before. For example, the Supreme Court has accepted, as
one argument in favor of common law intellectual property rights, the
"straightforward" rationale of preventing unjust enrichment. 4 89 And
just as unjust enrichment can give rise to "quasi-contract," the
Supreme Court has used similar principles to hold that an intangible
intellectual product can be "quasi-property" as between someone who
490
labors to produce it and a parasitic competitor.
A potential problem with my antiencouragement reading of unjust
enrichment law is the denial of compensation under the common law of
484. Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra note 3, at 289 (emphases & footnote omitted).
485. Restitution law has two components: It provides remedies for other substantive
areas of law, and it provides its own substantive base for recovery under the rubric of "unjust
enrichment." See 1 G. PALMER, supra note 170, § 1.1, at 1-6.
486. Left, Law and, supra note 477, at 1009.
487. There are two possible routes to this result. One is a right to monetary recovery,
the other a right to enjoin use of the benefit and to require its return. Copyright law gives
rights to both monetary and injunctive remedy; what remedies might evolve from restitutionary principles is a complex question. Yet any sort of remedy might induce potential users of a
creative work to bargain with authors for permission before thefact, thus reducing the need to
tackle difficult questions such as how much a use of a plaintiff's product was "worth" to the
defendant, or whether it is appropriate to give a plaintiff a veto over a complex structure that
a defendant has created in which plaintiff's work is one small but essential brick.
488. See generally W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55. This is a controversial claim, and I discuss it here only briefly. Among other difficulties is the question of how
much generalization is appropriate. Thus, as Lord Goff and Gareth Jones noted of English
law in 1966, "[TIhough all restitutionary claims are unified by principle, English law has not as
yet recognised any generalised right to restitution in every case of unjust enrichment."
R. GOFF & G. JoNEs, supra note 56, at 13 (1966). American law and commentary are more
willing to generalize than the English on this point, and even England seems to be moving in
that direction, see LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUrON 15-16
(3d ed. 1986) (omitting the prior edition's caveat), but particular precedents on particular
fact patterns continue to be quite important.
489. See note 473 supra.
490. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 242 (1918) (news is
"quasi-property" as between the parties); id. at 239 ("defendant ... is endeavoring to reap
where it has not sown"); see Dawson, supra note 127, at 1415-16 (interpreting INS v. AP as a
restitution case). The Court's use of the word "quasi" here may have been more than a hedging device. Quasi-contract represents a decision that it is fair to act as if there were a contract;
the Court seemed to be making a similar decision in INS: Under the circumstances, it was fair
to act as if there were property.
Note that economics also played a role in the decision. See LVS, 248 U.S. at 241.
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restitution to anyone "who, incidentally to the performance of his own
duty or to the protection or the improvement of his own things, has
conferred a benefit upon another. '49 1 Under this rule, "volunteers"
and "officious intermeddlers" are not ordinarily entitled to restitution
and, conversely, persons who receive benefits from volunteers and intermeddlers are not ordinarily required to pay for what they have received. By voluntarily writing and publishing a book, a person furthers
his own interests and, except as to someone who has bargained with the
author for production of the work (such as a patron, granting agency,
employer, or contract-publisher), the author is a sort of volunteer. This
might suggest that when members of the public copy an author's book,
the "intermeddler" rule would give the public a privilege to do so without paying.
But there are many exceptions to the rule that volunteers are not
entitled to payment, and copyright generally fits those exceptions. For
example, after analyzing a host of cases in which volunteers were held
entitled to recover, John Wade presented the following criteria as accounting for the exceptions: no "intent to act gratuitously"; conferral
of a measurable benefit; and offering the beneficiary an opportunity to
decline (or a reasonable excuse for not doing so).492 If these criteria
are present, Dean Wade wrote, the volunteer "is entitled to
restitution.

'4 93

Each of these criteria is present in the typical copyright case. Most
authors do not intend to act gratuitously. A copier's benefit is often
measurable; at least commercial copiers will have account books showing profit and loss figures, and the market may show the price that ordinarily would be paid for a license to copy. 4 9 4 Persons who wish to copy
the work ordinarily have a choice whether or not to do so, 49 5 and the

context in which a work is encountered or the presence of a copyright
notice 49 6 will inform users that if they do copy, someone may claim
491. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 106 (1937).
492. John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1212 (1965). Dean Wade conceded that his proposed rule went slightly beyond the
available precedent in a subset of cases not relevant to our purposes. Also, additional restrictions apply if the beneficiary refuses the benefit.
493. Id.
494. Although there may be problems in apportioning the amount of profit attributable
to use of the plaintiff's work and the amount attributable to other factors, the mere possibility
of suit may encourage the parties to deal with each other before the fact and resolve this issue
between themselves.
495. When users do not have a choice, that may mean no protection should be given.
Thus, for example, persons who want to describe the world have no choice but to use the facts
others have discovered. This is arguably one reason why, generally speaking, copyright itself
gives the discoverer of facts no copyright in them. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
496. Legislation implementing the Berne Convention may reduce the use of notices.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §§ 7(a)-(b), 102 Stat.
2853, 2857-59 (notice requirement becomes a voluntary option, but applying notices will
have certain advantages).
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payment. 4 9 7 Copiers can therefore decline the benefit if they think it
not worth the cost. Thus, Dean Wade's set of general principles, summarizing a myriad of restitution cases which did not themselves focus
on intellectual property problems, predicts copyright results. 498 Far
from being coincidence, this parallel suggests that some forms of common law intellectual property are consistent with whatever larger pat49 9
terns exist in the law.

Other restitution scholars have indirectly suggested similar results.
For example, when John Dawson investigated the issue of self-serving
intermeddlers in restitution law, he suggested several sets of reasons
behind the courts' tendency to rule that such volunteers are not entitled to recover the value of their contribution. 50 0 One set of reasons is
social and instrumental: that a volunteer or intermeddler has her own
sufficient incentives to do the good deed, 50 1 rendering a reward unnecessary for creation of the benefit. Another set of reasons is individually
oriented: that fairness to the unknowing recipient and concern with
"individual freedom of choice" demand that the recipient not be placed
under an unlooked-for burden. 50 2 A third is a concern with limits: the
possibility that requiring all "uncompensated gains" to be compensated after all would be a dangerous and impractical rule, potentially
causing societal paralysis. 50 3 Where not all of these reasons apply, one
might infer from Dawson's analysis that recovery is proper in order to
honor the benefactor's claim to deserve payment; arguably, none of
these reasons for denying payment applies to copyright. With intellectual products the incentive issue is at worst a debatable question; the
author may well have insufficient incentives to produce new works without a right of recovery. As for fairness, the copier of a work of author497. Fixation may also help to communicate this information. Estate of Hemingway v.
Random House, 23 N.Y.2d 341, 349, 224 N.E.2d 250, 256, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 779 (1968),

discussed at note 183 supra.
One type of copyright case is not consistent with Dean Wade's approach. In copyright,
even unintentional copying constitutes infringement. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding ex-Beatle George Harrison's
unconscious use of a musical phrase from the Chiffons' song, "He's So Fine," in his own song,
"My Sweet Lord," an infringement). Were copyright perfectly aligned with restitution, only a
knowing act of copying would incur liability. Copyright law in fact follows the pattern of torts
like trespass to land, under which even good faith does not protect an unknowing trespasser
from liability. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 47, at 74-75.
498. The area in which Dean Wade's principle fails to square with better intellectual
property practice is its lack of limits. The boundary problems, such as administrability and
explosive liability, are too great to be resolved only by insisting that the benefit be measurable. This divergence means that Dean Wade's rule would predict more intellectual property
recoveries, rather than fewer, than there really are or should be, so the divergence could not
easily be used as evidence helpful to those who would prefer to eliminate copyright.
499. See Levmore, supra note 289, at 113-17 (restitutionary relief for submission of
ideas).
500. See Dawson, supra note 127, at 1409-18.
501. Id. at 1413-19.
502. Id. at 1417.
503. Id. at 1412; see also text accompanying notes 171-173 supra.
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ship is ordinarily an intentional actor, rather than an unknowing
recipient who would be taken by surprise if payment were demanded. 50 4 Regarding limits, the earlier discussion showed how copyright's demarcation and fixation requirements, combined with its
limited definition of exclusive rights, can be employed to keep the
boundaries of liability tolerably narrow. 50 5 In the copyright context,
then, all the reasons for denying someone a claim to their "just
deserts" are either of doubtful applicability or absent. Professor Dawson's analysis, too, therefore indirectly suggests that intellectual prop50 6
erty is consistent with the common law of restitution.
Saul Levmore has suggested that many of the patterns in restitution
law can be explained by the courts' desire not to allow judicially compelled payments to undermine complex consensual markets. 50 7 If volunteers cannot expect to obtain restitution via the courts, Levmore
suggests, they will be induced to enter into negotiations with persons
whom they are in a position to benefit. Restitution for volunteers,
therefore, is generally disfavored. But the same logic suggests that restitution should be favored for authors. Giving authors a right to payment will not discourage voluntary bargains. On the contrary, denying
authors a right to payment causes free-rider problems that inhibit market formation, while granting a right to payment encourages markets to
form. 508 Although economic concerns are relevant to both Levmore's
and Dawson's analyses, neither commentator proves that the judges
who have developed the law of restitution have erred in starting their
504. Admittedly, some recipients know they are copying but think they are doing nothing unlawful. The clearer the law were in identifying what copying constituted "unjust enrichment," the less surprise a copier could claim.
505. See text accompanying notes 168-189 supra.
506. Professor Dawson, however, is properly wary of the unbridled application of the
unjust enrichment principle. See Dawson, supra note 127. He was correctly disapproving of
the insensitivity to the need for limits and boundaries shown by the majority opinion in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (misappropriation of "hot news"
enjoined). However, he was premature in suggesting that the Supreme Court had repudiated
INS. See Dawson, supra note 127, at 1415-16. Professor Dawson's article was published in
1974, when the Court was just beginning to reveal its tolerance for state intellectual property
in preemption cases. See id. at 1416 n. 15 (briefly referring to Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973) (state law prohibiting the piracy of musical recordings held not preempted)).
More recently, the Court has cited INS with approval, see Carpenter v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. 316, 321 (1987), and state courts have recently been quite willing to build new intellectual
property rights. See generally Baird, supra note 471. The state courts may well be courting the
very dangers of which Dawson warned, see Lange, supra note 471, and some federal courts are
being less than wary in accepting state court rights. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (singer's claim of a state right against imitation of her voice during performance held valid and not preempted).
507. See Levmore, supra note 289, at 79-81.
508. The comparison between authors and other volunteers is explored in more depth
in W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55, at 42-50; see also Gordon, Fair Use, supra
note 14, at 1610-14 (how copyright helps markets to form); cf. Levmore, supra note 289, at
121-24 (suggesting that under some circumstances granting restitution to persons for their
"profitable ideas"--a form of intellectual product-will be consistent with a desire to encourage "thick" and complex markets).
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analysis at unjust enrichment rather than at value maximization. 50 9
To the extent there is a common law pattern, then, it militates
against a starting point like the one the encouragement theorists use,
which would give each of us, regardless of special need, a "right to ...
the benefit of another's Pains." 5 1 0 The common law does not stand for
the proposition that the public has a prima facie entitlement to share in
others' works, and the common law history does not cast any burden of
justification upon copyright. To the contrary, basic common law patterns in torts and restitution law and recent developments in the common law of intellectual property all suggest that the consuming public
has no such entitlement. They even suggest that, all other things being
equal, authors have a right to payment.
One might investigate this analogic common law restitutionary right
and seek to understand how the common law balances "just desert"
against economic or other values when they conflict. 51 1 One might further seek to determine whether a claim to restitution could lead to a
property right of full ownership. That would be a long journey, which I
undertake elsewhere 51 2 and which is not necessary here. One need not
accept the notion that restitutionary claims can be an appropriate basis
for some forms of property in order to accept that authors have a better
prima facie claim to the benefits of their own creations than do users.
The encouragement theorists' economic arguments in favor of copyprivilege are therefore flawed, either because they lack a distributional
principle, or because they use a distributional principle that is not itself
easily defensible.
Distributionally sensitive philosophic arguments do exist that might
justify giving the public a baseline entitlement to whatever they could
obtain in a world without intellectual property. For example, adoption
of a "common pool" approach to human talents and energies might
509. Admittedly, Levmore gives economics center stage, and he seems to doubt that
"unjust enrichment" is a concept with much explanatory power. Nevertheless, he does not
endeavor to prove that the impulse to reward productive persons is irrelevant to the cases. In
fact, one might view his catalogue of economic reasons for not granting restitution simply as a
set of countervailing considerations that can in some cases outweigh the goal of rewarding
benefactors.
510. Locke assumes that, absent extreme need or waste, each of us "ha[s] no right to...
the benefit of another's Pains." J. LoCKE, supra note 203, § 34 (emphasis added).
511. For example, I use common law analogy to suggest that authors' claims should give
way in the face of public exigency. See note 519 infra and accompanying text. Full specification of the weights that should be given to desert claims and to competing considerations is of
course outside the scope of this article.
512. See W. Gordon, Restitutionary Impulse, supra note 55 (investigating the links between intellectual property and restitution); W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14 (exploring philosophic justifications for a legal claim to restitution, and examining the rights to
which a restitution-based or Lockean labor theory could lead). In the latter piece I conclude
that though a restitutionary or a Lockean starting point generates a much more limited range
of intellectual property rights than is usually understood to flow from such principles, the
resulting set of entitlements does contain some rights for authors that would be greater than
those generated by the encouragement theorists' starting point.
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justify giving the public something like this entitlement. 51 3 But such
arguments are hard to maintain on the merits. 5 14 Even if copyright
critics took such a stance, they would need to do so for all property
rights, not just those that pertain to intangibles. And to take a leaf from
the encouragement theorists' own book, we might demand that they
defend their adoption of such a philosophic premise so at odds with the
51 5
common law tradition.
4.

Alternative notions of public entitlement.

Although the encouragement theorists seem to be wrong in giving
the public a baseline entitlement to share in what others have produced, any acceptable system of property rights must account for the
interests of the nonpropertied for two reasons. First, it is likely that the
public possesses justified noneconomic claims just as it is likely that authors do. A second reason lies in society's material welfare. Though
economics should not be the only relevant consideration, material wellbeing has some importance. A strong public domain makes important
contributions to a nation's cultural and scientific health. An intellectual
property system must therefore be sensitive to the needs and claims of
the nonowning public as well as those of authors. 5 16 If the encouragement theorists possessed a coherent statement of nonowners' interests,
and no competing source of public entitlements were available, it might
be necessary to defer to encouragement theory. For these reasons, and
because many of the strongest doubts about common law intellectual
property rights originated in doubts about judges' abilities to set and
enforce limits, 51 7 it is important to stress that rejecting the encouragement theorists' point of view need not deprive the public of all entitlements to copy nor send legislatures and judges into the morass with no
guiding principles at all. While I cannot do more than briefly touch
513. See note 242 supra and accompanying text ("common pool" interpretation of

Rawls). In his "utopian" analysis, Fisher briefly explores the Rawlsian difference principle
and notions of desert. He does not contend that his quasi-Rawlsian theory justifies the results
of his economic theory. See Fisher, supra note 5, at 1756-62 (distributive justice); id. at 177479 (compensating creators).
514. See generally George Sher, Effort, Ability, and PersonalDesert, 8 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 361
(1979) (criticizing Rawls and arguing that personal desert can play a potentially significant
role in deciding what distribution of goods is "just").
515. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 462, at 1126-27, 1186-87 (making reference to the common law).
516. See Lange, supra note 471 (eloquently defending recognition of the public domain
and its importance).
517. See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908)
(Holmes,J., concurring) (suggesting that copyright must be limited in time to be tolerable but
doubting that courts could develop and implement appropriate limits); Letter from Oliver
Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (June 26, 1894), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETrERS 53 (M.
Howe ed. 1941) (raising a similar point); see also International News Serv. v. Associated Press,
248 U.S. 215 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a right of misappropriation
needs to be limited in ways that a legislature is best able to evaluate and implement).
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upon some of these alternative sources of public entitlement in the
space remaining, some particularly salient possibilities follow.
The most obvious source for public entitlement is the first amendment. So, for example, copyright should not be used to suppress facts
or ideas,5 18 no matter how deserving the researcher or thinker whose
efforts brought them forth.
Another source is common law analogy. The common law grants
certain privileges to nonowners against even the most traditional property rights, and such privileges could apply to intellectual property as
well. This article's prior discussion of tangible property and torts suggests that the common law could easily support at least two kinds of
entitlements for the public: a right or privilege of access in times of
public emergency or great private need 5 19 and a privilege against asser520
tions of intellectual property rights that would do harm.
The doctrine of Pareto superiority suggests yet another source of
entitlements to copy: Some limitations on authors' rights may benefit
the consuming public without harming authors. 5 2 1 Since authors are
part of the public-and in fact may constitute the part of the public
most in need of using prior works as bricks when building new worksthat some privileges to copy will aid authors more than harm
it is likely
2
them.

52

518. See the discussion of Harper& Row,Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, text accompanying notes 457-461 supra (discussing the distinction between economic grounds for fair use and
other grounds such as free speech). The "fair use" doctrine is often seen as incorporating
first amendment policies, and some authors have suggested that in addition there should be a
separate "first amendment" privilege. See 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 11, § 1.10.
There are additional reasons why ideas and facts should not be subject to exclusion
rights. This is a common phenomenon; many legal results are "over-determined" in the
sense that many independent policies could justify them.
519. See text accompanying note 75 supra (rights and privileges of entry, based on necessity). Recall that a person who enters land pursuant to a privilege of private necessity must
pay for any harm she does; a private need exception to intellectual property might be similarly
incomplete.
A "need" exception to property also appears in Locke, in the form of a "Right to the
Surplusage" of another's goods to keep one "from extre[me] want." JOHN LOCKE, THE FIRST
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 42, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 159 (P. Laslett ed. 1970).

520. A qualified do-no-harm principle not only underlies many tort rights, see text accompanying notes 79-85, but also plays a role in limiting those rights. For example, privileges
of self-defense and defense of property limit some otherwise assertable rights against battery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63-68 (1965) (self-defense); id. § 77 (defense of possession). In addition, the pattern with which restitution cases award or deny recoveries to "volunteers" can be in part explained as an attempt to avoid imposing a net harm on those who
receive the benefits the volunteers confer. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 289, at 100-08; see also
Robert A. Long, Jr., A Theoy of Hypothetical Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 415, 431 (1985) (student
author) ('Judges have limited recoveries for unsolicited benefits to the cost of the goods or
services provided, or to the value of the benefit conferred whichever is less." (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 429 (no recovery at all for benefits not measurable in dollars); W. Gordon,
Creative Labor, supra note 14 (discussion of a do-no-harm interpretation of the Lockean
proviso).
521. See note 172 supra (reciprocity) and text accompanying notes 424-439 supra
(Paretianism).
522. This point is well made by Landes and Posner, supra note 21. Note, however, that
such a position addresses the (objectively determined) welfare of classes of authors and, like all
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Let us examine these last three entitlements (to ameliorate exigency, to avoid harm, and to achieve a form of Pareto superiority) in a
bit more detail.
First, exigency: Though I contend that the law should take desert
claims into account, even if that means attaining a less-than-maximal
amount of societal wealth, I do not contend that such claims should be
"trumps." Some degrees of public need may be great enough (whether
measured economically or otherwise) to warrant giving less than full
deference to authors' claims. An exception to copyright premised on
urgent public need might, for example, privilege the reproduction of
unique copyrighted photographs that are the only evidence on an important and disputed issue of public importance.5 23 For another example, deference to public exigency might give the public rights to employ
eminent domain or other modes of mandatory sharing 524 if a misanthropic inventor sought to withhold a cancer cure from public
5 25
distribution.
Such need-based entitlements can be distinguished from those that
would arise from an encouragement theory calculus of economic value.
The issue in the common law cases giving rise to the privilege of necessity, for example, is not whether a stranger's use of the property is marginally more valuable to society than the owner's ability to exclude.
Rather, the issue is whether such exclusion would threaten specific interests (such as life) that have a special status or that have a grossly
526
disproportionate value in comparison with what is sacrificed.
such approaches is vulnerable to the claim that, to be normatively acceptable, any limitation
on rights should benefit every individual affected. Autonomy-oriented commentators might
even demand that each affected person give actual consent.
523. See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (scholar's
duplication of unique copyrighted photographs of the Kennedy assassination held a noninfringing fair use). In such a case, the issues of "need" and of free speech tend to coalesce.
524. See text accompanying notes 289-304 supra (discussing a mandatory sharing model).
525. In the ordinary case a patentee is free to suppress her invention. Special Equip. v.
Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 377-80 (1945). Justice Douglas argued that this ordinary rule was incorrect because "there is no difference in principle" between usual cases of patent suppression
and cases where the suppression put public health at risk. Id. at 383 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
The Justice assumed (I think correctly) that in the latter class of cases, which falls into our
"public need" category, no judge would be willing to enforce the patentee's exclusion right
fully:
Take the case of an invention or discovery which unlocks the doors of science and
reveals the secrets of a dread disease. Is it possible that a patentee could be permitted to suppress that invention for seventeen years (the term of the letters patent) and
withhold from humanity the benefits of the cure?
Id.; see also Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Found., 146 F.2d 941 (9th
Cir.) (suggesting that patentee's refusal to license vitamin-enriching process for oleomargarine, "the butter of the poor," might justify denying injunction against patent infringement)
(dicta), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 876 (1945).
526. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs §§ 196, 262 (1965) (privilege of public necessity available to avert "imminent disaster"); id. §§ 197, 263 (privilege of private necessity
available to assert "serious harm"); see also id. § 73 (no privilege to inflict substantial bodily
harm on one person in order to avoid similar harm threatened by an independent source;
caveat to this section intimates that such privilege might exist if the two harms are "disproportional" and the harm to be inflicted by the privileged actor is slight).
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Turning to a public entitlement against being "harmed," such an
entitlement appears to be consistent not only with the common law but
also with the desert basis for intellectual property rights. (After all, if
an author has a right against a copier arising in part out of claims to
deserve a reward for the benefit the author has given that person, consistency suggests that the "desert" justification of the right does not
extend to occasions when its exercise would result in a net harm to the
person against whom it is asserted.) 52 7 Admittedly, a privilege against
harm is fairly broad; but its principle can be seen already operating in
several existing intellectual property doctrines. For example, under the
doctrine of fair use, persons who have been maligned by a copyrighted
work are privileged to replicate the work to the extent
necessary to
52 8
make an effective rebuttal and undo the harm done.
A public entitlement against being harmed by assertions of intellectual property rights would not reenshrine the encouragement theorists'
starting point. If individuals without a special showing of need have no
prima facie entitlement to share in others' creative productions, then,
as in ordinary tort law, 52 9 their harm should be measured against what

their welfare level would have been had there been no interaction with
the other party. We would therefore measure harm resulting from an
assertion of intellectual property rights from this baseline entitlement:
what the copier's welfare would have been in a world lacking the creative person and her efforts.
Finally, the use of a Paretian criterion could give the public substantial privileges to use works created by others because authors share in
the benefits that many limitations to their rights bring. If benefits of a
certain type are likely to be reciprocal over time, it can be argued that
they need not be paid for because nonpayment does not make the immediate donor, who will later be a beneficiary, worse off. Furthermore,
53 0
if the costs of administering a tracing and payment system are high,
527. Locke's "proviso," which seems to condition a laborer's property claim on there
being "enough, and as good left in common for others," has an analogous concern with
avoiding harm. J. LOCKE, supra note 203, § 27. This is discussed at length in W. Gordon,
Creative Labor, supra note 14; see also L. BECKER, supra note 444, at 51-55 (effect on desert
claims of effects that subtract value).
528. Congress contemplated that the 1976 Copyright Act fair use provision would include such an entitlement: "When a copyrighted work contains unfair, inaccurate, or derogatory information concerning an individual or institution, the individual or institution may
copy and reproduce such parts of the work as are necessary to permit understandable comment on the statements made in the work." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 143, at 73 (discussion
of § 107). Recent court decisions affirm this approach. E.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral
Majority, Inc. 796 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) (Falwell's reproduction and distribution to
his followers of a copyrighted Hustler cartoon that ridiculed him for purposes of "stimulating
moral indignation" and raising funds held a fair use: "an individual in rebutting a copyrighted work containing derogatory information about himself may copy such parts of the
work as are necessary to permit understandable comment," id. at 1153 (footnote omitted)).
529. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 169.
530. See text accompanying note 173 supra (discussing Dawson's suggestion that tracing
the fallout of important intellectual advances would be nearly impossible).
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then artists would actually be better offreceiving no payment in reciprocal situations. As taxpayers they would have to help bear the systemic
costs of requiring compensation, and as sometime recipients of benefits
they would not want the flow of positive interactions inhibited by a requirement for unnecessary payments. Speaking more generally, if artists' claims to a "just return for their labors" generate a requirement
that authors be paid, the Paretian approach suggests that payment for
benefits should not be required when the payment system would work
53 1
to those very artists' long-term detriment.
In much of intellectual property law it is plausible to argue that reciprocity determines the location of the crucial line between the benefits
that one is legally obligated to pay for and the benefits that one can get
for free. This notion can, for example, help to explain why general
ideas (like the theory of relativity in physics or the use of perspective in
art) are not ownable under any American version of intellectual property law. Even if the generator of a new general concept may give a
benefit to the world greater than he has derived from contemporary
colleagues, that creative individual has doubtless benefited from countless ideas originated by scientific or cultural predecessors. New idea
generators will probably be far better off in a world where neither their
ideas nor those of their predecessors are owned than they would be in a
world that gave them ownership but also required them to refrain from
using others' ideas without permission. Thus authors would likely gain
from a provision in intellectual property law that made general ideas
incapable of being owned.
Similarly, much of the case law construing the fair use doctrine can
be explained by authors' implied consent. 53 2 Also, the notions of
Pareto superiority and reciprocity might generate durational limitations
like those in the current copyright and patent statutes. Most authors
and inventors would probably prefer having their copyrights and patents expire, rather than face perpetual restrictions on all their prede5 33
cessors' works.
Let me reiterate that I mean this discussion of alternative sources of
public entitlement to be suggestive rather than exhaustive. I have not
indicated beyond the barest sketch, for example, what principles should
govern priority among entitlements when they conflict. The discussion
531. Thus, the inquiry could take the following form: whether a group of persons (e.g.,
authors) who are to be negatively affected by a governmental act (e.g., limitations on intellectual property rights) would be better off with these limitations, and thus likely to consent to
them, than they would be if the limitations were not imposed. The inquiry has obvious links
not only to Kronman's applications of Paretianism, but also to Michelman's applications of a
fairness criterion, see Michelman, supra note 172, Fletcher's version of reciprocity, see Fletcher,
supra note 82, Landes and Posner's analysis of authors' ex ante economic interest, see Landes &
Posner, supra note 21, at 332-33 & n.13, and the legal construct of "implied consent," see
Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1616-18. For the summary and suggestive purposes here,
it is unnecessary to analyze the distinctions among these notions.
532. See Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 14, at 1641-45.
533. For a related discussion, see Landes & Posner, supra note 21, at 362.
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nevertheless should suffice to demonstrate that intellectual property
law is quite capable of embracing a concern with the public's welfare
without having to accept the premises of encouragement theory.
D. Autonomy of the Intangible Realm
The preceding section suggested that copyright law is appropriately
concerned with issues of fair return and that the public has no automatic entitlement to whatever they could receive in a world without intellectual property rights. It also argued that the public should have
alternative sources for entitlements. Throughout I have argued that
creators and copiers should have fine-tuned entitlements appropriate
to their particular roles in particular contexts. This section will show
parthat copy-privilege is further flawed in treating authors' and users'
5 34
ticular relationships to the intellectual creation as irrelevant.
Copyright has on strong advantage over copy-privilege: It takes
the claims of authors and users seriously in their capacities as authors
and users. In a copy-privilege regime, an author's ability to control the
use made of the work and to profit from it, and the ability of someone
other than the author to copy or otherwise use the work, depend on a
host of considerations that are largely independent of the existence of
the work and the author's and user's relationship to it.
Under copy-privilege, the law takes no active position regarding
copying in and of itself; copying may or may not take place, with or
without a state impediment, depending on the interrelationship of in5 35
dependent state policies with serendipitous physical circumstance.
In such a system, a creator's ability to obtain protection against copying
would not be responsive to any quality inherent in the person seeking
the reward, any quality of the work itself, or any characteristic of the
audience. Mere happenstance would matter5 3 6 more than the amount
of labor invested, the quality of a given work, the moral desert of a
creator, the dependence on incentives of a particular industry, a creator's emotional stake in what she has made,53 7 or the urgency of public
need for access to a particular creative endeavor.
The discussion above is replete with examples of how copy-privilege
takes its shape from background circumstance. For instance, in the discussion of the economic functions served by the entitlement package, I
534. I am particularly indebted to Bruce Ackerman here.
535. See text accompanying notes 305-307 supra (alternatives to copyright).
536. For example, under a copy-privilege regime, third parties would have privileges to
copy, but the law might forbid them from impairing other of the creator's interests, such as
the creator's interest in physical security. To the extent that protection of these other interests happened to provide some shelter for the creator's copying interests, this shelter would
be permitted. See text accompanying notes 255-264 supra (copy-privilege); text accompanying
notes 319-343 supra (exploring Rothbard's notion of copyright as contract).
537. Although this issue is given little attention here, an alternative defense of intellectual property might be erected on the ground of creators' psychological cathexis to what they
make. See text accompanying notes 208-209 supra.
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suggested that some composers might earn significant revenues simply
by using their legal rights in realty to exclude nonpayors from concert
halls. 53 8 That is, a composer could piggyback protection for her intel-

lectual product on the legal system's protection of physical security if
the composer happened to have some way of linking performance of
the work to a physical location. But what of record broadcasts? Piggyback approaches like using a right of physical exclusion to extract nocopy promises are not very effective in limiting illict copies made from
public radio broadcasts. Listeners can easily make and sell excellent
copies of what their radios receive. Reproductive technology and its
relationship to marketing patterns, not the composer's energy or talent
level or contribution to public benefit, determine what the composer
receives.
For physical exclusion to work as a mode of generating revenues, a
creator's work must be of a type that can be enjoyed by some but be
physically hidden from nonpurchasers. Contract might fairly easily
protect such works from being copied in a world of copy-privilege. If
the information necessary to copy the intellectual product can be hidden even from purchasers, so much the better for the originator. No
ornate confidentiality contracts are needed to protect a trade secret if
the device in which it is imbedded cannot be reverse engineered. But
while a manufacturer might be able to profit from an innovative process
without revealing it, authors cannot sell their books without exposing
their creations to purchasers' eyes. If concealment is impossible, and if
initial sales make the intellectual product known both to purchasers and
to third parties, creators may be unable to use their privileges of nondisclosure or their rights of contract and security of realty to obtain
5 39
revenues.
Let me repeat an example I used in another context: A soft drink's
secret recipe might be more easily hidden than the "secret" of the
safety pin and if so could be more easily protected under copy-privilege. 540 The soft drink inventor can extract confidentiality contracts

from those involved in the manufacturing process, while the safety pin
inventor cannot prevent anyone who sees his invention from knowing
how it is made. Though for all one knows fastener inventors may deserve more rewards (or need more incentives) than soft drink inventors, potential for concealment is determinative.
The same "luck of the draw" also operates on an industry-wide
scale. In any given communications or publishing industry, the existing
state of technology or complex distributional networks might allow an
authorized disseminator such an extensive lead-time advantage that a
de facto monopoly would result regardless of whether copyright were
538. See text following note 213 supra.
539. See text accompanying notes 342-343 supra.
540. See text following note 336 supra.
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available. In such a case, a copy-privilege regime would be as profitable
to authors as copyright. In an industry where reproductive technologies were more advanced, however, or where independent copiers
could easily make their wares available to customers, copy-privilege
might be fatal to authors' revenues. Yet the authors in both industries
may have produced work that is equally valuable, and the authors themselves may be equally deserving and equally attached in an emotional
sense to their work. Their future productivity might even be equally
dependent on economic incentives. The impact of copy-privilege is no
more sensitive to where economic need is greatest than it is to most
other potentially relevant concerns.
To the extent that nonproperty solutions mimic property-like results, they impose similar costs. Thus, for example, lead-time advantage, marketing devices, and various institutional or technological
arrangements can inhibit copying. Even if deadweight loss would be
less in a copy-privilege regime than with copyright, there is no guarantee that the loss that remained would be distributed in normatively appropriate ways. And where nonproperty solutions did not avail
authors, resulting in some inexpensive access to creative works, the decrease in cost would also be distributed in a largely arbitrary fashion
among consumers.5 4 1 Except if administered on an individualized basis, which would likely be impractical, 54 2 copy-privilege would not distribute the economic costs and benefits according to any systemic
principle at all.
By contrast, copyright and other forms of property fill in the gaps
left by physical control and can be fine-tuned to match a particular view
of desert or other normative strictures. A pure contract mode of allocation, unaccompanied by property rights, cannot easily reward behavior
considered desirable by the polity or make secure those interests the
polity judges worthy of protection. It can only award what the parties
have power to extract from each other-power derived largely from
tangible property rights-and then cannot protect this allocation from
543
potentially significant third-party interference. Only a mixed regime
that incorporates the possibility of property rights can be molded to
reflect appropriate notions of justice and be sensitive to the peculiar
characteristics of intellectual works and the relationships surrounding
them.
Copy-privilege simply makes the contours of the physical world too
541. Judge Breyer does, however, suggest that at least some of the impact of restraining
copyright would be distributed in socially valuable ways. See Breyer, The Uneasy Case, supra
note 3, at, e.g., 31516 (lower textbook prices).
542. See text accompanying note 309 supra (low probability that Congress could fine-tune
intellectual property entitlements on an ongoing basis). Fisher has conceded and shown by
the complexity of the economic inquiry he outlines that the encouragement theorists' version
of copy-privilege is highly unlikely to be a practical method forjudges to use in solving individual controversies. Fisher, supra note 5, at 1739.
543. Current copyright law is such a regime.
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important. It accepts the patterns of compulsion and freedom governing that world as determinative and treats the interests of authors
and users in the work as essentially irrelevant. The characteristics that
determine the fate of creators and users in a world of copy-privilege
have only an arbitrary relationship to either users' or creators'
characteristics.
Creativity is too important to human life, economically, psychologically, and culturally, to have its legal treatment subordinated to the
legal policies regulating the tangible domain. Both creators and the
persons who wish to use their works should have a right to demand that
their entitlements be defined by societal notions of the proper interests
of authors, artists, inventors, adapters, copiers, and audience, rather
than being defined as accidental byproducts of laws created with other
interests in mind. Some claims may merit granting a liberty to copy,
such as claims based on free expression interests. Some claims of use
may even merit intrusive pro-access measures, such as imposing eminent domain or mandatory disclosure if lifesaving medical secrets are
being hidden. Discrete policies should be set to accommodate the relevant interests, but in copy-privilege the law treats most of the relevant
interests as nonexistent. Copyright defenders thus can make one claim
not open to the supporters of copy-privilege: It respects the autonomy
of the intangible realm.
The initial sections of the article analyzed the components of copyright as a species of intangible property and showed the common structure underlying both intellectual and tangible property. Among other
things, that discussion revealed that all property involves compulsion.
Yet some observers, both lay and scholarly, perceive the compulsions
that emanate from intellectual property law to be more unfair than the
more familiar and thus less striking species of coercion that regulates
the tangible realm. 5 44 The article has shown, however, that copyright's
compulsion is simply the same stuff of which all property is constituted.
The two most likely regimes for regulating intangible works of authorship are copyright and copy-privilege. In a world with copyright,
persons who have not consented to restraints on their activities may
find their liberty restrained, as they may be prohibited from copying
physical things to which they have legitimate access. In a world of
copy-privilege, users have greater liberty, but then creators would be
subjected to a fate to which they have not consented. Although the
544. For example, Palmer is willing to accept compulsions that stem from power over
tangible property, such as the contractual promises not to copy that an author might be able
to extract by virtue of his power over the physical embodiments of the work of authorship. See
Palmer, supra note 6, at 291-95. He does not, however, appear willing to accept compulsions
that have independent bases arising out of policies relating to intellectual products. See id. at
263, 303-04.
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sources of compulsion may be different under copyright and under
copy-privilege, the problems are similar: One party wishes to do something to which the other party objects, and the law must choose between them.
One could use many possible normative criteria to parse authors'
and users' claims. In addition to examining claims based on "consent,"
I have examined the normative premises of most economically oriented
copyright criticism and shown its weaknesses, particularly in regard to
the use of an economic methodology blind to distributional considerations and the dependence upon a belief that copyright is suspect because of its supposed inconsistency with the common law. I then
suggested that the common law supports giving author, right to be
rewarded for their efforts. I also argued that the first amendment and
the common law provide, directly or analogically, independent sources
upon which safeguards to protect nonowners' interests could be
erected that are more finely tuned to the relevant issues than the safeguards the economic theorists could provide. In addition, a Paretian
approach to economics, emphasizing reciprocity, is available to supplement the public's privileges of use in ways that both respect authors'
claims to deserve reward and promote the mutually beneficial interchanges upon which cultural life depends.
The Supreme Court has indicated an openness to arguments based
on the notion that creative persons deserve a fair return for their labor.
In forthcoming articles I explore the nature of such desert claims and
the extent to which they might justify particular forms of legal entitlement. 5 45 As I suggested briefly earlier in this article, I do believe both
that authors deserve some reward for their labor and that their desert
claims have a weight that the law should take into account. But adoption of such desert-based arguments is not essential. What is essential
is that the choice between author and user should be made on some
considered judgment of the merits, not on the basis of happenstance
and serendipity as would occur in a realm of copy-privilege. The realm
of copy-privilege has an arbitrariness that renders it an unacceptable
method for governing creative works.

545. See generally W. Gordon, Creative Labor, supra note 14; W. Gordon, Restitutionary
Impulse, supra note 55.
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